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Abstract
This Article deals with the United States’ presence at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the domestic
and international law issues that have arisen, and the nature of the jurisdiction exercised there by
the United States. It does not deal with the operation of the prison facility. Guantanamo Bay
is near the eastern end of Cuba, 628 miles (1000 km) from the capital, Havana. It is a deep-
water harbor, protected by hills from the extremes of Caribbean weather; but it has an unhealthy
tropical climate. The forty-five square miles of the Guantanamo Naval Base have been occupied
by the United States since the Spanish-American War in 1898. Originally a coaling station, it
had been utilized for training, repairs, anti-submarine warfare, and humanitarian rescue before its
present uses. Its continued presence is deeply resented in the island State of almost twelve million
people, but the persistence of the communist dictatorship of Fidel Castro has strengthened U.S.
determination to hold on, even though the base no longer serves a military purpose.
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Hurrah for old GITMO on Cuba's fair shore
The home of the cockroach, the flea and the whore
We'll sing of her praises and pray for the day
We get the hell out of Guantanamo Bay!t
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article deals with the United States' presence at Guan-
tanamo Bay, Cuba, the domestic and international law issues that
have arisen, and the nature of the jurisdiction exercised there by
the United States. It does not deal with the operation of the
prison facility.
Guantanamo Bay is near the eastern end of Cuba, 628 miles
(1000 km) from the capital, Havana. It is a deep-water harbor,
protected by hills from the extremes of Caribbean weather; but
it has an unhealthy tropical climate. The forty-five square miles
of the Guantanamo Naval Base have been occupied by the
United States since the Spanish-American War in 1898. Origi-
nally a coaling station, it had been utilized for training, repairs,
anti-submarine warfare, and humanitarian rescue before its pre-
sent uses. Its continued presence is deeply resented in the island
State of almost twelve million people, but the persistence of the
communist dictatorship of Fidel Castro has strengthened U.S.
determination to hold on, even though the base no longer
serves a military purpose.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Spanish Colony
After Spain lost most of its empire in Latin America during
* John D. Calamari Distinguished Professor of Law, Fordham University School of
Law, New York City; Captain, JAGC, USNR (Ret.).
The author is most grateful for the research assistance of his students, Mr. Ryan
Krebsbach, '07, and Mr. Matthew Daly, '07, and the patient and skillful work of Ms. Judy
Haskell and Associate Law Librarian Kate McLeod.
t Old Navy song, recorded in 1968 by Oscar Brand. The Spanish language uses an
accent mark over the second "a" in Guantanamo. Navy practice eliminates the accent
in English, a practice followed herein.
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the first quarter of the nineteenth century, Cuba became its
most valuable colony, the source of wealth from sugar, tobacco,
and minerals, produced largely by slaves.1 In 1854, the United
States had sought to annex Cuba by purchase or other means as
a slaveholding outpost from which U.S. slaveholding could be
protected, but Northern Abolitionists would never agree to such
an expansion of slavery.2 By that time, the Cuban economy,
1. Efforts by Spain to plant a settlement on Cuba after its discovery by Columbus in
his first voyage (1492-93) did not begin until 1512 at Baracoa near the eastern tip of the
island, and, were quickly followed by other settlements with headquarters at Santiago
de Cuba, in 1515. From this outpost the conquistadors of Mexico under Cortes set out
in 1519; at the same time as an outpost on the northeast shore, Havana (San Cristobal
de Habana) was established. By 1533 native opposition to Spanish land seizures ended
as their numbers decreased from war and disease and the importation of African slaves
had begun. Sugar and tobacco plantations soon joined the mines as sources of wealth
and Spanish entrepreneurs developed Cuba into Spain's richest colony. The bloody
slave revolution in Haiti from 1791 to 1803 forced the French planters out and many of
them made the short voyage to Cuba where they were permitted to reestablish their
sugar and coffee plantations worked by slave labor. See RICHARD GOTT, CUBA: A NEW
HISTORY 11-26 (2005); HUGH THOMAS, RIVERS OF GOLD: THE RISE OF THE SPANISH EM-
PIRE, FROM COLUMBUS TO MAGELLAN 312-22, 473-91 (2004) [hereinafter THOMAS, RIVERS
OF GOLD]. The absence of Spanish language authorities is not meant to imply a lack
thereof; there is a substantial literature by Cuban, Spanish and Latin American scholars
in all aspects of Cuban history; for instance, see the bibliographies in Go-r, supra,
HUGH THOMAS, CUBA: THE PURSUIT OF FREEDOM (1971) [hereinafter THOMAS, CUBA],
and FRANK ARGOTE-FREYRE, FULGENCIO BATISTA: FROM REVOLUTIONARY TO STRONGMAN
(2006).
2. The United States, then a country half-slave and half-free, entered Cuban his-
tory at the beginning of the nineteenth century as U.S. slave-owning interests sought to
invest in or acquire the slave-dependent island. See THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 207-
32. In fact, slavery was so important to the Spanish Colony of Cuba that it survived
more than twenty years in Cuba after its abolition in the United States; slavery was
abolished in 1886, the first year of the reign of Alfonso XIII under the regency of his
mother, Queen Maria Cristina. See id. at 281-92.
Efforts to acquire Cuba by purchase were made informally after the United States
purchased Florida in 1819 but were ignored. A formal effort in 1853 occurred in the
wake of President Pierce's inaugural address in which he suggested further territorial
purchases. Secretary of State William L. Marcy offered to purchase Cuba for
US$130,000,000. In October 1854, a meeting at Ostend in Belgium of the U.S. Minis-
ters to Spain (Pierre Soul6), France (John Y. Mason) and Great Britain (James
Buchanan, future president) composed a dispatch ("The Ostend Manifesto") sug-
gesting future policy respecting Cuba, concluding that if Spain should refuse to sell,
"then by law human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we
possess the power." The Secretary of State rejected the suggestion and dismissed Minis-
ter Soul6. Nevertheless, the dispatch received wide publicity in Europe and the United
States.
Spain's colonial policy has been described as both "incompetent and tyrannical,"
especially in the 1895-1897 uprising when General Valeriano Weyler (called "the
Butcher" in the U.S. press) introduced concentration camps in which thousands of
GUANTANAMO AND U.S. LAW
based on sugar, was more closely connected to the United States
than to Spain.3
Spain retained a tight control as an independence move-
ment broke out in 1868. Interference by the United States in
1875 to assist the Cuban efforts was bitterly resented by Spain,
which succeeded in crushing the ten-year struggle in 1878.
When a new Cuban revolt occurred in 1895, Cuban revolutionar-
ies, many of them exiled in Florida and New York, sought to in-
volve the United States, which was again ready to assist in negoti-
ating independence from Spain, but Spain refused to consider
the offer and troops under General Valeriano Wyler brutally sup-
pressed the rebellion, which ended in 1897. General Weyler re-
signed when the Liberal Spanish Prime Minister Praxedes
Sagasta sought to bring peace to Cuba through negotiations and
home rule, but it was too late for negotiations.4
B. The Spanish-American War
The next year, on February 15, 1898, the battleship Maine
exploded and sank in Havana harbor,5 setting off a rancorous
call to war with Spain by several powerful newspaper editors.
Cubans died of disease and starvation. See HUBERT HERRING, A HISTORY OF LATIN
AMERICA 405-07 (2nd ed. 1961); THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 316-38.
After the end of U.S. slavery, Cuban revolutionaries from 1868 to 1898 operated
out of the United States, usually from Miami and New York where Marti, Estrada Palma
and Gomez planned the overthrow of Spanish colonialism. See THOMAS, CUBA, supra
note 1, at 293-315. See generally 2 PHILIP S. FONER, HISTORY OF CUBA AND ITS RELATIONS
WITH THE UNITED STATES 198-309 (1961); FREDERICK MERK, MANIFEST DESTINY AND MIS-
SION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 167-214 (1963).
3. See Gorr, supra note 1, at 67-70. United States predominance as Cuba's largest
trading partner continued until the total embargo on Cuban imports and exports after
the Castro revolution. See infra note 118.
4. SeeJOHN A. S. GRENVILLE & GEORGE B. YOUNG, POLITICS, STRATEGY AND AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY: STUDIES IN FOREIGN POLICY 1873-1917, at 179-200, 239-66 (1965); WILLIAM
L. LANGER, DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIALISM, 1890-1902, at 517-20 (1935).
5. Ostensibly on a courtesy call, the battleship Maine anchored in Havana harbor
on February 15, 1898. She was in fact there to protect U.S. citizens and property. An
explosion at 9:40pm destroyed the ship, which sank, killing 266 members of the crew.
The U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry blamed an external source, such as a torpedo or mine.
The official Spanish Investigation attributed the explosion to an internal source, espe-
cially a powder magazine. The U.S. press, led by William Randolph Hearst and Joseph
Pulitzer, blamed Spain and demanded war. Admiral Hyman Rickover, USN, agreed
with the Spanish investigation in his 1976 study, How the Battleship Maine was Destroyed.
See also PEGGY & HAROLD SAMUELS, REMEMBER THE MAINE 97-139 (1995). For the press,
seeJOSEPH E. WISAN, CUBAN CRISIS AS REFLECTED IN THE NEW YORK PRESS 384-447 (1934)
and WILLIAM A. SWANBERG, CITIZEN HEARST 108-73 (1962).
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President McKinley6 took action on April 11 by asking Congress
for forcible intervention in Cuba,7 and Congress responded on
April 20, 1898 with a Joint Resolution authorizing military force
against Spain.'
The long history of U.S. interests in Cuba had created suspi-
cions that the United States intended to acquire Cuba by any
possible method, largely because of substantial U.S. investment
and trade.9 To obviate the suspicions, Congress appended the
Teller Amendment to the Joint Resolution, by which the United
States denied any intention to assert "sovereignty or control"
over Cuba, which would instead remain free to determine its
own future government.'0
The President approved the Joint Resolution on the same
day and sent a simultaneous ultimatum demanding Spanish
withdrawal from Cuba." Two days later, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet
began a blockade of Cuba, to which Spain responded with a Dec-
6. William McKinley (1843-1901), from Niles, Ohio. His college studies at Alle-
gheny College were interrupted by the Civil War, in which he served at the battles of
Antietam, Winchester, and Cedar Creek, discharged as a major in 1865 at age 22. He
then attended Albany Law School and was admitted to the Ohio Bar in 1867. He prac-
ticed law in Canton, Ohio where he was elected county Prosecutor in 1869. In 1876 he
was elected to Congress as a Republican, serving twelve years, after which he was elected
governor of Ohio (1891) for two terms. As the prot~ge of the Ohio boss, Marcus
Hanna, he secured the presidential nomination in 1896 and defeated William Jennings
Bryan. He was reelected in 1900, again defeating Bryan; his first term vice president
died in 1899) and the 1900 Republican Convention forced the reform Governor of New
York, Theodore Roosevelt (elected as war hero in 1899) onto the ticket to get him out
of New York. McKinley strongly endorsed high protective tariffs and the gold standard.
His war message caused an unnecessary war as Spain had conceded earlier demands for
a cease fire and an end to the suppression of rebels. During the war with Spain, Con-
gress annexed Hawaii. McKinley said he acquired the Philippines in response to a
Christian duty to civilize the islands. He was assassinated at the Pan-American Exposi-
tion in Buffalo by the anarchist, Leon Czolgosz on September 6, 1901. See generally MAR-
GARET LEACH, IN THE DAYS OF MCKINLEY (1959).
The Congress that declared war was elected in 1896 and controlled by Republi-
cans:
House: 209 Republicans; 124 Democrats; 22 Populists; 5 Independents.
Senate: 46 Republicans; 34 Democrats; 10 Independents.
7. See 31 CONG. REc. 3699-702 Apr. 20, 1898.
8. SeeJ. Res. 24, 55th Cong., 30 Stat. 738 (1898).
9. See JULIUS W. PRATr, EXPANSIONISTS OF 1898: ACQUISITION OF HAWAII AND THE
SPANISH ISLANDS 209-51, 275-78 (1936); see also THOMAS, CUEA, supra note 1, at 271-315.
10. The Teller Amendment was offered by Senator Henry M. Teller (1830-1914).
He practiced law at Central City, Colorado. He served divided terms in the U.S. Senate
(1876-1882 and 1885-1909), and was Secretary of the Interior (1882-1885). He was the
voice of the Silver industry. See Pratt, supra note 9, at 230-48.
11. See An Act Declaring that War Exists Between the United States of America and
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laration of War on the United States on April 24; the United
States declared war on Spain on April 25, 1898,12 retroactive to
the beginning of the blockade. The U.S. naval blockading force
was established off Havana and the south coast of Cuba.
In mid-May the Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long,13 or-
dered Commodore Winifred Schley14 of the blockading squad-
ron to take possession of Guantanamo as a coaling station.
Thus, on June 7, the cruiser USS Marblehead anchored in the
outer harbor of Guantanamo, and on June 10 following a naval
bombardment15 sixty Marines from the Navy ships landed as a
covering force. A battalion of Marines-650 men-under Lieu-
tenant Colonel Robert W. Huntington, USMC, 16 landed on the
same day on the eastern side of the bay from the troopship USS
Panther and established a hillside camp. There was no Spanish
the Kingdom of Spain, 30 Stat. 364, ch. 189 (1898). President McKinley's War Message
is in 10 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 153-55 (1999).
12. The Teller Amendment states,
The United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise
sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island except for pacification
thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the
government and control of the island to its people.
J. Res. 24, 55th Cong., 30 Stat 738, 739 (1898).
13. John D. Long (1838-1915) served three terms as Governor of Massachusetts
and three terms in Congress before appointment as Secretary of the Navy by McKinley
in 1897 to 1902. Theodore Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary from 1897 to May 6, 1898,
when he resigned to join the Rough Riders. (As president (1901-1909) Roosevelt made
naval policy himself, the reason for the brief tenures of five Secretaries of the Navy.)
Long advocated an advanced naval strategy with battleships in his book, The New Ameri-
can Navy (1903). See ROBERT G. ALBION, MAKERS OF NAVAL POLICY, 1798-1947, at 323-54
(1980).
14. Winifred Scott Schley (1839-1901), graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in
1860, and commanded an Arctic Rescue Mission in 1884. In 1898 he was junior to Rear
Admiral William T. Sampson, USN (1840-1902), but, in Sampson's absence at a confer-
ence with General Shafter, Schley led the attack on the Spanish squadron at Santiago.
His retirement and early death ended a bitter controversy with Sampson over credit for
the victory. See genereally RICHARo CHALLENER, ADMIRALS, GENERALS AND AMERICAN FOR-
EIGN POLICY 1898-1914, at 81-88 (1976).
15. Col. R.D. Heinl, Jr. USMC, How We Got Guantanamo, 13 AM. HERITAGE 196
(1962). Stephen Crane served as a war correspondent and published his reports of the
action as Wounds in the Rain (1900).
16. Colonel Robert W. Huntington, USMC (1840-1917), from West Hartford, Con-
necticut. He left Trinity College to join the Army in 1861 but was commissioned in the
Marine Corps six weeks later. He served at the First Battle of Bull Run, then in the
Blockading Squadron. He later served in Tokyo, Samoa and the Brooklyn Navy Yard,
then was assigned to command the First Marine Battalion (Reinforced). He was pro-
moted to full Colonel by Presidential order because of eminent and conspicuous con-
duct at Guantanamo. He retired in 1900.
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resistance to the landing on that first day; however, Spanish
forces attacked the next night-two marines and a naval surgeon
were killed and three marines were wounded. Huntington then
moved the camp to a less exposed position.
On June 14, the Marines and Cuban guerillas aided by naval
gunfire attacked the Spanish position on Cuzco Hill. The Span-
ish force fled after 60 were killed and 150 wounded. The United
States had captured Guantanamo Bay.
Spain's Atlantic Fleet had arrived from Spain and was sta-
tioned since May 28 at Santiago de Cuba, sixty miles west of
Guantanamo. Santiago's large harbor was protected by for-
tresses manned by 24,000 troops. The U.S. Army Cuban Expedi-
tionary Force of 17,000 troops1 7 landed on the coast at Daiquiri
and Siboney near Santiago from June 20 to 26 and then began
its march on the city. On July 1, Colonel Theodore Roosevelt
led his Rough Riders in the successful battle of San Juan Hill",
and General Shafter's main force fought a battle at El Caney 9
on the same day, thereby seizing heightened positions looking
over Santiago from which the artillery could destroy the Spanish
fleet in the harbor. Before that bombardment began, Spanish
Admiral Pascual Cervera decided to escape from the blockaded
harbor, but in a running battle on July 3, the U.S. Navy blockade
Squadron (five battleships and two cruisers) destroyed four
cruisers and three destroyers of the Spanish fleet with almost 500
casualties and 1750 prisoners.2' Two weeks later, on July 17, the
Spanish army in Santiago surrendered, ending hostilities;21
Spain sought to end the war on July 26-its Pacific Fleet having
already been destroyed by the U.S. Asiatic Fleet under Admiral
George Dewey, USN, at the Battle of Manila Bay on May 1,
1898.22
Active warfare ceased on August 12, 1898; the war had
17. See FRANK FREIDEL, THE SPLENDID LITTLE WAR 56-57 (1958).
18. See THEODORE ROOSEVELT, ROUGH RIDERS 103-28 (1899); see also HERMANN
HAGEDORN, ROUGH RIDERS (1927) (novel based on Roosevelt's account).
19. See FREIDEL, supra note 17, at 142-79.
20. Id. at 192-211. United States casualties were one dead and one wounded.
21. See GRENVILLE & YOUNG, supra note 4, at 256-96.
22. See KENNETH J. HAGAN, THE PEOPLE'S NAVY. THE MAKING OF AMERICAN SEA
POWER 214-27 (1991); see also ALFRED T. MAHAN, LESSONS OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN
(1899). The obsolete Spanish fleet lost seven warships with 400 casualties. Seven U.S.
sailors were wounded. See WILLIAM R. BRAISTED, THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN THE PA-
CIFIC, 1897-1909 21-32 (1958).
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lasted only sixteen weeks. 93 Four months later, the Treaty of
Paris of December 10, 1898 restored peace between the United
States and Spain. 4 According to the terms of the Treaty, Spain
abandoned its title and claims to Cuba, while assuming Cuban
public debt. Spain ceded outright its colonies of Puerto Rico
and Guam to the United States and agreed to the cession of its
colony of the Philippine Islands to the United States in ex-
change for a cash payment of US$20,000,000. 25 This did not
end the violence and deaths to U.S. personnel. While only 385
were killed in the Cuban combat, tropical diseases killed more
than 2500 soldiers. Three years of guerilla warfare in the Philip-
pines tied down an army of 60,000 U.S. troops.26
Although the victory over Spain was very popular, the in-
stant creation of a U.S. colonial empire was not generally ap-
proved by the U.S. public. 27 A fierce newspaper battle began,
and public meetings occurred in which "Anti-imperialists" con-
fronted McKinley's "Imperialists" in a prelude to the 1900 presi-
dential election. 2' The resulting Senate advice and consent to
the Treaty with Spain on February 6, 1897 was very close, with a
vote of fifty-seven in favor, twenty-seven against-only one vote
more than the constitutional requirement of two thirds of the
eighty-four senators voting (six did not vote) .2
Spain's abandonment of Cuba proceeded rapidly after De-
cember 10, 1898, even though tropical diseases had caused the
withdrawal of most of the U.S. Expeditionary Force.30 Post-war
problems soon became apparent. Businesses had ceased to op-
erate during the revolt and war; agriculture was largely in ruins.
Cuban revolutionaries, operating from the United States for
23. See PRATr, supra note 9, at 328-45.
24. See Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of
Spain, U.S.-Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.
25. See id. arts. 2, 3, 30 Stat. at 1755-56.
26. See STUART C. MILLER, BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION: THE AMERICAN CONQUEST OF
THE PHILIPPINES 1899-1903 (1982); see also STANLEY KARNOW, IN OUR IMAGE: AMERICA'S
EMPIRE IN THE PHILIPPINES 78-195 (1987).
27. See ROBERT L. BEISNER, TWELVE AGAINST EMPIRE: ANTI-IMPERIALISTS 1898-1900
151-59, 215-30 (1968); see also Christopher Lasch, Anti-Imperialists, The Philippines and
Inequality of Man, 24J. So. HIST. 319 (1958).
28. Id. In fact, however, McKinley was reelected by an increased margin over
Bryan.
29. S. Doc. No. 62, 55th Cong. (1899).
30. Many of the U.S. deaths occurred at Montauk, N.Y., where the troops were sent
for demobilization. See FREIDEL, supra note 17, at 295-304.
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more than thirty years, assumed that U.S. democratic ideals
would immediately determine the relationship between an inde-
pendent Cuba and the United States;31 they had not foreseen
the challenges to Cuban independence in the world situation.
First, Spain had not encouraged Cubans to participate in
the higher levels of administration. Thus, few Cubans had been
trained to assume the responsibilities of governing Cuba and
many Spanish administrators remained after the army left. Sec-
ond, Cubans held strongly divergent views as to the way Cuban
democracy should develop and were unable to compromise
their political beliefs." Lastly, in the age of colonialism, the
Spanish withdrawal from Cuba could provide an opportunity to
Germany, France, or Great Britain for adventures on the island.
Among the many problems facing the McKinley Administration
and its Secretary of State, John Hay, was keeping Europe out of
Cuba until a stable democracy could be established.33
An experienced Army officer, Colonel John R. Brooke, 4
who had led the occupation force in Puerto Rico, was on the
spot and was appointed Military Governor of Cuba in January
1899 with a force of 24,000 men, a new U.S. army with prefer-
ence given to those accustomed to tropical climates-thus, an
army with large numbers of southerners and black Americans. A
small cadre of civilian employees also accompanied the military
governor.
Eleven months later, Brooke was replaced by the United
States' most talented colonial administrator, Colonel Leonard
31. See THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1; see also Gorr, supra note 1, at 104 -10.
32. See PRATr, supra note 9; see also DANA G. MUNRO, INTERVENTIONS, DOLLAR Di-
PLOMACY IN THE CARIBBEAN, 1900-1921, at 24-37 (1964).
33. John Hay (1838-1905), born in Indiana, A.B. Brown University 1858, then to
Springfield, Illinois, admitted to Bar in 1861; served as a private secretary to President
Lincoln. After Lincoln's death he served in diplomatic posts in Paris, Madrid, and Vi-
enna (1865-70); journalist in New York 1870-75, served as Assistant Secretary of State
1879-81. Under McKinley, he was Ambassador to United Kingdom in 1897-1898 and
Secretary of State from 1898 to 1905. Author of Abraham Lincoln: A History, written with
John G. Nicolay in ten volumes (1890), novels and poetry. He announced the "Open
Door Policy" respecting China to prevent further dismembering of China after the
Boxer Rebellion (1901) and negotiated the construction of the Panama Canal. See
THoMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 402-14.
34. John R. Brooke (1838-1926) from Pennsylvania, served in the Civil War battles
of Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg; wounded at Cold Har-
bor; promoted Major General 1897, led invasion of Puerto Rico before assignment to
Cuba.
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Wood,35 a medical doctor who had initially commanded the
Rough Riders in battle. During Wood's twenty-nine-month ad-
ministration, improved sanitation and standards of public health
led to the conquest of yellow fever.3 6 Furthermore, unemployed
guerillas were disarmed and paid. Public schools were organ-
ized, a census was held and municipal elections were held to es-
tablish local governments. Elections for a Constitutional Con-
vention were held early in Colonel Wood's tenure and assem-
bled in Havana on November 5, 1900. In the Constitution of
February 21, 1901, the delegates adopted a U.S.- type of govern-
ment for their non-federal or unitary nation with a two-house
Congress and a popularly elected president.
Before the Constitution became effective, the United States
forced a virtual recognition of a U.S. protectorate over Cuba
when Wood told the delegates that the U.S. army would remain
until a permanent relation with the U.S. was fixed. 7 Senator
Orville H. Platt (R. Conn.) had attached an amendment to the
crucial appropriation for the U.S. Army in May 1901 with the
following stipulations: (1) Cuba may not become party to a
treaty impairing its sovereignty in favor of another State; (2)
Cuba may not commit itself to an "excessive foreign debt" be-
yond its capacity to repay based on ordinary revenue receipts;
35. Leonard Wood (1860-1927) from Winchester, NH, M.D. Harvard 1884; joined
U.S. Army Medical Corps in 1886. In 1897, in Washington, he became acquainted with
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt. He organized and commanded
the Rough Riders (1898), assisted by T.R. who became commander when Wood was
given command of a cavalry brigade. Wood became military governor of Santiago
before his appointment as military governor of Cuba from December 1899 to May 1902,
having been promoted Brigadier General (1901) and Major General (1903). After
Cuba he was sent to the Philippines as Governor of Mindanao, then given command of
the U.S. Army in the Philippines (1906-1908). On return to Washington he was ap-
pointed Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army (1910-1914). He became a candidate for the
Republican presidential nomination in 1916 and 1920, but lost out to Charles E.
Hughes in 1916 and Warren G. Harding in 1920. Harding appointed him Governor
General of the Philippines (1921-1927). See I HERMANN HAGEDORN, LEONARD WOOD
261-392 (1931);JACK MCCALLUM, LEONARD WOOD 147-96 (2005).
36. See MOLLY CALDWELL CROSBY, THE AMERICAN PLAGUE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF
YELLOW FEVER, THE EPIDEMIC THAT SHAPED OUR HISTORY 31-33; 93-106; 122-49; 161-92,
203-07 (2006). A Cuban doctor, Carlos Finlay had identified the mosquito as the
source in 1881, but he was ignored until the Sanitary Commission with Major Walter
Reed (M.D. Virginia 1869) demonstrated mosquito transmission of the disease. Major
William Gorgas supervised the elimination of the disease in Havana and later at the
Panama Canal.
37. See 1 HAGEDORN, supra note 35, at 328-33; 338-65. Wood personally favored
U.S. annexation of Cuba.
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(3) the United States will maintain Cuban independence and
may intervene at any time to preserve life and property, and (4)
Cuba will sell or lease territories for coaling stations for the U.S.
Navy.3 8 Secretary of War, Elihu Root 9 was undoubtedly involved
38. See THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 448-52; see also Go-rr, supra note 1, at 108-
12; DAVID F. HEALY, THE UNITED STATES IN CUBA 1898-1902, at 116-78 (1963). Orville H.
Platt (1827-1905) from Washington, Conn., lawyer, Senator 1879-1905, where he served
as a Member of the Foreign Relations Committee. Senators were divided on the wis-
dom of the protectorate over Cuba but finally regarded it as inevitable.
The U.S. version of the Platt Amendment says:
The President of the United states is hereby authorised to "leave the govern-
ment and control of the island of Cuba to its people" so soon as a government
shall have been established in said island under a constitution which, either as
a part thereof or in an ordinance appended thereto, shall define the future
relations of the United States with Cuba, substantially as follows:
1. That the government of Cuba shall never enter into treaty or other
compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to
impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or per-
mit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military
or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion
of said island.
(A) That said government shall not assume or contract any public
debt, to pay the interest upon which, and to make any reasonable
sinking fund provision for the ultimate discharge of which the ordi-
nary revenues of the island, after defraying the current expenses of
government, shall be inadequate.
(B) That the government of Cuba consents that the United States
may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban
independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the
protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharg-
ing the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of
Paris on the United States, now to be assumed by the government of
Cuba.
(C) That all acts of the United States in Cuba during its military
occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful rights ac-
quired thereunder shall be maintained and protected.
(D) That the government of Cuba will execute, and, as far as neces-
sary, extend, the plans already devised or other plans to be mutually
agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the island, to the end
that a recurrence of epidemic and infectious diseases may be pre-
vented, thereby assuring protection to the people and commerce of
Cuba, as well as to the commerce of the southern ports of the United
States and the people residing therein.
(E) That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed consti-
tutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto being left to future ad-
justments by treaty.
(F) That to enable the United States to maintain the independence
of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its defense,
the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands
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in drafting Platt's Amendment, which was unopposed by the Mc-
Kinley Administration.
The February Cuban Constitution was amended on June 12,
1901 to incorporate the Platt Amendment into the Constitu-
tion. 40 To guarantee the undisturbed future of the Platt Amend-
ment, it was also incorporated into the Treaty of May 22, 1903
between the United States and Cuba.4' This treaty was negoti-
ated and signed in the year when President Theodore Roosevelt
would often boast, "I took the isthmus. '4 2 The 1903 treaty with
the newly independent Panama granted to the United States
"full sovereignty" over a ten-mile-wide zone in the middle of Pan-
ama in which the new canal would be built.4 3
To these treaties must be added the U.S. protectorate over
the Dominican Republic, initially contained in the 1905 treaty
necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to
be agreed upon with the President of the United States.
An Act Making Appropriation for the Support of the Army for the Fiscal Year Ending
June 13, 1902, ch. 803, pts. I-VII, 31 Stat. 895, 897-98 (1901).
39. Elihu Root (1845-1937) from Clinton, N.Y., A.B. Hamilton College (1864),
LL.B. New York University (1867). After private practice in New York City he was ap-
pointed U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York (1883-1885). He served in
the New York State Constitutional Convention (1894) and became an expert in effi-
cient reorganization of government. He was appointed Secretary of War by President
McKinley in 1899, after the inefficient administration of the dismissed Secretary Alger.
He continued under President Roosevelt, who appointed him Secretary of State in
1905. He was elected Senator from New York in 1909 and served until 1915 when he
returned to private practice. After the First World War, Root was a drafter of the Stat-
ute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and served as U.S. Representative
to the Conference on Naval Armaments Limitation. He was awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize in 1912. See generally PHILIP C. JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT (1938).
40. The Constituent Assembly approved the addition by a vote of fifteen to four-
teen after considerable debate. The winning argument asserted that the change was
necessary in order to make General Wood and the U.S. Army leave. See GoTr, supra
note 1, at 110-12; THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 453-57.
The U.S. Navy initially sought to buy four port areas as coaling stations; two leases
were agreed to, Guantanamo on the south shore and Bahia Honda on the north shore.
By 1912, no further efforts were made to acquire Bahia Honda.
41. Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, T.S.
No. 418, 6 Bevans 113.
42. "I took the isthmus." Theodore Roosevelt, Speech at University of California,
Berkeley, March 23, 1911; see also HENRY F. PRINGLE, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: A BIOGRA-
PHY (1931); EDMUND MORRIS, THEODORE REx (2001).
43. Convention between the United States and the Republic of Panama for the
construction of a ship canal to connect the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans
("Hay-Bunau-Vailla Treaty"), U.S.-Pan., Nov. 18, 1903, 33 Stat. 2234; see DAVID McCuL-
LOUGH, THE PATH BETWEEN THE SEAS: THE CREATION OF THE PANAMA CANAL 1878-1914,
at 353-94 (1979).
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between the United States and the Dominican Republic that was
rejected by the U.S. Senate but carried out by President
Roosevelt as an executive agreement.4 4 These situations, and the
threats of Germany and Great Britain to blockade Venezuela be-
cause of failure to pay debts, produced the Roosevelt Corollary
to the Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed in the President's message
to Congress of December 6, 1904. Theodore Roosevelt stated
that the United States would "reluctantly" intervene as an inter-
national police force in nations of the Western hemisphere
where "[c] hronic wrong doing, or [a governmental] impotence
[resulted] in a general loosening of the ties of civilized soci-
e ty. "
4 5
The Platt Amendment authorizing such intervention re-
mained at the heart of United States-Cuba relations for thirty-
three years until the first administration of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt when the Amendment was abrogated under the "good
neighbor" policy by the new treaty of May 29, 1934,46 which also
contained a provision for the continuation of a lease by Cuba to
the United States of the naval station at Guantanamo for a yearly
rental, the lease to continue until both sides agree to its termina-
tion.4 ' During the Platt Amendment the United States inter-
vened militarily in Cuban affairs in 1906, 1912, 1917, and 1921,
but the economic intervention was not sporadic but permanent.
The troubled sugar-based economy and the political chaos
of the twenties did not stop U.S. investment in the island. The
British historian, Richard Gott, has summarized this period:
Cuba had become a significant producer of immense wealth,
44. 4 UNPERFEcTED TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1976, at 19-22
(C. Wiktor ed., 1979).
45. President Theodore Roosevelt, Fourth Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 6,
1904, in 15 COMPILATION OF MESSAGES AND PA'ERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 6894, 6923; see
DEXTER PERKINS, THE MONROE DOCTRINE, 1823-1826, at 322 (1927); DEXTER PERKINS,
THE UNITED STATES AND THE CARIBBEAN 122-34 (1947).
46. Treaty of Relations, U.S.-Cuba, May 29, 1934, T.S. 866, 48 Stat. 1682; see
THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 693-96; see also U.S. Dep't of State Website, Good Neigh-
bor Policy, 1933, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/17341.htm (last visited May
11, 2007). The negotiators were Secretary of State Cordell Hull and former Ambassa-
dor Sumner Welles for the United States and President Carlos Mendieta for Cuba.
47. See Lease to the United States of Certain Areas of Land in Cuba for Coaling
and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, Feb. 16-23, 1903, T.S. No. 418, 6 Bevans 1113 [hereinaf-
ter 1903 Lease Agreement]; see also Treaty Between the United States of America and
Cuba Defining Their Relations, U.S.-Cuba, May 29, 1934, T.S. No. 866 [hereinafter
1934 Lease Agreement].
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in whose activities American companies and individuals were
deeply involved. Bankers and traders, mill and plantation
owners, railroad operators and simple investors, all looked to
the United States to protect their interests. Cuba had be-
come a colony in all but name.48
In addition to business investment, the Cuban tourist indus-
try took off during U.S. prohibition as thirsty Americans took
advantage of luxurious cruise ships to travel to elegant hotels in
Cuba where alcohol was abundant and the entertainment lav-
ish.4 9
C. Failures of Democracy
The next thirty-three years reveal a dismal story of the in-
ability to create the trust and confidence necessary for the sur-
vival of popular government. Massive corruption, tolerated by
U.S. business and government, undermined Cuban democracy
from the beginning. The result was dictatorship. It is a powerful
lesson of the United States' failure to export democracy.
The U.S. Army and General Leonard Wood sailed out of
Havana on May 20, 1902, after Tomas Estrada Palma5 ° was inau-
gurated as the first president of Cuba. The sixty-seven year old
Estrada Palma was a hero of the first Cuban Revolution (1868-
1878), in which he was appointed the provisional president of
the Cuban Republic; but he was captured and jailed in 1877,
expelled to Honduras in 1878, then to the United States. In the
second Cuban Revolution (1895-1897), he served as Minister
Plenipotentiary to the United States for the Provisional Republic
of Cuba, inspired by the martyr, Jos6 Martfi. 1
48. See GoTrr, supra note 1, at 129.
49. See THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 1062-64; ROSALIE SCHWARTz, PLEASURE IS-
LAND: TOURISM AND TEMPTATION IN CUBA 30-73, 103-63 (1977).
50. Tomas Estrada Palma (1835-1908) successfully combated graft and inefficiency
while greatly improving education but was unable to abolish the military and control its
incompetence and corruption. Although accused of subservience to the United States,
he obtained a very favorable tariff treaty with the U.S. and reduced U.S. demands for
coaling stations to two. Electoral purity was not in his vision; 150,000 spurious voters
were added to the voting lists by his cohorts. See Ana M. Otero, Cluster VIII: Cluster and
Postcolonial Critiques in Latcrit Theory: To the People Sitting in Darkness: A Resolve for Unity
and Integration, 54 RUTGERS L. REv. 1133, 1145-47 (2002); see also GoTr, supra note 1, at
113-14; THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 474.
51. Jos6 Marti (1853-1895) was jailed as a schoolboy for revolutionary writings;
then he was deported to Spain where he graduated in law and philosophy. He returned
to Cuba in 1877 but was deported again in 1879; he went to New York where he worked
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Estrada Palma's election had not been seriously opposed in
1901, but his conservative policies following the lead of Leonard
Wood, produced opposition and obstruction by the Liberals
under Jose Miguel Gomez.5" In the election of 1906, Estrada
Palma appeared to defeat Gomez, but the Liberals alleged fraud
and attempted an unsuccessful revolt. The turmoil of this Feb-
ruary upheaval led Estrada Palma to appeal to President Theo-
dore Roosevelt to intervene and restore order.53 Roosevelt sent
his Secretary of War and problem-solver, William Howard Taft,54
to Havana. Taft had already served as governor of the Philip-
pines, but Taft's mediation did not succeed, and Estrada Palma
was unable to govern with a hostile congress of his enemies, so
he and his vice president resigned their offices on September 25,
1906. 55 Deadlock in Cuba's congress continued causing Taft,
who was also Theodore Roosevelt's choice as his successor for
the 1908 U.S. election, to establish a provisional government
aided by a new 5,000 man army of occupation;5 6 he returned to
Washington, D.C. after fewer than four weeks.
as a journalist, translator and poet, then as consul for Argentina, Paraguay and Urn-
guay. He organized the Cuban Revolutionary Party in 1892; joined the revolution in
Cuba on April 2, 1895, was killed in action May 19, 1895. See THOMAS, CUBA, supra note
1, at 295-316 (recounting Marti's life).
52. Jos6 Miguel Gomez (1858-1921) a veteran of the 1895 revolution, former civil
governor of Santa Clara. He was a popular chief surrounded by thieves, who could not
be controlled. Gomez's political party was called the Republicans, then the Liberals, a
centrist group; while Estrada Palma's conservative party was called Moderates. See
THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 473-75, 507-24.
53. THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 479; Gorr, supra note 1, at 115-18. A.R. MiL-
LET, THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION IN CUBA: MILITARY OCCUPATION 1906-1909 44-168
(1968).
54. William Howard Taft (1857-1930), born in Cincinnati, A.B.: Yale 1878, LL.B.
Cincinnati 1880; Assistant County Prosecutor 1881; Judge of superior Court 1887;
United States Solicitor General 1890-92; Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for Sixth Circuit
1892-1900; Dean of the University of Cincinnati Law School 1892-1900; Philippine
Commission 1900; Civil Governor of the Philippines 1901-03; Secretary of War 1904-08;
President of the United States 1909-1913; Professor of Law, Yale 1913-1921 and Chief
Justice of the United States 1921-30. See generally HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES
OF WILLIAM HowARD TAr (1939).
55. Id. at 305-10. Taft was accompanied by Acting Secretary of State Robert Bacon,
arriving in Havana on Sept. 19, 1906. Taft's most recent experience as governor of the
Philippines was no help in Cuba, as he was unable to obtain agreement of the contend-
ing parties. See also Ralph Eldin Minger, William H. Taft and the United States Intervention
in Cuba in 1906, 41 HisP. AMER. L. REV. 75, 81-82 (1961).
56. Initially there were 5,000 U.S. Army in the interior. See THOMAS, CUBA, supra
note 1, at 490.
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Charles E. Magoon,5 7 a lawyer from Nebraska, who had just
served as governor of the Panama Canal Zone was appointed
provisional governor of Cuba on October 13, 1906, serving until
new elections under a reformed election law were held. The lib-
eral candidate of 1906,Jos6 Miguel Gomez was elected president
on November 18, 1908.58 U.S. military forces and Governor Ma-
goon left Havana on February 1, 1909. The Guantanamo coal-
ing station expanded into a repair facility and naval base.
In 1912, marines from Guantanamo were used to keep or-
der in Santiago during a strike by sugar plantation laborers, an
initial effort of black Cubans to exert political power, but vio-
lently suppressed by the Cuban army." After the unopposed
election of Estrada Palma in 1901, there was never an election
without some form of tampering by officials. It became a fatal
disease, as unrepresentative governments regularly ignored the
needs of the people. Gomez completed his term, but his Liberal
party fractured and the Conservative candidate, Mario Garcia
Menocal,6 ° was elected president in 1912. In the disputed 1916
election, Menocal was reelected, 61 but the Liberals, led by ex-
president Gomez, again alleged fraud and attempted a revolt on
February 10, 1917.62 The U.S. president, Woodrow Wilson,63
57. Charles E. Magoon (1861-1920) was a wealthy lawyer. He worked in the De-
partment of Justice in 1899 on legal issues of the new empire. Magoon's principal job
was to reform the administration, eliminate corruption, reform the electoral system,
and create a Cuban professional army. Governor Magoon was aided in the reorganiza-
tion by Enoch Crowder, who returned as a virtual pro-consul in 1919. See DAVID A.
LOCKMILLER, MAGOON IN CUBA 1906-1907 64-196 (1938).
58. THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, pp. 473-513.
59. Gorr, supra note 1, at 120-25.
60. Mario Garcia Menocal (1866-1941) trained as a civil engineer at Cornell Uni-
versity, and served in the revolution of 1895-1897. Advancing to General, he became
Manager of the largest sugar producer. His two terms continued the notorious corrup-
tion of the Gomez days. On U.S. declaration of war in April 1917, Menocal caused the
Cuban Congress to follow suit against Germany and Austria in order to confiscate their
investments in Cuba. [The U.S. did the same.] He created the Central Bank of Cuba
and stabilized the currency on a par with the U.S. dollar. See THOMAS, CUBA, supra note
1, at 467-68, 489, 525-43.
61. THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 526-27.
62. Id. at 528.
63. Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) was born in Staunton, Virginia, son of a Presby-
terian minister, A.B. Princeton 1879, LL.B. Univ. Of Virginia 1880, practiced law in
Atlanta; Ph.D. 1885 John Hopkins Univ. Professor at Bryn Mawr, Wesleyan, and
Princeton; President of Princeton 1902-1910, governor of NewJersey 1911-1912; chosen
presidential candidate on the 46th ballot at the Democratic Convention, elected Presi-
dent of the United States in three-way race with W.H. Taft and T. Roosevelt in 1912;
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threatened that the United States would never recognize a Cu-
ban government established by military force, a type of threat he
had carried out in 1913 after the murder of President Madero of
Mexico, and U.S. marines from Guantanamo landed at Santiago
as a deterrent.64 Gomez and the liberal leaders were jailed, and
Menocal took office for a second term on May 20, 1917,65 thus
ending the third U.S. interference.66
Because of U.S. involvement in the First World War (April
1917-November 1918), the Cuban sugar industry prospered
greatly.6" The war also brought the prohibition of the sale and
consumption of alcohol to the United States; accordingly, organ-
ized crime figures such as Al Capone, Meyer Lansky, Lucky
Luciano, and Santo Trafficante arrived in Cuba and developed
criminal activities there, beginning with the export of illegal li-
quor to the United States during prohibition and expanding
into prostitution, gambling, and drugs. Legal investments con-
tinued to pour into Cuba from the United States, chiefly in infra-
structure, (railroads, shipping, electric utilities), telephone and
telegraph, mining, cattle, tobacco, and especially sugar, the ma-
jor export.
Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso, vice-president under Gomez, as-
sembled a coalition from both parties for the 1920 election, but
Jos6 Gomez ran as candidate of the Liberal party. Zayas de-
clared that he had been elected, but Gomez again claimed fraud
and threatened another revolt (his third and last).68 A fourth
reelected in 1916. He requested war on Germany and Austria; father of the League of
Nations, he suffered a stroke on a speaking tour in favor of the League of Nations
(September 25, 1919) and was incapacitated for the last eighteen months of his term.
See ROBERT F. SMITH, UNITED STATES AND CUBA: BUSINESS AND DIPLOMACY, 1917-1960 18-
41 (1960). See generally August Hecksher, Woodrow Wilson (1991).
64. THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, 528-34.
65. Under the war emergency, President Menocal governed by decree and exer-
cised full powers over the nation without Congress. A general amnesty freed the liberal
politicians in March 1918. Id. at 534.
66. Id. 529-35.
67. Id. 536-42.
68. Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso (1861-1934) lawyer and Liberal politician, he met with
Gomez in the 1906 election and then served as vice-president. As president (1921-
1925) he was under the tutelage of General Crowder, as Cuba suffered from a depres-
sion in its sugar industry. See, THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 2, at 473, 550-56.
General Gomez never hesitated to use force in the 1906, 1916, and 1920 elections.
In 1917 he was imprisoned but amnestied in 1917. He died in New York in 1921 at-
tempting to undo Zayas's presidency in an unsuccessful appeal to President Harding.
See id. at 474, 527, 529-30, 547, 554.
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U.S. intervention looked imminent, but General Enoch H.
Crowder,69 a Missouri lawyer who had graduated from West
Point and served as Judge Advocate General of the Army after
the First World War, was sent as pro-consul in 1921 to attempt a
peaceful resolution without an army of occupation. General
Crowder's "advice" was acceptable because of a simultaneous
loan of US$50 million from J.P. Morgan Co. Under General
Crowder, a new presidential election was held on March 15,
1921, in which Zayas was again elected president.7 ° General
Crowder retired from the U.S. Army in 1923 and was immedi-
ately appointed U.S. Ambassador to Cuba, serving until 1927. 71
The facade of Cuban independence remained, but the reality
was economic and political dependence on the United States.
In the 1924 election the Conservative Mario Menocal
sought reelection as president, opposed by the Liberal candi-
date, Gerardo Machado, 72 a businessman. He was another vet-
eran of the 1895 revolution. Machado was elected president, but
the election of 1924 was the last attempt to govern Cuba by hon-
est elections. After a constitutional convention, assembled in
April, 1928, extended his term of office from May 20, 1929 until
May 30, 1935, Machado assumed dictatorial powers.7 3 Dictators
and sham elections have followed in dismal succession until the
present day, but no Cuban politician in the democratic era
could disregard the commands of U.S. business or government.
69. Enoch H. Crowder (1859-1932) fought in the Indian Wars and had served
under Governor Magoon to reform the judiciary (1906-1908). He also served in the
Philippines. He was the principal drafter of the U.S. compulsory draft in the First
World War, became Provost Marshall (1917) and Judge Advocate General of the U.S.
Army (1919). See D. LOCKmILLER, ENOCH H. CROWDER 217-54 (1955).
70. Zayas's presidency occurred during a worldwide agricultural depression, begin-
ning in 1921. See THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 544-55.
71. General Crowder, as adviser, lived on board a U.S. warship in Havana harbor
(usually USS Minnesota). As ambassador, he operated out of the U.S. embassy with far
less leverage than he had as adviser. SeeJoRGE I. DOMINGUEZ, CUBA: ORDER AND REVOLU-
TION 18 (1978); see also THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 548-56.
72. Gerardo Machado (1871-1939) a young butcher's apprentice, became a pro-
teg6 of Gomez, ran a sugar mill and then the Cuban Electric Co., electricity supplier to
Havana, of which he became vice-president. The company helped him buy the Liberal
nomination in 1924. His administration spent lavishly on roads and the new Capitol
Building (1928). GoTr, supra note 1, at 129-35; see also THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at
569-602.
73. See THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 587. John Huston made a film of the over-
throw of Machado, "We Were Strangers" (1949) withJohn Garfield, JenniferJones, and
Gilbert Roland.
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D. Cuban Dictatorships
1. The Fascist Model: Machado and Batista
In the age of dictatorship,7 4 the United States did not use
military force in Cuba 75 until the Bay of Pigs in 1961. Despite
considerable misgivings, dictatorship was tolerated so long as
U.S. investments and lives were protected; however, when the
dictator Batista fled, to be succeeded by Fidel Castro, v6 toleration
turned to outright hostility and the termination of any formal
relations between the United States and Cuba.
Dictatorship began with Gerardo Machado's "reelection" in
1929 and his use of the army to control opposition, but his in-
competence could not improve Cuba's depression economy and
merely ignited conspiracies, especially among university stu-
dents. Machado's Cuba had become a victim of the worldwide
depression after 1929 and could not emerge from the resulting
poverty by its own efforts. The first revolt against Machado, led
by former president Menocal, was unsuccessful in 1930, but a
"golpe de estado" led by Army officers on August 12, 1933, assisted
by U.S. Ambassador Sumner Welles, and business leaders forced
Machado to flee to the Bahamas. 7 Manuel de Cespedes y
Quesada, 71 grandson of a martyred revolutionary, became provi-
sional president for about three weeks before a second golpe en-
74. Dictatorships in most parts of the world were the curse of the twentieth cen-
tury. A partial list would include Mussolini, Stalin, Hitler, Pilsudski, Vargas, Franco,
Salazar, Trujillo, Peron, Somoza, Stroessner, Duvalier, Pinochet, Marcos, Mobutu,
Bokasso, Idi Amin, Hussein, and Mugabe.
75. Fulgencio Batista (1901-1973), born on a sugar cane plantation, cut sugar cane
in the day and attended a Quaker School in the evening. He enlisted in the army at age
twenty, served as a typist and stenographer, and made wide and deep contacts with
other enlisted men. Batista promoted himself to Colonel and named himself Chief of
Staff, from which position of strength he controlled Cuba for twenty-five years. Batista's
ancestry was widely debated. No definitive information is available. However, given the
region of his birth, he probably had Spanish, African, and Indian ancestors. See ARGOTE-
FREYRE, supra note 1, at 9-10; GOTr, supra note 1, at 142; see also, THOMAS, CUBA, supra
note 1, at 635-40, 646-47.
76. THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 590-91. ARGOTE-FREYRE, supra note 1, at 1-5
(2006). See alsOJULES R. BENJAMIN, THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA: HEGEMONY AND INDE-
PENDENT DEVELOPMENT 1880-1934 128-49 (1977); IRWIN F. GELLMAN, ROOSEVELT AND
BATISTA: GOOD NEIGHBOR DIPLOMACY IN CUBA 1933-1945 8-33 (1973).
77. THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, 615-25.
78. Carlos Manuel de Cespedes y Quesada (1871-1939) grandson of Carlos Manuel
de Cespedes (1819-1874), hero of the first Cuban revolution (1868-1878), first provi-
sional president. Born and educated in the United States, was chosen provisional presi-
dent because of his heritage. He restored the 1901 Constitution before he was deposed
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gineered by the young enlisted man, Sergeant Fulgencio Batista.
Batista was quickly designated Colonel 79 and became Com-
mander of the Army. There was no doubt that Batista was in
charge after September 4, but he did not assume the presidency
for the first seven years of his power, always dependent on con-
trol of the Army.8 ° The presidency itself became comical as ten
men succeeded one another in the office from 1933 to 1940:
Gerardo Machado, Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, Carlos Hevia,
Manuel Marquez Sterling, Ramon Grau San Martin, Carlos
Mendieta, Jose Barnet, Miguel Mariano Gomez, Federico Laredo
Bru, and Fulgencio Batista.
For the first four months of Batista's power, the provisional
presidency was held by Ramon Grau San Martin,8' a self-de-
scribed radical, who would frequently appear on the political
scene over the next twenty-five years, but his first "presidency"
was cut short by the failure of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to
recognize his radical government, on the urging of the new U.S.
Ambassador, Sumner Welles,82 later famous for the Good Neigh-
and fled to the Brazilian Embassy and to Brazil. See THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 621-
31.
79. Sergeant Batista's forces were able to lay siege to 250 of the most senior officers
in the Hotel Nacional in Havana where they had assembled to bargain with the old
politicians who had now been bypassed. THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 640-55.
80. Id. at 651-706.
81. Ramon Grau San Martin (1887-1969), a medical doctor, professor, and dean of
medicine, was selected by students and intellectuals of ABC, but supported by Batista
until Ambassador Welles reported U.S. disapproval, after which he fled to Mexico on
January 14, 1934. He returned to the presidency in 1940, serving four years marked by
graft and corruption. See THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 638, 642-74.
82. Sumner Welles (1892-1961) from New York City, A.B. Harvard (1914), served
with the State Department in Tokyo, Buenos Aires, the Dominican Republic, and Hon-
duras before his appointment as Ambassador to Cuba in 1933. Under Secretary of State
under Cordell Hull, 1933-1943 and U.S. Delegate to many international conferences.
He was forced to resign by Secretary Hull on September 23, 1943. See GELLMAN, supra
note 76, at 12-13, 221; THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 549 n.29, 606-07; see also Arthur P.
Whitaker, Review: The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 29 Hisp. AMER. HisT. REV. 81, 85 (1949).
The Good Neighbor Policy was introduced by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in
his Inaugural Address and was implemented by Secretary of State Hull at the Monte-
video Conference of the Pan American Union, December 26, 1933, by which the
United States opposed armed intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American
nations. See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933); see
also ARGOTE-FREYRE, supra note 1, at 45.
The Good Neighbor Policy did not seek to undo the historical past of Manifest
Destiny, the Mexican War of 1846-1848 nor the filibusters in Central America when
William Walker was President of Nicaragua (1856-1860) nor the excision of Panama
from Columbia. The concerns of the Good Neighbor Policy were 20th Century: U.S.
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bor policy.
Grau San Martin, installed September 10, 1933, was re-
moved on January 15, 1934, and initially replaced by Carlos
Hevia 83 for a mere seventy-two hours, then replaced by the more
conservative Carlos Mendieta, recalled from exile in the
United States and quickly recognized as provisional president.
During the two years in which Mendieta fronted for the Batista
regime, the relationship between the United States and Cuba
was renegotiated in a treaty signed on May 29, 1934.85 The 1903
treaty, which included the Platt Amendment, was abrogated ex-
cept for the lease terms to the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay.
In addition, a trade agreement that benefited Cuba's economy
was signed on August 23, 1934.86
Popular discontent with the apparent failure of Cuba's gov-
ernment to improve living conditions led to riots in Havana dur-
ing which Mendieta resigned on December 10, 1935.8' Batista's
involvement in the disorder is uncertain. Batista replaced
Mendieta with Jose A. Barnet88 for a few months until a sham
election could be put together.
military interventions in the Dominican Republic, 1905-1907 and 1916-1930; Nicaragua,
1912-1934; Mexico, 1914 and 1916; and Haiti, 1915-1934.
83. Carlos Hevia (1900-1964), served in the U.S. Navy and graduated from the U.S.
Naval Academy. He was Secretary of Agriculture under Grau and provisional president
Jan. 15-17, 1934. He was Foreign Minister (1948-1950) and a candidate for president in
1952, but forced into exile to the United States. See THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 669,
676; see also ARGOTE-FREYRE, supra note 1, at 130-35, 175, 317 n.132.
84. Carlos Mendieta (1873-1960), participant in the 1895-1897 revolution, op-
posed Menocal and Machado, went into exile in New York, 1931. He became provi-
sional president on January 18, 1934 but was forced to resign in December 1935. As
there was no vice-president, he was replaced by the Secretary of State, Jos6 A. Barnet.
Mendieta had abolished guarantees of civil rights in February, 1934 and dissolved labor
unions in March, 1935 after a general strike was suppressed by the army. See GoTrr,
supra note 1, at 140"2; see also SMrrH, supra note 63, at 156-57; THOMAS, CUBA, supra
note 1, at 676-78, 701,
85. The yearly rental is US$4,085 (the 1934 value of the $2000 in gold of the 1903
lease). See Lease Agreement, supra note 47, art. II. The Cuban government has not
cashed the rental checks since 1959.
86. THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 694-95.
87. The dissolved unions did not disappear and violent strikes began in March
1935 in many industries until the strikes were crushed by Batista's army. THOMAS, CUBA,
supra note 1, at 98-99.
88. Jost A. Barnet (1864-1945), Secretary of State under Mendieta, provisional
president for four months until Mariano Gomez was elected and inaugurated. See GELL-
MAN, supra note 76 at 138; see also THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 701-02.
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A new president, Miguel Mariano Gomez,89 the son of the
former Liberal president who had fomented several revolts
against conservative presidents, was elected in January 1936. Af-
ter Mariano vetoed school legislation desired by Batista, he
lasted a little more that ten months before Batista became deter-
mined to replace him. This time, the appearance of legality was
used in that Mariano Gomez was impeached, tried before the
Senate, and removed. ° Batista's next choice was Vice President
Federico Laredo Bru,9 ' who served four years until Batista had
rewritten the Constitution under the influence of European fas-
cism, especially Mussolini's 1934 Corporative State plan. 2 Dur-
ing this regime, Batista's exercise of power included the fascist-
type repression of opposition. Prison and murder replaced exile
for political opponents.
The Constitutional Convention of February 194013 ap-
proved a new document based on models that greatly increased
State power concentrated in the presidency, while incorporating
the social decrees of the brief Presidency of Ramon Grau San
Martin. A referendum, without opposition, replaced the 1901
Constitution9 4 and Fulgencio Bastista became the President in
89. Miguel Mariano Gomez (1889-1950), son of General Jose Miguel Gomez,
Mayor of Havana 1934. He was elected President January 10, 1936, but impeached and
removed December 24, 1936. His downfall came from an attempt to reduce the size of
the army and civil service and keep the army out of the rural education scheme. The
tax on sugar to support rural education was vetoed on December 21, 1936; the House
voted impeachment on December 22 and the trial in the Senate was December 23. See
GELLMAN, supra note 76, 138-58; see also THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 678, 702-04.
90. The House of Representatives voted for an impeachment trial before the Sen-
ate. Gomez was convicted by twenty-seven votes in favor, 12 opposed, December 24,
1936. Vice-president Laredo Bru was inaugurated at noon on December 24, 1936.
91. Federico Laredo Bru (1875-1946): Vice-president under Mariano Gomez,
served as president until Batista took office in 1940. Batista was elected in a reasonably
honest (for Cuba) election in which his opponent's votes were actually counted and
reported as 40 percent of the total (Candidacy of Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin).
92. The Corporative State Plan, begun in 1926, put all parts of the economy under
state control, including education, labor organizations, business cartels and social wel-
fare. Members of Parliament were selected through these organizations. See IVONE
KIRKPATRICK, MUSSOLINI: A STUDY IN POWER 246-48 (1964); NATHANIEL & SYLVIA WEYL,
THE RECONQUEST OF MEXICO: THE YEARS OF LAzARo CARDENAS 198-314 (1939).
93. The 1940 Constitutional Convention began on February 9, 1940, consulting as
model the Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931, a social democrat document
with enormous detail about unemployment, pensions, accidents, minimum wage, holi-
days, forty-hour work week and eight-hour day. In an emergency, all political rights
could be suspended for forty-five days. State "intervention" [nationalization] of busi-
nesses was allowed. See THOMAS, CUBA, at 716-23.
94. The Referendum of October 10, 1940 approved the new constitution, which
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his own name on October 10, 1940 as the United States pre-
pared for an Atlantic war with Germany. Despite popular elec-
tion, no one could question the authority of Batista and his con-
tinued control of the 30,000 man army.
In the near approach of world war, the Batista dictatorship
could be tolerated by the United States and its wartime allies in
order to incorporate Cuba, its harbors, and airfields into the war
against the German submarine menace.95 Mammoth and end-
lasted until 1976. The Castro Constitution of 1975 copies from the Soviet Constitution
of 1936, describing Cuba as a "socialist state of workers and peasants and all other
manual and intellectual workers."
95. After the Second World War began in Europe on Sept. 1, 1939, the United
States assembled the Latin American nations to demand that the belligerent powers not
carry out hostile action in the Western Hemisphere south of Canada, a belligerent. See
Panama Declaration of October 3, 1939, reprinted in 34 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 1 (1940).
The next year at the Inter-American Conference of the Pan American Union in July
1940, the nations unanimously agreed to the Act of Havana of July 30, 1940 and an-
nounced a plan to take control of any European colony subject to being taken over by a
belligerent power-essentially the French colonies of Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guiana,
and St. Martin and the Dutch colonies of Aruba, Bonaire, Cura:ao, St. Maarten, and
Suriname.
After the fall of France in June 1940, as Hitler prepared to invade Britain, the
United States, and Great Britain made an executive agreement for the transfer of fifty
First World War destroyers in exchange for leases of military air and naval bases in the
Western Hemisphere in Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Trinidad, Antigua, St. Lucia,
British Guiana, and Newfoundland. See Agreement of Sept. 2, 1940, U.S.-U.K., 203
L.N.T.S. 201, 54 Stat. 2405 (1940).
During 1941, prior to the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941,
the neutral countries of the Americas became involved in the war. Under the 1939
"Cash and Carry" policy, Britain was able to buy war material in the United States to be
carried across the Atlantic in convoys under British-Canadian control, an effort to
counter German submarine warfare that was only partly successful.
U.S. involvement, despite neutrality, increased with the Declaration of April 11,
1941, establishing a maritime security zone in mid-Atlantic as the sea frontier that
would be patrolled by the U.S. military. This followed the new policy of "Lend-Lease,"
whereby the financially strapped British were able to "purchase" war materials in the
United States under a new federal exception to neutrality. See An Act Further to Pro-
mote the Defense of the United States, Pub. L. No. 11, 55 Star. 31 (1941).
After U.S. entry into the Second World War, a Conference of Foreign Ministers of
the Pan American Union met at Rio deJaneiro (Jan. 15-29, 1942), recommending that
all Latin American republics, at a minimum, break diplomatic relations with the Axis
powers. All republics except Argentina and Chile did so and declared war on the Axis
powers. After signing the Declaration of United Nations on January 1, 1942, Cuba had
declared war on Japan on December 9, 1941 and on Germany and Italy on December
11, 1941. Several additional U.S. naval and air bases were established for the war period
in Cuba.
During the Second World War, United States naval and air installations in several
other Cuban areas were part of the anti-submarine campaign. Dirigibles (blimps) and
seaplanes operated out of Guantanamo and U.S. naval air units patrolled the Caribbean
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less corruption continued to affect all aspects of business and
trade, but U.S. business was eager to invest in sugar and other
developing industries, without too many questions being asked.
Repression of outspoken critics continued unabated, but the in-
competence and inefficiency at most government levels meant
that discrete and private opposition could continue in privileged
circles. Unknowing foreigners concluded that graft was re-
duced, but it was merely systemized by Batista who accumulated
a great fortune.
Batista held the presidency in his own name during the war
emergency, 1940-1944,96 but he allowed the old radical, Ram6n
Grau San Martin,9 7 to hold the presidential office as Cuba be-
came involved in international affairs in the work of the Pan
American Union9" and the United Nations.9 When Batista re-
tired to Florida, however, he retained control of everything im-
portant, including U.S. investments. In 1948, during a period of
heavy U.S. investment, when the Cuban peso and the U.S. dollar
were on par, Carlos Prio Socarras 00 held the presidency until
from the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Antigua, and Trinidad. Just before the end of
the Second World War the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace
met in Mexico City from February 21 to March 8, 1945. (Only Argentina did not at-
tend). The result was the Act of Chapultepec of March 3, 1945, by which the nations
agreed that aggression by one American state on another American state would be
deemed an attack on all and could be prevented by armed force; a further regional
security agreement would remain in force until the end of the Second World War.
(Regional security for the hemisphere was negotiated at Bogota, Colombia, in the new
Organization of American States ("OAS") on April 30, 1948. Cuba was expelled from
OAS in 1962.)
96. See THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 718-36.
97. Ramon Grau San Martin was not supposed to win the 1944 election, intended
for Batista's Prime Minister, Carlos Saladrigas, but Batista did not use the army to sup-
port his candidate. Although Grau became President, Batista controlled Congress and
the army from his Miami residence.
98. The Pan American Union came out of an international conference of the na-
tions of Latin America at Washington, D.C. Oct. 1889 to April 1890, on call of President
Grover Clevland but continued during the presidency of Benjamin Harrison and Secre-
tary of State James G. Blaine. While the substantive achievements were slight, machin-
ery for an international organization with a long series of conferences emerged. The
name was changed to Organization of American States in 1948.
99. Cuba signed the Declaration of United Nations of January 1, 1942, 55 Stat.
1600 (1942), and declared war on Japan on December 9, 1941, and on Germany and
Italy on December 11, 1941, leading to the internment of 5000 enemy aliens and confis-
cation of enemy property. Cuba was an original member of the United Nations.
100. Carlos Prio Socarras (1903-1977) was one of the student revolutionaries in the
Machado era. Served as Senator, then Minister of Labor under Grau San Martin. Prio
did not achieve a majority, but a plurality over four candidates. He established the
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1952 when Batista again decided to be leader in fact and engi-
neered a golpe de estado on March 10, 1952 through his leader-
ship of the military.'
In the last six of the twenty-five years of the Batista dictator-
ship, U.S. control of the economy became absolute. 10 2 Batista
and his cronies profited excessively as U.S. organized crime in-
creased its investments and joined the parade of wealthy inves-
tors in Cuba, as left-wing opposition to Batista expanded at uni-
versities in the Americas to include middle-class elements.
2. Fidel Castro and the Communist Model
Fidel Castro1 3 was a young law graduate of the University of
Central Bank in 1950. Before the 1952 election, Batista engineered a golpe on March
10, 1952. Prio was forced into exile in Mexico. The United States recognized the new
regime seventeen days later. U.S. organized crime figures were part of the Batista dicta-
torship until the end on January 1, 1959.
101. Batista allowed the 1952 election to be held in November 1953.
The flavor of the Batista regime (Batistero) is portrayed in English in Graham
Greene's novel Our Man in Havana (1958), which was made into a motion picture in
1960 by Carol Reed; also in Ernest Hemingway's posthumous Islands in the Stream
(1970), which was made into a motion picture in 1977.
102. See ROBERT F. SMITH, THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA: BUSINESS AND DIPLO-
MACY, 1917-1960, at 165-86 (1960); see also U.S. DEP'T OF COMM., INVESTMENT IN CUBA
(Gov't Printing Off. 1956).
Despite the grinding poverty of the back country, Cuba was one of the wealthier
nations in Latin America, with per capita income second only to Venezuela (oil ex-
porter). In the pre-revolutionary years it was estimated that sixty-five percent of Cuba's
exports and seventy-five percent of Cuba's imports involved the United States. SeeJAIME
SUCHLICKI, CUBA FROM COLUMBUS TO CASTRO AND BEYOND 119 (5th ed. 2002).
103. Fidel Castro Ruz was born in 1926. His father, Angel, came from Luo in
Galicia, Spain in 1898, acquired a farm and worked for the United Fruit Company (El
pulpo--the octopus). The farm grew sugar cane on roughly 10,000 acres owned or
leased, located near Bir-n and the Bay of Nipe in Oriente Province. Fidel was one of
five children of Angel's second marriage.
Fidel Castro's education before university was in Catholic schools: first, in Colegio
de la Salle, then to Colegio Dolores, both in Santiago and then to the Jesuit Preparatory
School, Bel(n, in Havana. In 1945 he became a law student at the University of Havana,
but he was soon immersed in the revolutionary politics of the post-war era, skipping
classes, and cramming for exams. He married in 1948 and graduated from the Univer-
sity in law in 1950. He began the practice of law with a Havana firm, but the golpe by
Batista in March 1952 pushed him into anti-Batista revolutionary activities, culminating
in the attack of July 26, 1953 on the Moncada Barracks in Santiago, for which he was
prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned. See generally HERBERT L. MATTHEWS, CASTRO
(1969) (Matthews, a New York Times reporter, interviewed Castro in the mountains);
ROBERT E. QUIRK, FIDEL CASTRO (1993); RAMON E. RuIz, CUBA: THE MAKING OF A
REVOLUTION (1968); TAD SZULC, FIDEL: A CRITICAL PORTRAIT (1986); see also ANDRES
OPPENHEIMER, CASTRO'S FINAL HOUR (1992) (presenting the negative side of the Castro
Administration).
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Havana when Fulgencio Batista seized the presidency in 1952.
Batista introduced a tighter form of dictatorship that took rigor-
ous action to suppress dissent, while simultaneously encouraging
monopoly capitalism. As Havana and the cities became too dan-
gerous for opposition groups, almost always infiltrated by the se-
cret police, the dissidents had to move out of their civilized orbit
to the wild, lightly inhabited mountains of Oriente province."°4
There, the Castro brothers assembled a band of adventurers that
made their move against the dictatorship in an attack on the
Moncada Army Barracks in Santiago on July 26, 1953.105 Al-
though repressed with great violence, this event achieved the
public notice needed by revolutionaries to grow the movement.
Captured, tried, and imprisoned on the Isle of Pines, the Castros
were released on May 15, 1955, after nineteen months, in an am-
nesty of political prisoners.
On July 7, 1955, Fidel Castro, fearing for his safety in Cuba,
left for Mexico where he lived in exile for the next seventeen
months. The Castro group managed to escape assassination and
returned to Cuba on December 2, 1956. Acquiring the aura of
inevitability, these revolutionaries became popular heroes and
the corrupt dictatorship lost any type of popular support among
factory workers and agricultural laborers. Whether the Castro
brothers were then communists is questionable, 10 6 but, in any
event, the Soviet Union of Nikita Khrushchev was far away and
unable to commit substantial resources to the mountain men.
The idea of removing a corrupt dictatorship in Cuba proved at-
tractive in university circles, labor groups, and the few democra-
104. Oriente, the most easterly province in Castro's Cuba, has now been subdi-
vided into four provinces: Granma, Santiago, Guantanamo and Holguin. In 1976 the
six former provinces were subdivided into fourteen districts.
105. Castro's attack on the Batista army occurred on a Sunday morning, July 26,
1953 when Castro and 105 men charged the gate successfully but an alarm was given,
and the rebels had to retreat. Nineteen soldiers were killed in the attack, as were three
rebels; sixty-eight captured rebels were later tortured and killed. Castro was captured
last and put on trial two months later. A gifted orator, he defended himself, but was
convicted and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. However, Batista signed an amnesty
eighteen months later, and Fidel Castro fled to Mexico for the next seventeen months.
See THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 836-39.
106. The Soviet Comintern Communist Party, legalized in 1940 by Batista, strongly
opposed the Castro mountain men. In 1959 Castro frequently and publicly denied any
"communist" ties, but on December 1, 1961, Castro announced that Cuba and its
revolution were "Marxist-Leninist" instead of "socialist."
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cies of the hemisphere. 10 7 In the United States, opinion about
Batista was divided. Batista played the anti-communist card in
the McCarthy era and was attractive to the military, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), the Central Intelligence Agency
("CIA"), big business, and organized crime, but many exiles
from the dictatorship and their supporters loudly and persist-
ently decried the crimes of Batista and his colleagues.1 °8
By late November 1958, the Batista regime was crumbling as
support diminished in the army, the civil service, the unions, the
bankers, the church, and, lastly, among the wealthy. Members of
the Batista regime began to plan their places of refuge and exile,
as Castro's mountain men moved relentlessly toward the capital.
Finally, on New Year's Day, 1959, Batista fled into exile.10 9
Fidel Castro did not immediately enter Havana to claim the
prize of governing Cuba. His mountain men under Che
Guevara preceded him and began to settle scores with the
Batista people who had not yet fled. Looting and mob violence
were followed by mass trials and mass executions in the Sports
Stadium.110 In the absence of government, Fidel Castro was pro-
claimed provisional premier of Cuba on February 16, 1959."'1
107. Democratically elected governments in Latin America were few and weak in
1959. In Brazil, the Vargas dictatorship gave way to the elected presidents: Kubitschek
(1956-1961) and Goulart (1961-1964), but the army returned in 1964. Chile's demo-
cratic tradition continued only until Pinochet in 1973. Mexico's P.R.I. Party permitted
a limited democracy under Lopez Mateos. Panama had a form of democracy, until a
new strongman, Omar Torrijos Herrara, seized power in 1968.
The remaining nations were ruled by dictators or military juntas: Argentina; Bo-
livia; Colombia, recovering from a vicious civil war; Dominican Republic's Trujillo; Ec-
uador; Guatemala-Jacobo Arbenz was removed in golpe; Haiti-Duvalier; Paraguay-
Stroessner; Peru-the army twice removed the elected Haya de la Torre; Uruguay-a
junta; and Venezuela-a junta. See generally HERRING, supra note 2.
108. See generally EARL E. T. SMITH, THE FOURTH FLOOR: AN ACCOUNT OF THE CAS-
TRO COMMUNIST REVOLUTION (1962). Smith was U.S. Ambassador to Cuba from June
1957 to January 1959.
109. Batista and his family and close aides flew out of Havana at 3:00am on January
1, 1959 to the Dominican Republic. Asylum in the United States was not permitted,
thus he retired to Spain.
110. Approximately 200-700 people were briefly "tried" by a court presided over by
Che Guevara and executed at the Sports Stadium or the fortress. The sources do not
agree on the number of killings.
111. Initially Manuel Yrrutia Lleo was provisional president, but he was ousted by
Castro and replaced by a figurehead, Oswaldo Dorticos Torrado in July 1959, who
served until Castro assumed the Presidency on December 3, 1976. See Phillip W. Bonsal,
Cuba, Castro and the United States, 45 FOREIGN AFF. 260 (1967). Bonsal was the last U.S.
Ambassador to Cuba, from January 1959 to January 1961.
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The prime targets of his reforms were: (1) the sugar industry,
with vast plantations and sugar refineries owned by U.S. inves-
tors; (2) the cattle industry; and (3) the tobacco plantations that
were the source of the international cigar industry. These vital
industries were nationalized without "prompt, adequate and ef-
fective" compensation-the formula devised by Secretary of
State Cordell Hull in 1938 to deal with Mexican nationalization
of the oil industry. 1 2 The promise of land reform was peasant
ownership of land, but this did not happen. Instead, the reality
was the Soviet collective farm. An actual achievement was the
expulsion of U.S. organized crime figures in June, 1959.
The U.S. owners of these confiscated lands and industries
vowed to pursue the produce of their confiscated properties any-
where in the world, following the precedents of the nationaliza-
tion of the Iranian oil industry under Mohammed Mossadegh in
1951.113 Before Mossadegh was removed in a coup in which the
CIA and British Intelligence Service were involved, every Iranian
112. Cordell Hull (1871-1955), from Tennessee, received a law degree from Cum-
berland University (1891), and served in Cuba in the Spanish-American War. He was a
judge in the Tennessee state courts in 1903, and served as a Member of Congress from
1907-21, and as Senator from Tennessee from 1931-33, specializing in federal income
and inheritance taxes. He was Secretary of State from 1933-1944, was awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize in 1945. He negotiated tariff reduction agreements under the 1934
Trade Expansion Act.
113. The ancient ruling house of Persia was deposed by the father of the last shah
in 1923; his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, succeeded in 1941. In 1951, the elected
Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh nationalized the oil industry, including the Brit-
ish-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, whose employees were expelled. The Shah fled
to Italy in 1953, but Britain's MI-5 and the U.S. CIA had combined efforts to support a
coup in favor of the shah on August 20, 1953, and Mossadegh was jailed.
The early effort to pursue the confiscated goods in world markets was initially re-
jected in the United States under the Act of State doctrine, Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), but Congress rejected the court's decision in the "Sabba-
tino Amendment" or the "Second Hickenlooper Amendment."
No court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of
state doctrine to make a determination of the merits giving effect to the prin-
ciples of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other right is
asserted by any party including a foreign state . . . through a confiscation or
other taking after January 1, 1959 by an act of that state in violation of the
principles of international law including the principles of compensation ....
Foreign Assistance Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-171, 79 Stat. 653; see Anglo-Iranian Oil
Co. Case (U.K v. Iran), 1951 I.C.J. 437 (Dec. 20); accord Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v.
S.U.P.O.R. Co., 22 I.L.R. 19 (Italy, Civ. Ct. Rome 1954); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v.Jaffrate
(The Rose Mary), 20 I.L.R. 316 (Aden Sup. Ct. 1953). See generally MICHAEL GORDON,
THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATION: THE DEMISE oF FOREIGN PRIVATE PROPERTY 69-108
(1976).
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oil cargo unloaded in a Western State was pursued as stolen
property. In Cuba, U.S. banks soon became involved as loans
and mortgages with the nationalized industries could not be re-
paid, causing loans to be called and collateral to be sold.1 14
Thus, Cuba's efforts to reform its domestic industries soon had
international implications. Fidel Castro entered world politics in
September, 1960 when he gave a four and one-half hours-long
speech to the U.N. General Assembly. During that New York
visit, Castro held meetings at the Hotel Theresa in Harlem with
Nikita Khrushchev of the USSR, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt,
and Jawarhalal Nehru of India. President Eisenhower would not
meet him anywhere-Castro had a two and one-half hour-long
meeting with Vice President Nixon at the U.S. capitol on April
19, 1959.
Searching for leverage against Cuba's uncompensated tak-
ings, the Eisenhower Administration determined to alter the spe-
cial provisions for importation of Cuban sugar under the quota
system, 115 the Cuban quota being eliminated in favor of in-
creases in the sugar quotas for Trujillo's Dominican Republic
and for the Philippines. 16 The response of the Castro Govern-
ment was further confiscations and the offer of compensation
for nationalized properties by agricultural bonds, the repayment
of which required increased sales of Cuban sugar in the United
States. ' 17
Because of the failure of economic retaliation, the outgoing
Eisenhower Administration broke diplomatic relations with
Cuba on January 3, 1961.118 The incoming Kennedy Administra-
tion was also presented with a covert CIA plan, approved by Ei-
senhower, to overthrow Castro through an invasion by Cuban
refugees trained in Guatemala and Nicaragua. 1 9 The presup-
positions of the plan were: (1) air cover by the U.S. naval and air
forces, and (2) the participation by malcontent Cubans who
114. See First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
115. See Agricultural Adjustment Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 213, 48 Stat. 670
(1934).
116. In June 1960, quotas for Cuban sugar were eliminated.
117. See THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 1215-33.
118. Diplomatic relations ended on January 3, 1961 by order of President Eisen-
hower. The embargo on trade with Cuba is in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations,
31 C.F.R. 515.204 et seq.
119. See HAYNES B. JOHNSON, THE BAY OF PIGS: THE LEADERS' STORY OF BRIGADE
2506, at 103-202 (1964); PETER WYDEN, BAY OF PIGS: THE UNTOLD STORY (1979).
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were expected to join the invasion forces in the overthrowing of
Castro: neither occurred. The new U.S. Administration did not
cancel the plan, which was put into execution on April 17, 1961
at the Bay of Pigs. 12° The invasion failed and no uprising oc-
curred.
The collapse of the invasion and the inability to disavow the
CIA plan humiliated the new president and put U.S.-Cuban rela-
tions into the middle of the Cold War. Fidel Castro announced
that he was now, and had been, a Marxist-Leninist, and this dec-
laration was soon accompanied by military negotiations with the
Soviet Union, 121 while the U.S. military's plans for an invasion of
Cuba moved ahead. Threats of war over Soviet efforts to expel
the United States, Britain, and France from Berlin eventually led
to the construction of the Berlin Wall in mid-August 1961 that
would imprison East Germans for the next twenty-eight years.
Undoubtedly frustrated by Western resistance, Nikita
Khrushchev then took the greatest risk of the cold war years.
Soviet assistance became essential for Cuba as the conse-
quence of the United States' embargo on all U.S. trade with
Cuba. But Soviet assistance went far beyond petroleum, machin-
ery, tourists, and advisers; it developed into the creation of a So-
viet missile base with nuclear weapons fitted on Intermediate
Range Ballistic Missiles (1,000 mile radius). 2 2 U.S. overflights
by U-2 aircraft, above the range of existing anti-aircraft, con-
firmed the installation of forty-two missile sites with twenty-four
120. Of the 1400 invaders, 211 were killed and about 1178 were taken prisoner.
Private groups raised US$62 million to ransom the prisoners. One hundred and sixty
Cuban soldiers were killed. For conflicting numbers, see GoTr, supra note 1, at 194;
THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 1370-71.
121. CIA efforts to kill Fidel Castro in "Operation Mongoose" are alleged in Philip
Agee's Inside the Company: CIA Diary (1975), supposedly involving expenditures of
US$100 million in cooperation with foreign governments and U.S. organized crime.
Practice landings on Caribbean islands were a feature of U.S. training exercises in 1961-
62 preparatory to an invasion planned for October 1962.
122. See HENRY M. PACHTER, COLLISION COURSE: CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND COEXIS-
TENCE 20-61 (1967); see also ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
(1969); accord ELIE ABEL, THE MISSILES OF OCTOBER: THE STORY OF THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS (1967); MICHAEL BESCHLOSS, THE CRISIS YEARS: KENNEDY AND KHRUSHCHEV 1960-
1963, at 431-548 (1991); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., A THOUSAND DAYS: JOHN F. KEN-
NEDY IN THE WHITE HOUSE 794-841 (1967); WILLIAM TAUBMAN, KHRUSHCHEV: THE MAN
AND HIS ERA 529-77 (2003).
For a review of the crisis by the remaining participants, see CUBA BETWEEN THE SUPER-
POWERS (J. Blight et al. eds., 1992), and ANATOLY DOBRYNIN, IN CONFIDENCE: MOSCOW'S
AMBASSADOR TO AMERICA'S SIX COLD WAR PRESIDENTS 66-93 (1995).
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nuclear missiles by October 14, 1962, despite Soviet prevarica-
tion.1 2 3 On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy announced
the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba and his response was the
Quarantine of Cuba-in truth a blockade-but without using
that inflammatory term. 24 The Quarantine 25 was designed to
prevent further installations of missiles and compel the removal
of those already present.
The next week resounded with world crisis, terrifying peo-
ple in the United States and Europe, but the Soviet people were
not informed of the crisis. Harsh words on both sides brought
the superpowers very close to a nuclear war.' 26 Soviet vessels
turned back before arriving at the Quarantine boundary, a 500-
mile radius from Cuba, thereby ending the immediate crisis.
The long-term resolution involved U.S. removal of intermediate
range missile bases in Turkey and a declaration not to invade
Cuba, while the Soviets removed the nuclear missiles from
Cuba; 127 Castro was furious about the missile agreement about
which he was not informed by the Soviets. Turkish missile re-
moval, however, was not part of the announced agreement.
Thirteen years later as the United States was withdrawing from
Vietnam, after dealing with the Nixon presidential crisis, hear-
ings into CIA operations of an illegal nature around the world
revealed a clearer picture of U.S. efforts to eliminate Fidel Cas-
123. Missiles are Missiles. The Soviets alleged that the missiles were not offensive,
but defensive. In a White House meeting on October 18, 1962, Andrei Gromyko, ac-
companied by Ambassador Dobrynin, denied the presence of offensive missiles in
Cuba.
124. The threat of nuclear war appeared in the President's words:
It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched
from Cuba as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States requiring full
retaliatory response on the Soviet Union.
PresidentJohn F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People on
the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba, 485 PuB. PAPERS 806, 808 (Oct. 22, 1962),
125. In customary international law, absent the U.N. Charter, a blockade was an
act of war. See LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw: THE LAw OF WAR 767-99 (7th ed.
1952); see also The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863);
accord Symposium on the Quarantine/Blockade, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 515-613 (1963).
126. Estimates at the time were that the Soviets' nuclear capability was limited to
forty-four intercontinental missiles ("ICBMs") while the United States had 156 ICBMs
and could deliver them from a large fleet of nuclear submarines and 1300 Strategic Air
Command ("SAC") bombers.
127. Kennedy feared that an exact exchange of missile for missile would only en-
courage further blackmail. See SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 122. The removal of Soviet
missiles was confirmed by low level flights over Soviet merchant ships with on-deck mis-
sile cargoes.
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tro and destabilize the Cuban government in the period between
the Bay of Pigs and the 1962 Missile Crisis. 2
Thirty years later, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, an
anniversary conference in Havana revealed that 40,000 Soviet
troops had been in Cuba, accompanying the missiles and six tac-
tical nuclear weapons. Soviet military men and some Politburo
members had opposed Khrushchev's reckless gamble in install-
ing the scarce missiles in a country likely to be invaded. The
Soviet military and Communist party leaders regarded the re-
moval of the missiles as a national humiliation, requiring
Khrushchev's deposition, accomplished on October 16, 1964.
U.S.-Cuban relations in the Caribbean became less turbu-
lent during the end of the U.S. Vietnam war, although the total
embargo continued; but financial aid from the Soviets and their
allies preserved the Cuban economy. 129
Cubans emigrating to the United States, especially to south-
eastern Florida, grew to about one million people, a formidable
political bloc.' Cuba's participation in the Cold War on the
Soviet side, however, increased tensions after 1975 when Cubans
served as Soviet surrogates in Angola, Guinea, and Ethiopia in
the 1975-1990 period, and in Nicaragua in the 1980s.13 ' But the
end of Soviet financial support forced Cuba to end its export of
revolution. A 1980 incident involving political prisoners, alleg-
edly being released from Cuban prisons through the port of
128. See generally REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE COMMISSION ON CIA AcrIVITIES
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES (June 1975), available at http://history-matters.com/
archive/church/rockcomm/contents.htm.
129. As a member of the Soviet trade bloc COMECON, Cuba bartered its sugar for
oil and manufactured goods until the collapse of COMECON in 1992.
130. Without accounting for Batista's followers, the Cuban urban middle class pro-
fessionals and the wealthy fled Cuba in a torrent-probably one-quarter million by 1963
to Florida, abandoning properties that were then seized by the State. By 2005, it was
estimated that one million Cubans resided in the United States, a political powerhouse
in Florida because of estimates that 500,000 have now become U.S. citizens and voters.
An international incident occurred in the aftermath of the rescue of five-year old Elian
Gonzales from the Atlantic Ocean in December 1999 when his mother and other refu-
gees had drowned in the foundering of their small boat. Miami Cubans demanded that
he remain with relatives there while his father (and Fidel Castro) demanded he be
returned to his family in Cuba. The United States Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice ("INS") seized the child from the Miami Cubans and gave custody to the father for
a return to Cuba. See Gonzales v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 120 S. Ct.
2737 (2000). Anti-Castro propaganda has been broadcast continuously by radio and
television in Spanish from Radio Marti in Florida since March 1990.
131. See GEORGE GALLOWAY, FIDEL CASTRO HANDBOOK 306-28 (2006).
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Mariel, destroyed any trust on the part of the Carter Administra-
tion. 132
The end of the Cold War in the period 1989-1991 should
have produced an improvement in U.S.-Cuba relations as the So-
viet Union collapsed and Soviet presence in Cuba terminated. It
did not, and Cuban Socialism was in desperate condition. The
flow of petroleum and the import of manufactured goods and
food from Soviet allies ceased. Castro, always wary of a U.S. inva-
sion, decreed wartime austerities, along with mobilization mea-
sures in this "Special Period in Peacetime," while Cuba's econ-
omy spiraled downward, stopping just short of collapse. How-
ever, capitalism rescued the situation in part after 1994 as the
tourist industry was revived and brought essential financial aid.
Western Europeans were no longer involved in a cold war,
so they sought to invest in the developing tourist industry in
Cuba, which had decided to risk its socialism to benefit from
tourism in order to fill the void left by the Soviets.' U.S. inves-
tors whose property had been confiscated in the early 1960's had
preserved their claims, with the aid of the U.S. Foreign Claims
132. Briefly altering his policy against exiles in 1980, Castro "accepted" President
Jimmy Carter's offer to allow Cuban political prisoners into the United States, depart-
ing Cuba by ship from the small port of Mariel, west of Havana. More than 120,000
Cubans left Cuba, but in fact there were few political prisoners. Instead, Castro emp-
tied the jails of petty offenders and many of the criminally insane were released from
mental institutions, plus many Havana homosexual men, deemed "anti-social ele-
ments." Cf STRAWBERRY AND CHOCOLATE (Mirimax Films 1995).
On arrival, the Marielitos were reviewed by INS: Class I convicted criminals were
detained for deportation, while Class II were released on parole pending asylum deter-
minations. But then the new Reagan Administration changed the Carter policy and all
the Marielitos were detained in federal prisons awaiting disposition by INS. The change
of U.S. policy was upheld by the courts on the principle that "executive policy" can alter
customary international law. See Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (l1th Cir. 1986).
By statute, INS can deport people from the United States to nations that accept
them; Cuba, however, refused to accept the return of Marielitos, thus they remained in
detention. The Mariels allegedly cost the U.S. government $530 million.
Finally, in 1987, Cuba accepted the return of 2500 Cuban convicted criminals or
insane and 4000 convicted of crime after entry into the United States. Those remaining
in custody are entitled to habeas corpus. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
133. Raul Castro (born 1931), brother of Fidel was given charge of an economic
policy and program to encourage foreign investment in areas of the economy released
from socialist controls, especially the tourist industry. This change followed devastating
famines, shortages of all goods, and economic slowdown resulting from the end of
COMECON trade. See generally Berta Esperanza Hernandez Truyol, Out in Left Field:
Cuba's Post-Cold War Strikeout, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 15 (1994).
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Settlement Commission' and the possibility that former U.S.
properties would pass to European and Canadian investors led
to a tightening of the U.S. trade restrictions of the embargo in
1992.135
Political dissent and popular demonstrations in the summer
of 1994 in Cuba brought about further repression and the Cas-
tro regime's decision to expel dissident elements. Courageous
but foolhardy Cubans attempted to cross the ninety miles of
ocean to the United States in small, unseaworthy boats and rafts
resulting in great loss of life.136 Miami Cubans of Brothers to the
Rescue (Hermanos al Rescate) occasionally flew patrols over the
ocean area to alert the U.S. Coast Guard to the presence of Cu-
ban boat people in peril in international waters. 37
On February 24, 1996 the Cuban Air Force jets shot down
two unarmed, propeller planes of Brothers to the Rescue. At
this point, factual agreement ceases: the Cubans claim that the
aircraft had invaded Cuban airspace to drop anti-Castro leaflets
on Havana; 3 1 the Miami Brothers claim the attack took place
over international waters. 39 Litigation followed in the United
States against the Cuban government,14 ° but in 1996 Congress
used the occasion to enact a series of further restrictions on do-
134. The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission established under 22 U.S.C.
§ 1622 et seq.
135. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575
(1992).
136. Cuban boat people (los balseros) crowded the Straits of Florida in Fall 1994 as
75,000 Cubans had to be rescued at sea. See James M. Cooper, Creative Problem Solving
and the Castro Conundrum, 28 CAL. W. INr'L L.J. 391, 399-400 (1998); Thomas David
Jones, A Human Rights Tragedy: The Cuban and Hatian Refugee Crisis Revisited, 9 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 479, 492-93 (1995); see also infra notes 191-192.
137. But these risky attempts to cross the Straits on rafts or flimsy boats had greatly
diminished by the date of the fatal flights. See Cooper, supra note 136, at 399400.
138. No provision of the 1944 Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944,
15 U.N.T.S. 295, 61 Stat. 1180, authorizes the use of deadly force to destroy a private,
civil aircraft trespassing into national air space; such aircraft may be required to land.
Id. arts. 9, 10.
139. Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997). A report
by the International Civil Aviation Organization supported the international waters si-
tus. The action was commenced under the "terrorist nation" 1996 amendment to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). Punitive damages are
authorized against agents or instrumentalities of foreign sovereigns.
140. Recovery of damages by execution on Cuban State Telecommunications
debts was disallowed in Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga Distancia de P.R , Inc., 183 F. 2d 1277
(11th Circ. 1999). Payment of US$96,700,000 was made out of frozen Cuban assets in
2001.
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ing business in or with Cuba. 4 ' Opposition by U.S. allies to the
legislation, resulted, but the restrictive laws were not repealed. 4
Several prominent people have spoken out against the em-
bargo. In 1998, during an unprecedented papal visit to Cuba,
Pope John Paul II indirectly denounced the U.S. embargo as
"unjust and ethically unacceptable;"' 43 four years later, former
U.S. President Jimmy Carter during his visit to Cuba urged the
lifting of the ban. The embargo is still in force.
Nonetheless, Fidel Castro and his Revolution have managed
to survive, astonishing millions around the world, including
probably the Cuban leader himself, who is well aware that many
groups, known and unknown, have targeted him for assassina-
tion."' Last summer, on August 13, 2006, Castro celebrated his
eightieth birthday, and four months later, on December 2,
Cubans marked the fiftieth anniversary of the landing-or
rather running aground in a mangrove swamp-of the Granma,
an unseaworthy, overloaded vessel that had taken Fidel, his
younger brother, Radil, and Che Guevara and seventy-nine other
guerrilla fighters on a 1,200-mile perilous voyage from Mexico to
the southwest shore of Oriente province.' 45 In just a little more
than two years, the small band that had survived the landing,
with the help of revolutionaries throughout Cuba, installed a
government in Havana. 46
On August 1, 2006, Fidel Castro delegated his duties to his
brother, Rafil. Seriously ill with diverticulitis, Castro underwent
several surgeries that caused a number of complications,147 in-
cluding peritonitis. As a result, his health has been severely com-
promised, leading to speculation about how long he will survive,
how the world will view his legacy, and what will happen in Cuba
after his death.
The first issue is left to the medical professionals who know
141. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity ("LIBERTAD") Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (1996).
142. See W. Fletcher Fairy, The Helms-Burton Act: The Effect of International Law on
Domestic Implementation, 46 AM. U.L. REV. 1289 (1996-1997); see also Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba; The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L LAw 419 (1996).
143. Gorr, supra note 1, at 309.
144. See GALLOWAY, supra note 131, at 240-41.
145. See GoTr, supra note 1, at 154-56.
146. See THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 1030-34.
147. See Marc Lacey, Castro "Serious;" Report Details Many Surgeries, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
16, 2007, at A4.
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the facts of his case. With regard to Castro's legacy, his achieve-
ments are not inconsiderable and, in many ways, reflect the views
of his hero, Jos6 Marti, about literacy, racism, Cuba's indepen-
dence, as well as the country's relationship to the United States.
From the first days of his regime, Fidel Castro placed great
emphasis on the literacy of the entire Cuban population. In
1960, forty percent of the population could not read or write;
today almost all Cubans are literate. 4 8 They also have access to
good health care, whether they live in urban or rural areas.
Castro, like Marti, abhorred racism and its resultant inequi-
ties and set out to eradicate it; racism in Cuba, while still prob-
lematic, has been greatly mitigated. 49 Fidel Castro was not only
concerned with racial inequality at home, but also in other parts
of the world. When Nelson Mandela visited Cuba in July, 1991,
he credited Castro with advancing the cause of non-white South
Africans in their struggle against apartheid, citing the symbolic
importance of the 1988 victory against the South African Army
by Cuban forces at Cuito Cuanavale in Angola. 50
Marti always visualized an independent Cuba, stating:
The hands of every nation must remain free for the untram-
meled development of the country in accordance with its dis-
tinctive nature and with its individual elements. 15 1
Castro has certainly achieved and maintained Cuba's politi-
cal independence. Whether it will continue in the twenty-first
century remains to be seen. Unfortunately, Castro also shares
Marti's animosity toward the United States, which Marti articu-
lated in his last letter, written to a friend:
It is my duty ... to prevent, through the independence of
Cuba, the U.S.A. from spreading over the West Indies and
falling with added weight upon other lands of Our America.
All I have done up to now and shall do hereafter is to that
148. See GoTr, supra note 1, at 188-89.
149. SeeJAIME SUCHLICKI, CUBA FROM COLUMBUS TO CASTRO AND BEYOND 224 (5th
ed. 2002).
150. See Gorr, supra note 1, at 276-79. Fifty thousand Cuban troops were sent to
Angola, where some of them fought against guerrillas and the South African Army at
Cuito Cuanavale in the south. The victory led to the retreat of the South Africans from
Angola and their subsequent withdrawal from Namibia. Chester Crocker, the United
States Secretary of State for African affairs, led negotiations that resulted in Namibian
independence and the departure of Cuban troops from Angola.
151. See THOMAS, CUBA, supra note 1, at 301.
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end ... I know the Monster .... 
15 2
Fidel Castro, obsessed by the United States and always fear-
ful of an invasion or annexation or U.S. expansion into Latin
America, has echoed Marti's anti-American theme in his many
speeches over the years. In May of 2001, in addressing students
at the University of Tehran, he voiced his hostility to the United
States once again, by telling them that "the imperialist King will
fall."' 55 The Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's principal religious
leader, stated that their two countries could "overcome the
United States.'
5 4
No matter what the positive accomplishments of dictators
have been, there is always a dark side to their legacies; Castro's
legacy will be no exception. Almost inmediately after he took
power, human rights violations started with the execution of sev-
eral hundred of the soldiers, policemen, and officials of the
Batista government; 155 the violations have continued with the
ongoing repression, imprisonment and sometimes elimination
of political adversaries. Thousands of Cubans have fled, princi-
pally to the United States. 156 Those who remained have suffered
great privations, particularly after the withdrawal of subsidies by
the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. 157
One wonders what will occur after the passing of Fidel Cas-
tro. Will there be a period of chaos? A successor administration
made up of a cadre of university graduates is already in place.' 51
Ratil Castro is in charge of the military, so the transition may be
a tranquil one. Of course, there are relatively new players on the
scene in Cuba. President Hugo Chdivez of Venezuela has an ar-
rangement to supply much needed oil in exchange for Cuban
assistance in the fields of education and medicine. 159 China has
also made sizable investments in the Cuban economy,16 ° and
there is always the possibility of a Cuban-Iranian alliance. It is
difficult to assess what the ramifications of these relationships
152. Id. at 310.
153. See Gorr, supra note 1, at 318.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 168; see also supra note 110.
156. See Gorr, supra note 1, at 298-300; see also supra note 130.
157. See Gorr, supra note 1, at 286-88.
158. Id. at 318.
159. See GALLOWAY, supra note 131, at 401.
160. See Gorr, supra note 1, at 297.
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will be. But, Cubans have always aspired to freedom and democ-
racy, an aspiration that should not be underestimated.
III. THE U.S. NAVAL BASE AT GUANTANAMO
On December 10, 1903, the Cuban government presented
the forty-five square miles of the Naval Base to the United States
under the terms of the lease in a ceremony onboard the U.S.S.
Kearsarge, anchored in Guantanamo Bay.1 6 1 While the Base is on
both sides of the entry to the Bay, Cuban vessels and those ves-
sels trading with Cuba have a right to pass freely to the upper bay
and the Cuban ports of Boqueron and Caimanera. To Fidel Cas-
tro, however, the Base is "a dagger plunged in the heart of Cu-
ban soil." Guantanamo thus resembles Gibraltar in Spain, East
Timor in Indonesia, or Nagorno Karabakh in the Caucusus
Mountains in being an unwelcome outpost.
Guantanamo started as a coaling station for U.S. Navy oper-
ations in the Caribbean; the first U.S. military installation outside
the continental United States. In that era, navies depended on
coal to fire the burners to produce the steam to propel their
steel warships. Coal ships (colliers) did not accompany the fleets
since they were regarded as dangerous and impractical; instead,
land-based coaling stations around the world were considered
essential, preferably controlled by the colonial power whose fleet
would be serviced. After navies switched to petroleum for pro-
pulsion during the First World War, oil tankers (fleet oilers) ac-
companied the operating fleets, thereby rendering coaling sta-
tions obsolete;1 62 however, two new uses for Guantanamo had
already been found.
The U.S. Atlantic Fleet operated out of naval bases at Ports-
mouth, Boston, New London, New York, Philadelphia, and Nor-
folk. All were affected by winter weather to the point where
training of the peacetime Navy was often disrupted; thus, an all-
weather instruction center for refresher training of vessel crews
and "shakedown" cruises of new vessels was set up at the Guanta-
namo Base. The Fleet Maintenance Center (a repair facility) was
161. The metes and bounds were fixed from May 27 to July 8, 1903 by a Joint
Commission at 11,661,983 hectares or 28,812,360 acres. The grant also includes adja-
cent waters. See 1 RADM. M.E. MURPHY, USN, THE HISTORY OF GUANTANAMO BAY, 1494-
1952 ch. 3 (1953).
162. The last vessel coaled at Guantanamo was serviced in 1937. See Heinl, supra
note 15.
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established in 1903, and the Fleet Training Center was estab-
lished in 1943. Added over the years were the following: one of
the largest post exchanges in the navy system, two airfields, a
naval hospital, a Communications Center, a Meteorological and
Oceanographical Center, a Schools Command, library, chapel,
cemetery, four cinemas, five swimming pools, a golf course, 400
miles of highways, a race track, English language radio and TV
stations, and a major Fleet Industrial Supply Center. The lease
excludes the possibility of private enterprise on the Base. All of
this activity required civilian help, and the U.S. Base became the
major employer in the region with 2,000 to 3,000 Cuban work-
ers. 163 The Cuban cities of Guantanamo and Caimanera pro-
vided fleet entertainment not available on the Base.
A second reason for retaining the Base at Guantanamo was
the protection of the Panama Canal. The Panamanian Revolu-
tion of November 1903 separated the independent republic of
Panama from Colombia, and the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of
November 18, 1903 granted to the United States the right to
build the 50.7 miles long canal across the Isthmus of Panama
connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Congress finally au-
thorized construction on June 25, 1906, after the conquest of
yellow fever and the decision to build the canal with locks.16 4
The canal was built by the Army Corps of Engineers, led by Colo-
nel George W. Goethals, U.S.A.,16 5 and was opened on August
15, 1914 to world traffic. The opening date, however, occurred
just as the European nations began the First World War. 66 Pres-
163. See id. The permanent shore station personnel included only 300 officers and
men until the Second World War. Occasionally Marines would be brought in to await
transfer to Haiti or the Dominican Republic. Congress appropriated $100,000 to build
a naval station in 1903. A further US$385,000 was appropriated in 1906 for the ship
repair facility and drydock. See Gerald Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197,
1128-29 (1996).
164. See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, THE PATH BETWEEN THE SEAs: THE CREATION OF
THE PANAMA CANAL, 1870-1914, at 438-58, 481-89 (1977).
165. George W. Goethals (1858-1928) from Brooklyn, NY, graduated from West
Point in 1880. He was appointed Chief Engineer to construct the Canal in 1907 and
completed the job in 1914. Promoted to Major General USA in 1915. (He was ap-
pointed the Governor General of the Canal Zone in 1914 and Quartermaster General
in the First World War. He retired in 1923.). See, e.g., Panama Canal Authority, George
Washington Goethals, http://www.pancanal.com/eng/history/biographies/goe-
thals.html (last visited May 14, 2007).
166. The war in Europe began in earnest on August 1, 1914 after the assassination
of the Austrian heir to the throne (June 28, 1914) and the mobilizations of armies and
the demands on allies during July.
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ident Wilson's Neutrality Policy, 16 7 proclaimed the same day as
the canal opened, continued until the declaration of war against
Germany on April 6, 1917.16 Conscious of the danger of Ger-
man occupation of Denmark and its West Indies colony, the
United States purchased the Virgin Islands from Denmark for
$25 million by the Treaty of August 4, 1916.69 Accordingly,
when the United States became a participant in the First World
War in April 1917, it had complete control of access from the
Atlantic to the canal, extending from Guantanamo through His-
paniola (where U.S. Marines had occupied Haiti since July 1915,
and the U.S. Army had occupied the Dominican Republic since
November 1916); 171 Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands were
U.S. fortified possessions.
During the Second World War, the Base was expanded for
anti-submarine activities and a further US$34 million was spent
by the United States on Guantanamo.171 U.S. supervision of the
Caribbean because of the canal continued throughout the entire
period when the United States was in control of the Panama Ca-
nal. Gradual Panamanian operation and control of the canal be-
gan with the Treaty of 1977,172 the United States ceding com-
plete control to Panama on December 31, 1999.
A third rationale for Guantanamo surfaced, and that was
the protection of American interests in Cuba, because of the in-
stability and unpredictability of the Batista dictatorship (1933-
1959), although the Platt Amendment no longer governed,
there was always the possibility of chaos and bloodshed in a land
where many Americans worked and traveled.
167. See generally EARNEST MAY, WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN ISOLATION, 1914-1917
(1959).
168. Declaration of War between Germany and the United States, Apr. 6, 1917, 40
Stat. 1 (1917).
169. Convention for the Cessation of the Danish West Indies, Aug. 4, 1916, U.S.
Den., 39 Stat. 1706. See generally CHARLES TANSILL, THE PURCHASE OF THE DANISH WEST
INDIES (1932).
170. For information on the U.S. occupations of Haiti and the Dominican Repub-
lic, LUDWELL LEE MONTAGUE, HAITI AND THE UNITED STATES, 1714-1938 (1940) and MEL-
VIN KNIGHT, AMERICANS IN SANTO DOMINGO (1928).
171. See sources collected supra note 170. Coastal artillery, anti-aircraft, and anti-
submarine protection was added during the Second World War. See MURPHY, supra note
161. The book has been updated to 1997 by Capt. John Pomfret, USMC.
172. Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama
Canal ("Panama Treaty"), U.S.-Pan., Sept. 7, 1977, T.I.A.S. No. 10,029, 1161 U.N.T.S.
177 (signed 1977, ratified 1978).
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The Castro uprising in Oriente province, 1956 to 1958,
brought civil strife near the Base, as foreigners were frequently
kidnapped. On June 27, 1958 Raul Castro's band took 29 US
sailors and marines captive and held them as hostages for three
weeks. 173 With the fall of Batista, and his flight into exile on
January 1, 1959, the Base Commander restricted U.S. civilian
and military personnel to the Base, and some Cuban workers
brought their families inside the Base. 174 Evacuation of non-mil-
itary U.S. personnel occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis
from October to December 1962.175 Another result of the mis-
sile crisis was that both Cuba and the United States laid down
minefields on both sides of the fence. The U.S. minefield was
disarmed and dug up in 1999; the Cuban mines remain. During
the existence of the U.S. minefield, 15 military personnel and
five Cubans were killed by the mines. Cuba has also built mili-
tary and naval installations near the Base. Unable to find new
jobs for the Cuban workers at the Base, Castro ordered that no
new Cuban workers could be employed, but those Cubans al-
ready employed were allowed to remain.
The Cold War at the Guantanamo Naval Base continued
even though tensions between the U.S. and the Soviets had
eased after the Cuban Missile crisis, with the "Hot-Line" of June
20, 1963176 and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of August 5,
1963.177 The assassination of President Kennedy on November
22, 1963 and the Politburo coup against Khrushchev in 1964
changed two of the principal actors in the superpower struggle,
but Castro remained, and in 1964 it was Castro who made his
move against the Base.
Guantanamo Naval Base is in an arid region and fresh water
was a problem until 1939 when Cuba provided water from the
Yateras River. In February 1964 Castro cut the water supply but
173. See generally U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Website, History http://
www.nsgtomo.navy.mil (last visited May 14, 2007).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Com-
munications Link, U.S.-U.S.S.R., June 20, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 825, T.I.A.S. No. 5362, 472
U.N.T.S. 163.
177. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space,
and Under Water ("Limited Test Ban Treaty"), Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S.
No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
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this proved to be an easy challenge for the Base to meet as a new
desalination plant, capable of producing three million gallons of
fresh water from sea water daily and new electric generators
made the Base entirely self-sufficient. 178  During the seven
months required to build the US$10 million plant, water was
brought by barge from Jamaica. Except for the Cuban families
that moved onto the Base, Cuban employees were replaced by
U.S. and Jamaican workers. 179
Strategic concepts of the U.S. military changed with the end
of the Cold War in 1989-90, and the importance of Guantanamo
readily declined until a new mission developed with the plight of
thousands of refugee "boat people." This new mission was not
executed in an appropriate manner because U.S. government
officials abused the extraterritorial location to violate their own
rules concerning refugees and asylum seekers that would have
been applied in the continental United States.
The expression "boat people" entered the popular vocabu-
lary after April 1975, the fall of Saigon, as thousands of South
Vietnamese citizens who had worked for the United States or
had some connection with the former government, fled the op-
pression and hardships introduced by the Communists. Because
their departures were forbidden, they risked great perils from
hostile seas and blood-thirsty pirates as they fled in their small
and overcrowded boats. Over time the quality of the vessels and
the nautical skills of their crews declined precipitously; un-
seaworthy sailing boats and even rafts were used to attempt to
178. See ALBINO Ko ET AL., 40 YEARS OF SEAWATER DESLINATION AT GUANTANAMO
BAY, CUBA 1 (2006), available at http://www.energy-recovery.com/news/documents/
40YearsofSWDesalatGuantanomoBay.pdf. Provocative confrontations were the princi-
pal feature of the Guantanamo Naval Base during the time Capt. John D. Bulkeley,
USN (1911-1996) (later Vice Admiral) was in command from November 1963 to July
1966. See Rachel L. Swarns, Obituary, Vice Adm. John D. Bulkeley, 84, Hero of D-Day and
Philippines, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1996. With 5,000 military and 10,000 civilians (military
dependents and employees) the water supply was crucial. See Ko, supra, at 103. In re-
sponse to the arrest of Cuban fisherman off the Florida Keys, Castro closed off the
source of the fresh water (the Yateras River), but fresh water was brought in by barge
until the completion of a US$10-million desalination plant for fresh water. The John-
son Administration responded by calling for the discharge of all Cuban employees who
would not agree to live and spend all their income on the base. See Quirk, supra note
103, at 490-93.
179. Alan Sorkin developed an interesting play of military life at the Base from a
1986 incident in A FEW GOOD MEN (Castle Rock Entertainment 1990), which was made
into a motion picture in 1992 starring Jack Nicholson, Tom Cruise, Demi Moore, Cuba
Gooding, Jr., Kevin Bacon, and Kiefer Sutherland, and directed by Rob Reiner.
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reach Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, where they were
unwelcome, and, where they were unwilling to settle. Because of
their political connection to the U.S. presence in Vietnam, the
U.S. Government considered that there was an obligation to as-
sist in the resettlement of Vietnamese boat people in the United
States.
That exodus from Vietnam coincided with a humanitarian
crisis in Cambodia where the Khmer Rouge regime of Pol Pot
took power in April 1975, eventually killing 1,700,000 of their
own people in the "Killing Fields." Many Cambodians fled into
Thailand, Malaysia and Hong Kong seeking asylum. (The
Khmer Rouge control of Cambodia ended in January 1979.)
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees organized
the emergency efforts to control the worst effects of famine and
disease. In these two circumstances two U.S. programs, "Hu-
manitarian Operation" and the "Orderly Departure Program"
resulted in the resettlement of about 825,000 of these refugees
in the United States from 1979 to 1994.180 (France, Australia,
Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom also accepted the
"boat people" of Indochina.)
Half-a-world away in impoverished Haiti and Cuba, knowl-
edge about asylum in the United States for the Vietnamese boat
people created the impression that "economic refugees" fleeing
poverty would be welcome, if they could only find a way to cross
the seas to America. In Cuba the end of Soviet economic assis-
tance had made civilized life very difficult for ordinary non-polit-
ical Cubans who sought to escape Cuba's new poverty.
The problem for the effective administration of immigra-
tion policy was the presence of economic refugees among politi-
cal refugees with a "well-founded fear of persecution." Congress
revised these laws in 1980 to tighten the asylum provisions in the
Refugee Act.' 8 ' The greatest number of cases concerned Hai-
tians in the nine months from November 1991 to July 1992.
That time period began after the Haitian military coup d'6tat
against the elected president, Jean Bertrand Aristide, when
armed thugs of the former Duvalier dictatorship terrorized the
180. Humanitarian Operation Program ("HO") 1989-1994 and Orderly Departure
Program ("ODP") resulted from the Agreement on the Special Release Reeducation
Center Detainee Resettlement Program, Aug. 28, 1989 U.S.-Viet., 29 I.L.M. 215 (1990).
181. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006)).
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population by looting and random killings. A great number of
small, unseaworthy boats and rafts, all overloaded with people
and baggage, began the almost 800-mile voyage to Florida. Very
soon most of these vessels were in peril of foundering, and U.S.
Navy and Coast Guard vessels responded to their cries for help;
however, President Reagan had ordered that the interdicted
boat people not go to Florida but to the Guantanamo Base for
immediate assistance.182 On May 24, 1992 President George
H.W. Bush issued an Executive Order effective beyond the terri-
torial waters of the United States that the interdicted Haitians
were to be returned directly to Haiti, without any U.S. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service ("INS") refugee screening.'83
(This procedure was challenged, unsuccessfully, in the Supreme
Court) .184
The 36,000 Haitians were divided into two main groups:
those "screened out" for immediate return to Haiti (approxi-
mately 25,000) and those "screened in" for resettlement outside
Haiti because they met the standard of a "credible fear of re-
turn" (approximately 10,500).85 It was the second group that
created the problem as the INS took no action to move the
182. Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (Sept. 29, 1981).
183. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23133 (May 24, 1992). See generally Capt.
Gary W. Palmer, USCG, Guarding The Coast: Alien Migrant Interdiction Operations at Sea,
29 CONN. L. REv. 1565 (1997).
184. See generally Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993). The issue
before the Supreme Court was the decision to return the boat people to Haiti from ship
or from Guantanamo without providing an opportunity to seek asylum in the United
States. In the view of the Haitian supporters, the boat people were refugees covered by
the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, which imposes the duty of non-refoulment on signato-
ries-i.e.: that no Party State shall return a refugee ... to a State where his life or
freedom would be threatened, see id. art. 33, a treaty obligation to which a U.S. statute
conforms. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252-53. The eight to one decision written by Justice Stevens
interprets the convention's plain language to forbid the return of the refugee from the
territory of the contracting state and states that the treaty is silent concerning the appli-
cation of the duty outside its borders; there is an exception to the obligation for people
who are dangers to the security "of the country in which he is." Thus, the boat people
have no rights under the treaty because they were never in U.S. territory. Justice
Blackman's dissent implied a more general humanitarian obligation never to return
refugees to their persecutors, because the treaty does not define the geographical area
from which the return is made, but it does clearly specify the place to which the refugee
may not be sent.
185. See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1040-41 (E.D.N.Y.
1993). The decision was vacated on February 22, 1994 after approval of the class action
settlement agreement.
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"screened in" Haitians but detained them in Camp Bulkeley at
Guantanamo, while seeking to resettle some of them in other
Caribbean locations. The responses of the governments of Be-
lize and Honduras were positive for persons free of the HIV vi-
rus.18 1 (Alien persons with certain communicable diseases are
excludable from admission to the United States). Accordingly,
all the "screened in" people were subject to testiig for the HIV
virus, a predictor of the incurable and deadly AIDS.
Those testing positive for HIV were segregated and con-
fined in a special camp. The immediate result was the indefinite
incarceration of 267 people who had tested positive for HIV.
While this action created a political storm in the United States,
the continued detention of more than 8,000 people in tents and
decrepit buildings at Guantanamo produced riots and a hunger
strike. The hunger strike was taken up on college campuses in
the United States. It was in this context that the status of the
Haitian detainees at Guantanamo was reviewed by Judge Sterling
Johnson of the United States Court for the Eastern District of
New York. 1 8 7
Judge Johnson first allowed class action for "all Haitian citi-
zens who have been or will be ... 'screened in' . . . who are now,
will be or have been detained on Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base .. ."188 The "well-founded fear of persecution" hearings
without lawyers for the detainees violated existing statutes and
were permanently enjoined. 89 Furthermore, the Court found
that the conditions in the camps for indefinite and arbitrary de-
tention, inadequate medical care and disciplinary punishments
violated the Due Process of Law requirement of the Constitu-
tion, thus, "screened-in" plaintiffs must be immediately released
(to anywhere but Haiti)190 The U.S. Government did not appeal
this decision.
Judge Johnson had no difficulty with his court's jurisdiction
in consequence of the position of Guantanamo in American law,
noting the First Amendment says that: "Congress shall make no
186. Id. at 1035.
187. See BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, STORMING THE COURT: How A BAND OFYALE LAW STU-
DENTS SUED THE PRESIDENT-AND WON 136-40 (2005); see also Harold Hongju Koh,
America's Offshore Refugee Camps, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 139, 141-64 (1994).
188. Hatian Ctrs. Council, 823 F. Supp. at 1049.
189. Id. at 1050.
190. Id.
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law... abridging the freedom of speech" U.S. Const. Amend. 1
applies on Guantanamo Bay Naval Base which is under the com-
plete control and jurisdiction of the United States government,
and where the government exercises complete control over all
means of communication."
After the decision not to appeal, the "screened-in" refugees
were admitted into the United States, and the HIV detention
center was closed.
Further turmoil in Haiti and Cuba in the 1994-1995 period
brought at least 45,000 Cuban refugees to Guantanamo and
more Haitian refugees. This time the Haitians were returned
directly to Haiti, but the provisions for automatic asylum for
Cubans in the United States had been replaced by an agreed
quota system.' 91 The drama of boat people ended after a small
number of illegal Chinese were sheltered at Guantanamo in
1997.
The large military commands began to abandon Guanta-
namo in 1995 as the southern states of the United States de-
manded the transfer of naval activities there. The Fleet Training
Center relocated to Florida, and the Maintenance Facility was
disestablished, 19 2 but Guantanamo would not be allowed to fade
away. After the attacks on New York and Washington on Sep-
tember 11, 2001, the United States' war on terrorism produced
new uses for the Base. The Southern Command Joint Task
Force was established for anti-terrorism activities and when the
United Nations' war on the Afghan Taliban began to produce
captives, the Base was designated as a detention center begin-
ning in January 2002.193 In 2006 Al-Qaeda captives were trans-
191. Cuban immigration was governed by the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act for
Cubans Seeking Asylum in the United States. There is now an annual quota of 20,000.
See Maria E. Sartori, The Cuban Migration Dilemna: An Examination of the U.S. Policy of
Temporary Protection in Off-Shore Safe Havens, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 319, 327 (2001).
192. See U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Website, supra note 173.
193. Guantanamo's uses as a detention center or prison, designed to produce in-
telligence for the war on terror rather than to serve punitive or correctional purposes,
began in January 2002 when a temporary external stockade, Camp X-Ray, was hastily
thrown together to receive prisoners from the Afghanistan War. A more elaborate facil-
ity, Camp Delta, was quickly constructed for interrogation as the number of prisoners
multiplied; another facility, Camp Echo, would be constructed for client interviews after
they were authorized. Prison construction has continued with Camp Five, a super-maxi-
mum security prison for the most incorrigible and uncooperative and Camp Six, a bar-
racks with communal conditions for minimal risk prisoners. A temporary facility for
juveniles was also provided. See John C. K Daly & Martin Sieff, UPI Intelligence Watch,
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ferred to an enlarged facility. "Detention center" does not accu-
rately describe its function after 2002 as a permanent warehouse
for men expected to be sources of intelligence over an indefinite
period. Determination of the status of these prisoners will be
discussed in Sections V and VI.
IV. THE GUANTANAMO LEASE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Treaty law is one of the areas of customary international law
codified under the International Law Commission194 and put in
treaty form at a Diplomatic Conference at Vienna in 1968-69.95
UNITED PRESS INT'L, Jan. 11, 2005, available at http://www.upi.com/Security-
Terrorism/Analysis/2006/01/ 11/upijintelligencewatch/9786/.
194. The International Law Commission ("ILC") was established by the General
Assembly in 1947, initially only fifteen members, they were to be experts, not represent-
atives of governments, to fulfill the mandate of Article 13 of the Charter to "en-
courag[ing] the progressive development of international law and its codification."
The vast number of projects of codification and development arising from the work of
the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations rapidly outstripped the ability of the
Commission to develop priorities in its work, which now deals exclusively with public
international law issues. See G.A. Res. 174(11), U.N. Doc. A/Res/174(11) (Nov. 21,
1947).
The subject of treaty law occupied the Commission-then twenty-five members,
now thirty-four-for fifteen years during which a series of eminent British scholars
served the Commission as special rapporteurs: Prof. James Brierly of Oxford, Sir
Hersch Lauterpacht, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, and Sir Humphrey Waldock also of Ox-
ford. During those years, however, the number and character of the member nations of
the U.N. changed as former colonies gained independence from colonial masters and
the very expertise of the British components in the commission's product was regarded
with suspicion and even hostility by developing countries.
The ILC was not the first effort at codifying treaty law. The League of Nations
looked at the subject in 1927 in a study by a Group of Experts and Prof. Manley 0.
Hudson of the Harvard Law School and his group of experts prepared a Draft Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties. See Laurence Preuss, Note, Survey of International Law in
Relation to the Work of Codification of the International Law Commission, 43 AM. J. INT'L L.
829, 829-30 (1949).
The classic treatise on the customary law of treaties is by Lord McNair, entitled The
Laws of Treaties (1961).
The work of the Commission on the subject is reported annually in the ILC year-
books. The Commission's Report of a seventy-five article draft treaty, U.N.G.A. 21st
Session, Official Records, Supp. 9, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (1966), is conveniently
printed in 61 A.J. INT'L L. 263-285 (1967).
195. The General Assembly authorized the Diplomatic Conference after a review
of the ILC Draft in the Sixth (Legal) Committee. See G.A. Res. 2287 (XXII), U.N. Doc.
A/Res/2167(XXII) (Dec. 6,1967); G.A. Res. 2166(XXI), U.N. Doc. A/Res/2166(XXI)
(Dec. 8, 1966). The Diplomatic Conference met at the Hofburg Palace in Vienna in
two sessions in Spring 1968 and Spring 1969, attended by 110 nations. Because of a
large number of new nations with small delegations, the work of the Conference was
done in the Committee of the Whole rather than subdivided on topical lines. Although
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The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("Vienna Con-
vention") entered into force in 1980;196 however, it has not yet
been ratified by the United States, even though it was presented
to the Senate for advice and consent by President Nixon in
1971.97
The diplomatic conference at Vienna was not without con-
troversy. Forty-one of the 110 states that participated had
achieved independence after 1945. Debates at the conference
often appeared to be the struggles of these developing, newly
independent nations to emerge from a colonialism seemingly
being re-imposed by developed nations claiming to be preserv-
ing the stability of treaties.
Although the treaty has languished in the Senate, lacking an
advocate to shepherd it through to ratification, the U.S. Depart-
ment of State considers the Vienna Convention on The Law of
Treaties to be the authoritative guide to current treaty law, in
effect a restatement of customary international law. 98 Accord-
ingly, the Guantanamo treaty-based lease will be examined
under the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, although the convention is not retroactive 99 and would
only be analogous in a United States-Cuba dispute.
Just as modern contract law seeks to preserve the contrac-
tual relationship rather than terminate it, 20 0 so the Vienna Con-
decisions by consensus rather than by vote had emerged in the General Assembly, vot-
ing was used to determine many controversial issues.
196. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("Vienna Convention"), May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, reprinted in 63 AM.J. INT'L. L. 875 (1969). There
are 108 ratifications as of Jan. 1, 2007. It entered into force on Jan. 27, 1980.
197. President Richard Nixon, Message to the Senate Transmitting the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Nov. 22, 1971); see Maria Frankowska, The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 281, 295-96
(1988).
198. S. Exec. Doc L, 92nd Cong. (1971); see Herbert W. Briggs, United States Ratifi-
cation of the Vienna Convention, 73 AM.J. INT'L L. 470, 471 (1979).
199. Article 28 on non-retroactivity is an essential part of the Convention in view of
the developments in a number of areas, especially the invalidity articles. During the
ILC and the Diplomatic Conference, a number of participant States were engaged in
boundary disputes that might have been affected by the Treaty provisions unless the
Convention were prospective only. See Mavrommatis Palestine Concesssion (Greece v.
U.K), 1924 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 2, at 35 (Aug. 30).
200. See 5 MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRAcrs § 24.22 (Joseph M. Perillo
ed., 1998). The ILC said, "[a]s a safeguard for the stability of treaties ... the validity
and continuance in force of a treaty is the normal state of things which may be set aside
only on the grounds and under the conditions provided for in the present articles."
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vention has the same goal, clearly expressed in Article 26,
Pacta Sunt Servanda
Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and
must be performed by them in good faith.
Thus, the Vienna Convention does not make it easy to avoid or
escape treaty obligations, listing about a dozen narrow excep-
tions to the continued viability of treaties.
2 °1
1. The Passage of Time: Articles 45 and 56
Despite efforts to eliminate all treaties imposed by colonial
powers prior to the U.N. Charter,2 °2 the Vienna Convention pro-
vides that international agreements without express provisions
for termination or denunciation are intended to be perpetual
and must be observed.2 3 Article 56 clearly states such treaties
are "not subject to denunciation or withdrawal." Without spe-
cific termination language or the characteristics of necessarily
ephemeral alliances, there is in effect a presumption of
perpetuity unless future treaty drafters intend the opposite re-
sult.20 4  Termination of the Guantanamo lease is by mutual
ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties and Commentaries, reprinted in 61 AM.J. INT'L
L. 285, 387 (1967).
201. See Vienna Convention, supra note 196, arts. 46, 48-49, 50-53, 56-62.
202. Especially in the discussion of the use of travaux prparatoires in the interpreta-
tion of treaties, id. art. 32, treaty invalidity due to error, fraud, corruption, coercion of
representatives, and States, id. arts. 46-53, acquiescence of States, id. art. 45, and the
definition of peremptory norms-ius cogens, id. arts. 53, 64, implied conditions-rebus sic
stantibus, id. art. 62, and dispute settlement, id. Art. 66. See Richard Kearney & Robert
Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM.J. INT'L L. 495, 519-21, 525-28, 528-34, 535-38, 542-
45, 548-52 (1970). Ambassador Kearney was the United States Member of the Interna-
tional Law Commission and Representative at the Diplomatic Conference; Mr. Dalton is
Head of the Treaty Section in the Office of the Legal Adviser to the Department of
State.
203. See Vienna Convention, supra note 196, art. 56. Article 56 provides:
Art. 56. Denunciation of or Withdrawal from a Treaty Containing No Provi-
sion Regarding Termination, Denunciation or Withdrawal
1. A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and
which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to
denunciation or withdrawal unless:
(A) it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility
of denunciation or withdrawal; or
(B) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the na-
ture of the treaty.
2. A party shall give not less than twelve months' notice of its intention to
denounce or withdraw from a treaty under paragraph 1.
204. The 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, the Convention on the
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agreement or abandonment by the United States.
The presumption of perpetuity is strengthened by the Com-
mand of Article 26 (Pacta sunt servanda) and the presumption of
acquiescence of Article 45 (Loss of a Right to invoke a Ground
for Invalidating, Terminating, Withdrawing from or suspending
the Operation of a Treaty).2o5 Analagous decisions make it plain
that the passage of more than thirty years without objection re-
sults in acquiescence.2 °6
These provisions invalidate the legendary view of General
de Gaulle concerning inconvenient treaties:
Le trait6, c'est comme une rose ou comme une jeune fille;
quand elles sont passes, elles sont pass~es.
207
Age alone does not invalidate treaties, otherwise the organiza-
tions that have been built out of treaties, such as the United Na-
tions (Treaty of 1945)208 or the European Union (Treaty of
1957)209 become evanescent.
2. Rebus Sic Stantibus (All Things Must Stay the Same):
Article 62
The cynical view that all treaties are never more than tem-
porary or conditional was the hidden danger in the rebus sic stan-
tibus doctrine as ILC and the Diplomatic Conference considered
it. 210 This customary doctrine ought not to be part of the same
Territorial Sea, and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S.
205, the Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82,
and the Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499
U.N.T.S. 311, had no provisions for termination, but they are being replaced by the
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea which also has no provisions for termination.
See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
205. See Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain (Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960 I.CJ.
192, 213 (Nov. 18); see also Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), 1962 I.C.J. 6,
23 (Nov. 18)
206. See Temple ofPreah Vihear, 1962 I.CJ. at 23. In the Honduras-Nicaragua case,
the period of alleged acquiescence was sixty-one years; in the Cambodia-Thailand case,
the period was fifty years. Efforts to impose a statute of limitations on claims of invalid-
ity were defeated at the Conference. See Kearney & Dalton, supra note 202, at 526-27.
207. "Treaties are like roses or young ladies, when they've gone by, they've gone
by." De Gaulle, a press conference remark.
208. See generally U.N. CHARTER.
209. See generally Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (Mar. 25, 1957).
210. Report of the ILC on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, May 4 to July 19,
1966, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-First Session, Supplement No.
9, A/6309/Rev.1 [hereinafter I.L.C. Report]; see Oliver Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed
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treaty with pacta sunt servanda, but its long tradition was recog-
nized by most scholars, thus the Vienna Convention preserved
but narrowed the formulation and refrained it in Article 62.211
The circumstances being changed must have been an essen-
tial basis of the consents, and the changed circumstances must
radically transform the extent of obligations remaining.
It could be argued that the change of Guantanamo from a
coaling station, as expressed in the 1903 lease 2 12 to a multi-pur-
pose naval base violated this doctrine. However, the lease says
"coaling and naval stations" and the transformation of vessel pro-
pulsion systems from coal to oil was surely not an essential basis
of the agreement. More importantly, the lease was rewritten in
1934.213 Further, Cuba's obligation to provide the land and
Circumstances (Rebus Sic Stantibus), 61 Am. J. INT'L L. 895 (1967); Kearney & Dalton,
supra note 202, at 542-44; see also Load Line Convention Termination, 40 Op. Atty. Gen.
119 (1941).
211. See Vienna Convention, supra note 196, art. 62. Article 62 states:
Art. 62. Fundamental Change of Circumstances
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard
to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not
foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or
withdrawing from the treaty unless:
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the
consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations
still to be performed under the treaty.
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground
for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty:
(a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or
(b) if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking it
either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obliga-
tion owed to any other party to the treaty.
3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental
change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a
treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground for suspending the operation
of the treaty.
See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 60-65.
212. Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S-Cuba, art. I, Feb. 16-23,
1903, T.S. No. 418 ("The Republic of Cuba hereby leases to the United States, for the
time required for the purposes of coaling and naval stations, the following described
area of land and water situated in the island of Cuba.").
213. Treaty on Relations with Cuba, U.S.-Cuba, May 29, 1934, 48 Stat. 1682. Arti-
cle III of the treaty provides:
Until the two contracting parties agree to the modification or abrogation of
the stipulations of the agreement in regard to the lease to the United States of
America of lands in Cuba for coaling and naval stations signed by the Presi-
dent of the Republic of Cuba on February 16, 1903, and by the President of
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water areas, and the United States obligation to pay rent are not
impeded by the change of fuel-both are pollutants.
The next question concerns the use of Guantanamo as a
prison or detention center. It is loosely referred to as a prison,
but in fact none of the detainees have been tried, convicted and
sentenced. Arguably, a military prison is not a necessary func-
tion of a naval station, but a naval brig for short-term punish-
ments is included on all naval stations. However, the A1-Qaeda
and Taliban prisoners are being detained rather than imprisoned
at hard labor. Their detention, although more severe as to phys-
ical restraints on the person, resembles the detention of the Cu-
ban and Haitian boat people prior to their return to their home-
lands, a detention to which Cuba made no objection.
3. Coercion of the State: Article 52
This highly controversial article making void a treaty pro-
cured by threat or use of force made a fundamental change
from customary international law, 214 as it would have invalidated
hundreds of peace treaties imposed by the victor on the van-
quished. 215 Undoubtedly the new law was mandated by the pro-
vision of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, that no state shall use
force in international relations, and the individual criminal re-
sponsibility of the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Trials.
The inability of the developing nations to add "economic pres-
the United States of America on the 23rd day of the same month and year, the
stipulations of that agreement with regard to the naval station of Guantanamo
shall continue in effect. The supplementary agreement in regard to naval or
coaling stations signed between the two Governments on July 2, 1903, also
shall continue in effect in the same form and on the same conditions with
respect to the said naval station at Guantanamo. So long as the United States
of America shall not abandon the naval station of Guantanamo or the two
governments shall not agree to a modification of its present limits, the station
shall continue to have the territorial area that it now has, with the limits that it
has on the date of the signature of the present Treaty.
Id. at 1683.
214. Customary international law did not prohibit resort to force: war, reprisal or
retaliation. Treaties of 1899 and 1907 at the Hague imposed certain limitations on the
use of force on land and sea and an obligation to make a declaration of war prior to the
commencement of hostilities. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 renounced war as an
instrument of national policy.
215. For example, the Treaty of Peace between the United States and the United
Kingdom of 1783 after the surrender of British forces under General Charles Cornwal-
lis at Yorktown on October 19, 1781. See generally STUART S. MALAWER, IMPOSED TREATIES
AND INTERNATIONAL LAw (1977).
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sure" to the threat or use of force also caused an inability to
agree on explanation of the uses of force that had paralyzed the
General Assembly's efforts to define the nature of the prohibited
force.216
Obviously, the treaty written after the surrender of armies
because of defeat in battle will make the peace treaty void, but
the use of hostages held under threats of death as in the hi-
jacking of aircraft217 or vessels218 or the invasion of an embassy 219
or the threat of chemical, biological or nuclear damage 22' as the
motivating force behind an agreement is the more likely modern
possibility that suggests the applicability of Article 52.
Certainly the 1898 Treaty of Paris between Spain and the
United States was coerced because of the surrender of Spain's
216. In the debates, the withdrawal of promised economic aid was given as an
example of prohibited use of force. See Kearney & Dalton, supra note 202, at 534-35.
The potential victory of the advocates of the "economic pressure" amendment
would have been hollow, as developed nations would not ratify the resulting conven-
tion, accordingly the amendment was withdrawn and a declaration against the threat or
use of pressure in any form was added outside the treaty in the Final Act of the Confer-
ence. Id.
The U.N. General Assembly eventually dealt with the use of force issue in two reso-
lutions: Resolution 2625 on Friendly Relations Between Nations, G.A. Res. 2625(XXV),
U.N. Doc. A/Res/2625(XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970); and Resolution 3314 on the Definition
of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314(XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/Res/3314(XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974).
217. The Black September Hijackings of September 1970 when five 747 aircraft
were hjacked over Western Europe and flown to the Desert of Jordan. See Alona E.
Evans, Aircraft Hijacking: What Is Being Done, 67 AM.J. INT'L L. 641, 644-48 (1973).
218. The Cruise ship Achille Lauro was hijacked in the Mediterranean Sea on Octo-
ber 7, 1985 and the passengers were held hostage for two days and an U.S. citizen, Leon
Klinghoffer, was killed. The hijackers left the ship in Egypt, but their flight out of Egypt
was intercepted by U.S. warplanes and forced to land in Italy where they were prose-
cuted. See Thomas Friedman, Hijackers in Custody: A Special Satisfaction for Israel and U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1985, at A10. As a result, a new treaty emerged. See Antonio Cas-
sese, The International Community's "Legal" Responses to Terrorism, 38 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q.
589, 592 (1989).
219. The United States Embassy at Tehran, Iran was seized by militant "students"
on November 4, 1979. Members of the embassy staff were held hostage until January
20, 1981 when they were released pursuant to the Algiers Accord, negotiated on the last
day of the Carter Administration. The incoming Reagan Administration was urged to
repudiate the financial aspects after the hostages were freed, but eventually decided to
carry out the agreement. The Algiers Accord survived constitutional attack in Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 683-89 (1981).
220. See William J. Broad, Experts Call For Better Assessment of Threats, N.Y. TIMEs,
Oct. 2, 2001, at F1. The Tokyo subway attack by sarin gas of 1995 and the fear of
anthrax poisoning in the U.S. in October 2001 are prominent examples. See Kieth John-
son et al., British Police Fear More Attacks by Terrorists, WALL. ST. J., July 12, 2005, at A2.
Traditional explosives were used in the Madrid and London subway bombings.
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armies and the destruction of the Spanish Atlantic and Pacific
fleets. 22' There is little doubt that the incorporation of the Platt
Amendment into the Cuban Constitution in 1903 was co-
erced,222 but the leases of 1903 and 1934 were made, arguably,
by a Cuban government in full control of its land and people
and not subject to occupation by a hostile army.223
4. Ius Cogens (Impermissible Subject Matter):
Articles 53, 64 and 71
While it is difficult to imagine any human activity that could
not be made the subject of a treaty, nevertheless the Vienna Con-
vention drafters had the experience of recent history near at
hand to give rise to the new concept of the ius cogens peremptory
norm2 2 4 (or the norm erga omnes).225 Violation of ius cogens
norm cannot be the subject of international agreement. The
treaty language is devoid of exemplars because of the inability of
the delegates to agree. 2 6
Obviously peremptory norms, such as the prohibition of the
use of force by individual nations, 227 use of force to compel the
221. See FREIDEL, supra note 17, at 295-302.
222. See BENJAMIN, supra note 76, at 12.
223. The U.S. governor and the U.S. army left Cuba on May 20, 1902 after the
inauguration of President Estrada Palma. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
The lease agreement was negotiated on July 2, 1903 and the ratifications were ex-
changed on October 6, 1903. See Joseph Lazar, International Legal Status of Guantanamo
Bay, 62 AM.J. INT'L L. 730, 734-38 (1968).
224. Jus Cogens-A mandatory norm of general international law from which no
two or more nations may exempt themselves or release one another. BLACK'S LAw Dic-
TIONARY 1295 (7th ed. 1999). See generally Egon Schwelb, Some Aspects ofInternational Ius
Cogens As Formulated by the International Law Commission, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 946 (1967).
The Restatement describes them as "basic standards of international conduct." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 116 (1965).
225. Erga Omnes. Rights belong to the peoples of all nations and cannot be contra-
vened by agreements or votes or decisions. See Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996
I.C.J. 595, 4 (July 11).
226. See Kearney & Dalton, supra note 202, at 535-38. While noting the recent and
rapid development of the concept, the ILC determined that, "the full content of this
rule [is] to be worked out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of international
tribunals." ILC Report, supra note 210, at 81. Some limit on the concept was the addi-
tion to Article 53 of the description that the norm was, "accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole." Id. at 90.
227. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
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payment of debts,,228 the prohibition on piracy,
2 29 slavery, 230
slave trade,231  drug trafficking, 232  and genocide of racial
groups2 3 existed when the Vienna Convention was drafted, but
the list is capable of growth and there are no necessary limita-
tions on that possibility. Thus, an agreement to breach an ex-
isting treaty,2 3 4 to pollute the oceans 23 5 or the atmosphere, 2 36 to
hijack aircraft,2 37 or vessels, 23 8 to torture individuals or take hos-
tages239 or to terrorize 2 4 populations are within the meaning of
ius cogens. These ius cogens analogies are based on international
treaties, the modern form of legislation. The next question is
whether General Assembly Resolutions are (or should be) enti-
228. See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 1, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631.
229. See, e.g., In re PiracyJure Gentium, [1934] A.C. 586 (PC).
230. Twentieth century prohibition on slavery began with the Convention to Sup-
press the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, 46 Stat. 2183.
231. Nineteenth century prohibitions on the slave trade, initially bilateral, became
multilateral in the General Act of Berlin Conference art. IX, Feb. 26, 1885, 165 Consol.
T.S. 485, and the General Act for the Repression of the African Slave Trade, July 2,
1890, T.S. No. 383, 1 Bevans 134, 27 Stat. 886.
232. Drug Conventions: International Opium Convention, Jan. 23, 1912, 8
L.N.T.S. 187; United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 19, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493.
233. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 102 Stat. 3045.
234. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
235. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as
amended by the Protocol of 1978 relating Thereto (Marpol 73/78), Feb. 17, 1978, 17
I.L.M. 546; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF 62/121, 21 I.L.M. 1261.
236. Air Pollution: Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,
Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.AS. No. 11,097, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293, 26 I.L.M. 1529; United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration of Principles,June 16, 1972, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 48/14, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
237. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192.
238. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Mari-
time Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221, 27 I.L.M. 668.
239. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT"), June 26, 1987, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 112
Stat. 2681; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 203.
240. Inability to agree on the definition of terrorist and terrorism has stymied ef-
forts to prepare a general convention; this despite the General Assembly's December 9,
1985 resolution denouncing terrorism. See G.A. Res. 40/61, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess.,
Agenda Item 129, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40.61.
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tied to ius cogens treatment.241 Undoubtedly, the Charter never
intended to create a legislative body in the General Assembly.242
Even so, however, the use of General Assembly Resolutions as
evidence of customary international law243 has been recognized
and does create the possibility of arguing Jus Cogens status, but
the problem for Cuba is the absence of sufficiently analogous
language in the General Assembly's series of resolutions on Per-
manent Sovereignty over Natural Resources2 44 or the 1974 Char-
ter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. 45
The 1934 lease of Guantanamo provides for termination of
the lease by mutual agreement or abandonment by the United
States.24 6 The latter now seems to be the more likely prospect.
Even President Bush has expressed a desire to close the Base,
241. At the time when General Assembly resolutions resulted from voting, it was
argued that resolutions approved nearly unanimously with strong support from all geo-
graphic, economic and political viewpoints, could be used as evidence of customary
international law. See OSCAR SCHAGHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
85-92 (1991); see also OBED AsAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF DECLARATIONS OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1966). Many important treaties emerged
after a positive General Assembly Resolution. See, e.g., Treaty on the Principles Gov-
erning the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205;
Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71; CAT, supra note 239.
Since 1965, consensus has replaced voting and such resolutions often have internal
contradictions necessary to obtain a wide range of sponsors, thus the future use of Reso-
lutions as evidence of customary law is questionable.
242. U.N. CHARTER arts. 10-12. The Charter uses "may" to describe General As-
sembly operations as opposed to the imperative "shall" used in the Security Council
articles.
243. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810, enacted on December 10, 1948 at the begin-
ning of the Cold War, in accordance with UN Charter Articles I and 55 is often de-
scribed as the evidence of customary international law, although at the time of prepara-
tion it was regarded as inspirational rather than legislative. Its provisions were put into
treaty form in two covenants in 1966: The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR"), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 172, and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 4. See
generally Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary International Human
Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1995); Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, The
Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens and General Principles, 1988-1989 AUSTRA-
LIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 82.
244. G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/5217
(1962); accord G.A. Res. 3171, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1973).
245. See Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States ("CERDS"), G.A. Res.
3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
246. See 1934 Lease Agreement, supra note 47, art. III.
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and the Base Realignment and Closure Commission may very
well make such a recommendation.
V. LAWS APPLICABLE IN GUANTANAMO
A. Overview
Guantanamo is not a legal vacuum. A number of laws of the
United States are applicable, but Cuban law does not apply. The
lease agreement provides that the United States has complete
jurisdiction and control of the area;247 there is a reciprocal obli-
gation assumed by both Cuba and the United States to return
fugitives from justice.24
United States military personnel are subject to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") of the United States. 249 The
United States may also administer certain customary laws: the
Law of War,250 Martial Law2 1 or Military Government, 252 in cir-
247. The 1903 Lease Agreement states:
While on the one hand the United States recognizes the continuance of the
ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over the above described areas of
land and water, on the other hand the Republic of Cuba consents that during
the period of occupation by the United States of said areas under the terms of
this agreement the United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and con-
trol over and within said areas.
See 1903 Lease Agreement, supra note 47, art. III. A second lease agreement, signed on
July 2, 1903, provides that:
Fugitives from justice charged with crimes or misdemeanors amenable to Cu-
ban law, taking refuge within said areas, shall be delivered up by the United
States authorities on demand by duly authorized Cuban authorities. On the
other hand the Republic of Cuba agrees that fugitives from justice charged
with crimes or misdemeanors amenable to United States law, committed
within said areas, taking refuge in Cuban territory shall on demand, be deliv-
ered up to duly authorized United States authorities.
See Agreement Between the United States and Cuba for the Lease of Lands for Coaling
and Naval Stations art. IV, U.S-Cuba, Feb. 23, 1903, T.S. No. 426.
248. A mutual extradition treaty was signed April 6, 1904. See Treaty Providing for
the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, U.S.-Cuba, Apr. 6, 1904, T.S. No. 440,
33 Stat. 2265, 6 Bevans 1128.
249. See Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice ("UCMJ"), codified at 10 USC §§ 801-946
(2002).
250. Textual treatment of the law of war may be found in LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: DIsPuTEs, WAR AND NEUTRALrry 201-533 (7th ed., Hersch Lauterpacht
ed., 1952). A number of provisions of the law of war have been codified in the UCMJ:
Article 99 (misbehavior before the enemy in war); Article 100 (subordinate compels
surrenders); Article 101 (countersign offenses); Article 102 (forcing a safeguard); Arti-
cle 103 (offenses involving enemy property); Article 104 (aiding the enemy); and Arti-
cle 105 (misconduct as prisoner of war; Art. 106 espionage).
251. Martial Law implies temporary control of a civilian population by military au-
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cumstances authorized by international law; however martial law
and military government are not part of this discussion. In addi-
tion, a United States statute, the Special Maritime and Territo-
rial Jurisdiction, 253 and a number of federal criminal laws are
thorities during a period when the normal civil officers are not in effective control-
during wartime or in a weather emergency. See Wayne McCormack, Emergency Powers
and Terrorism, 185 MIL. L. REv. 69, 83-87 (2005).
252. Military Government implies temporary performance of normal governmen-
tal functions by specially assigned military officers because of a breakdown in such per-
formance as the result of wartime operations. See Michael J. Frank, US. Military Courts
and the War in Iraq, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 645, 748-53 (2006).
253. 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2001).
7. Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States defined
the term "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States," as
used in this title, includes:
(1) The high seas, any other waters within the admiralty and maritime juris-
diction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State,
and any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States or any citizen
thereof, or to any corporation created by or under the laws of the United
States, or of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, when such
vessel is within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States
and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State.
(2) Any vessel registered, licensed, or enrolled under the laws of the United
States, and being on a voyage upon the waters of any of the Great Lakes, or
any of the waters connecting them, or upon the Saint Lawrence River where
the same constitutes the International Boundary Line.
(3) Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and
under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased
or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the
State in which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal,
dockyard, or other needful building.
(4) Any island, rock, or key containing deposits of guano, which may, at the
discretion of the President, be considered as appertaining to the United
States.
(5) Any aircraft belonging in whole or in part to the United States, or any
citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or under the laws of the
United States, or any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, while
such aircraft is in flight over the high seas, or over any other waters within the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the juris-
diction of any particular State.
(6) Any vehicle used or designed for flight or navigation in space and on the
registry of the United States pursuant to the Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the exploration and Use of Outer space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the Convention on Registration of
Objects Launched into Outer Space, while that vehicle is in flight, which is
from the moment when all external doors are closed on Earth following em-
barkation until the moment when one such door is opened on Earth for dis-
embarkation or in the case of a forced landing, until the competent authori-
ties take over the responsibility for the vehicle and for persons and property
aboard.
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applicable to the Naval Base.254
In circumstances different from the present hostile confron-
tation between Cuba and the United States, there would be re-
ciprocal provisions for jurisdiction concerning the presence of
non-U.S. military personnel in the series of Executive Agree-
ments called Status of Forces Agreements.2 5 5
(7) Any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an offense
by or against a national of the United States.
(8) To the extent permitted by international law, any foreign vessel during a
voyage having a scheduled departure from or arrival in the United states with
respect to an offense committed by or against a national of the United States.
(9) With respect to offenses committed by or against a national of the United
States as that term is used in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act
(A) The premises of United States diplomatic, consular, military or other
United States Government missions or entities in foreign States, including the
buildings, parts of buildings, and land appurtenant or ancillary thereto or
used for purposes of those missions or entities, irrespective of ownership; and
(B) residences in foreign States and the land appurtenant or ancillary thereto,
irrespective of ownership, used for purposes of those missions or entities or
used by United States personnel assigned to those missions or entities.
Nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed to supersede any treaty or interna-
tional agreement with which this paragraph conflicts. This paragraph does
not apply with respect to an offense committed by a person described in sec-
tion 3261 (a) of this title.
254. See United States v. Rogers, 388 F. Supp. 298, 302 (E.D. Va. 1975). Federal
criminal prosecutions must be based on legislated crimes, since the Supreme Court has
held that there are no federal common law crimes. See United States v. Hudson and
Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
The U.S. Code currently lists and defines seventy-two federal offenses from arson,
18 U.S.C. § 81 (2001), to release of state motor vehicle records, 18 U.S.C. § 2721
(2000).
255. In the nineteenth century, powerful colonial nations forced weaker non-Eu-
ropean nations to concede jurisdiction over their non-diplomatic citizens, such as busi-
nessmen, tourists or retirees-to special courts of the colonial power established in the
territory of the weaker nation. These were called Capitulation Courts that thereby
freed Europeans from Islamic law in the Turkish Empire and Africa and from Imperial
laws in China and from tribal laws in Africa. The Capitulation Courts ended by the
middle of the twentieth century. An example of Capitulation courts was the Court in
Egypt established for Europeans. See JASPER Y. BRINTON, THE MIXED COURTS OF EGvIT
(1968).
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO"), in response to the beginning
of the Cold War after the Communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia in February 1948
and the Berlin Blockade (June 23, 1948 to Sept. 30, 1949), was agreed by the United
States, Canada, and ten Western European nations. See North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4,
1949, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, T.I.A.S. 1964, 63 Stat. 2244. See generally Jane E. Stromseth, Sy-
posium, The North Atlantic Treaty and European Security After the Cold War, 24 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 479 (1991). Subsequent to the alliance the NATO nations agreed on proto-
type Status of Forces Agreement regulating the jurisdiction of host nations and guest
military forces, of June 19, 1951 (in force, Aug. 29, 1953); (T.I.A.S. 2846, 199 U.N.T.S.
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While Cuban law was not applied on the Base after the ef-
fective dates of the leases of 1903 and 1934, there were informal
arrangements for the transfer of Cuban nationals accused of
criminal acts on the Base to Cuban jurisdiction; these arrange-
ments ended in 1961.
B. United States Military Personnel
One result of the experience of more than 16 million U.S.
residents with military life in the Second World War was a de-
mand for change in the systems of military justice that had been
used during the conflict.256 Consequently, Congress enacted the
Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950, before the beginning of
the Korean War, but to be effective May 31, 1951 in the middle
of a new conflict, part of the forty-four-year Cold War.2 5 7
67, 14 U.S.T. 1792). Executive Agreements were negotiated between the United States
and individual nations. In fifty-eight years, NATO has expanded to thirty-six nations,
including Eastern Europe in the Partnership for Peace of June 19, 1995. See North
Atlantic Treaty and Other States Participating in the Partnership for Peace Regarding
the Status of Their Forces, June, 19, 1995, T.I.A.S. No. 12,666; see also Agreement Be-
tween the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of their Forces,
June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199 U.N.T.S. 67.
256. See Delmar Karlen, The Personal Factor in Military Justice, 1946, Wisc. L. REV.
394; Delmar Karlen, Lawyers and Courts-Martial, 1946 Wisc. L. REV. 240; see also ROBERT
SHERILL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC is To Music 74-93 (1969)
(Vietnam-era book concerned with the Military Draft but referring to World War II
criticisms). For judicial criticism, see Hicks v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664, 665-66 (3rd Cir.
1944).
257. See Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice ("UCMJ"), codified at 10 USC §§ 801-946
(2002). The UCMJ was enacted and approved May 5, 1950. The Korean War began
with the invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950. The UCMJ became effective May
31, 1951. See generally Howard S. Levie, How It All Started-And How It Ended: A Legal
Study of the Korean War, 35 AKRON L. REV. 205 (2005).
American military law originated before the Constitution; in 1775 the Continental
Congress enacted (1) the Articles of War for the continental army then assembled
outside Boston-it was an adaptation of the British Articles of War and was enacted as a
statute in 1790, revised in 1806, 1916 and 1920, and (2) Rules for the Regulation of the
Navy of the United Colonies, adapted by John Adams-unusual for its time in that it lim-
ited floggings ordered by the Captain to twelve lashes. See Lieutenant Keith J. Allred,
Rocks and Shoals in a Sea of Otherwise Deep Commitment: General Court Martial Size and
Voting Requirements, 35 NAVAL L. REv. 153, 154-58 (1986); Richard Hartzman, Congres-
sional Control of the military in a Multinational Context: A Constitutional Analysis of Congres-
sional Power to Restrict the President's Authority to Place United States Armed Forces under For-
eign Commanders in United Nations Peace Operations, 162 MIL. L. REV. 50, 86-87 (1999).
When Congress created a new navy for the undeclared war with France, Congress en-
acted the 1798 Articles for the Government of the U.S. Navy revised by Congress in 1800,
1862 and 1874, known familiarly as "Rocks and Shoals." Flogging was forbidden in the
Navy in 1862, but not until 1874 in the Army where branding and flogging had been
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The purpose of Congress was to consolidate, unify and cod-
ify the military laws applicable to all of the armed forces of the
United States: Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Coast
Guard. Furthermore, Congress clearly intended to increase the
rights of accused service men and women by mandating the rule
of law through the use of trained lawyers.25 a Congress thereby
common. See Dwight A. Sullivan, Playing the Numbers: Court-Martial Panel Size and the
Military Death Penalty, 158 MIL. L. REv. 1, 9-14 (1998)
The idea of a uniform military law for all branches of the military service had been
raised after the First World War by Professor Edmund M. Morgan of Harvard Law
School, an expert in the law of evidence, in testimony before a Senate Committee in
1919. See Edmund Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 28 MIL.
L. REv. 17 (1965); see also F. Bernays Wiener, The Seamy Side of the World War I Court
Martial Controversy, 123 MIL. L. REv. 109 (1989). Nothing was done until the end of the
Second World War when dissatisfaction with wartime military justice-especially be-
cause of the large number of naval personnel in pre-trial confinement-was loud and
clear from the public and from members of Congress who had been in military service.
The time was ripe because of the creation of a new military branch, the U.S. Air Force,
out of the old U.S. Army Air Corps in 1947. Most important was the unification of all
branches of the military under the Department of Defense, created on July 26, 1947. See
ROBINSON 0. EvERErr, MIuTARYJUSTICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES 9
(1956).
The first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal (1892-1949), formerly Secretary of
the Navy, appointed a Committee to prepare a Uniform Code of Military Justice in July,
1948. Professor Morgan was the Chair of the four-member committee. See Felix E.
Larkin, Prof. Edmund M. Morgan and the Drafting of the Uniform Code, 28 MIL. L. REv. 7
(1965). The Secretary's directive called for a statute, "that would provide full protec-
tion of the rights of persons subject to the Code without undue interference with ap-
propriate military discipline and the exercise of appropriate military functions." Mor-
gan, supra, at 22.
The Morgan Committee prepared a Draft Statute, introduced simultaneously in
Senate and House on February 8, 1949. Lengthy hearings featured many witnesses over
the next three months and amendments were made, the principal documents being:
Uniform Code of Military Justice, Hearings, H.R. Rep. No. 81-491 (1949), and Uniform
Code of Military Justice, Hearings, S. Rep. No. 81-486 (1949). The legislation passed
both houses and slight differences were reconciled in the Conference Committee, and
debate in both houses before Pub. L. No. 81-506 was enacted on May 5, 1950 and ap-
proved by President Truman on the same day. There are two helpful treatises: Military
Justice in the Armed Forces of the United States, written by future judge of the Court of
Military Appeals Robinson Everett (1956), and Justice Under Fire, by Joseph W. Bishop,
Jr. (1974).
258. The 1968 Amendment created the powerful office of the MilitaryJudge. Pre-
viously, the General Court Martial had a Law Officer to rule on motions with a mini-
mum panel of five officer members for verdict and sentence, but Trial Counsel (prose-
cutor) and Defense Counsel were law-trained specialists certified by the Judge Advocate
General of the relevant service. The Special Court Martial, with very limited punish-
ment power, had no law officer, but if trial counsel were a lawyer, defense counsel
would also have to be a lawyer. Review of courts martial began with the staff judge
advocate of the convening authority. Appeal was before the service Board of Review on
facts and law (now renamed Courts of Military Review). Questions of law could be
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acted under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. 259 The Con-
stitution specifically exempts the "land and naval forces" from
the provisions of the Fifth Amendment on Grand Jury indict-
ment for a "capital or otherwise infamous crime." 26 0 No provi-
sion of Article III extends the judicial power of the United States
to courts martial nor does the Article exempt courts martial
from the judicial power. In 1950 Congress had resolved that si-
lence by eliminating direct review of military trials by appeals, 261
nevertheless, the Supreme Court assumed the right to provide
extraordinary relief indirectly or collaterally by habeas corpus. 2 6 2
In 1983 Congress amended the Certiorari provisions to allow ap-
pellate review of the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces in the Supreme Court.2 63
Plenary jurisdiction over members of the U.S. armed forces
applies to: members of regular components of the armed forces
from the time of enlistment or commission until delivery of a
discharge; 264 (but discharged ex-servicemen cannot be arrested
and tried by court martial) ;265 members of reserve components
while on active duty under orders voluntarily accepted; 266 retired
regular component persons entitled to pay;2 6 7 retired reserve
persons hospitalized in a military hospital;268 certain employees
of the federal government in departments such as the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration or Public Health Ser-
vice, assigned to and serving with the armed forces;269 and ser-
appealed to the Court of Military Appeals (since 1994 the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces). See generally Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat.
1335 (1968). The finality of the direct review within the military was upheld in Burns v.
Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 154 (1953).
259. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("Congress shall have power ... to make rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces.").
260. U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land and naval forces").
261. UCMJ, arts. 66, 67(a), .
262. See Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957).
263. Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, § 1259, 97 Stat. 1393 (1983).
264. See UCMJ, art. 2(a)(1).
265. See Quarles, 350 U.S. at 13-15.
266. UCMJ, art. 2(4).
267. Id. art. 2(a)(4).
268. Id art. 2(a)(5).
269. Id. art. 2(a)(8).
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vice academy cadets and fleet reservists.27 °
Congress initially attempted to extend court martial jurisdic-
tion over civilians, "serving with, employed by, or accompanying
the armed forces" outside the United States but authorized
under a Status of Forces Agreement with the foreign nation.2 7 1
This statutory provision has been held to be unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court, despite the usual aversion of the Court to
interference in the military; in Reid v. Covert, the dependent
wives of servicemen were charged with murder on U.S. military
bases, resulting in trial by court martial and sentences to military
prison in the United States.2 72
There are similar provisions for military jurisdiction in time
of war over persons serving with or accompanying the armed
forces, "in the field;" the Supreme Court has not considered the
situation, although military cases appear to limit even this juris-
diction.273
270. Id. art 2(a)(2) (cadets), 2(a)(6) (fleet reserve). The statute also applies to
persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces and "[a]ll per-
sons within an area leased by or otherwise reserved or acquired for the use of the
United States which is under the control of the Secretary concerned and which is
outside the United States." UCMJ, art. 2(a)(12). Both sections are subject to Status of
Forces Agreements ("SOFAs"), which are agreements between a host country and a
foreign nation stationing military forces in the host country, generally regulating the
host country's jurisdiction over the troops stationed therein. See generally Jennifer Gan-
non, Renegotiation of the Status of Forces Agreement Between the United States and the Republic
of Korea, 12 COLO. J. IN 'L ENW'L L. & PoL'v 263, 264 (2000 Y.B.).
271. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 4, 15 (1957). The court heard cases from the
United Kingdom andJapan in which military dependent wives killed their service mem-
ber husbands on the U.S. military bases subject to SOFA. The host country refused to
seek jurisdiction. The dependents were tried by Court martial and sentenced to prison.
After transfer from overseas, the women were imprisoned in the United States where
the writ of habeas corpus was sought on grounds of denial of Constitutional rights
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
Congress considered three solutions to the "accompanying persons" problem: trial
of foreign offenses in the United States; trial in a U.S. court in the foreign country, and
surrender to foreign jurisdiction in all cases. All three were rejected. These cases usu-
ally involve intense diplomatic negotiations. See Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524,
548(1957) (surrender of U.S. military member to Japan for trial and imprisonment).
Reid v. Covert was applied in Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (dependent wife
tried for manslaughter on a non-capital charge), Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960)
(civilian employee on a capital charge of murder), and McElroy v. Giragliardo, 361 U.S.
281 (1960) (civilian employees on non-capital charges of larceny and sodomy).
272. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 1, 3, 5, 40-41; cf. United States v. Averette, 19 U.S.C.M.A.
363 365(1970). The Reid wives' petitions for habeas corpus were granted after the Su-
preme Court decision.
273. Congress has provided new legislation applicable to the non-military mem-
ber. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267; see UCMJ, art. 2(10)- (11); see also Mark Yost & Douglas S.
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Nevertheless, one provision is crystal clear, the UCMJ ex-
tends to "Prisoners of War in custody of the armed forces.1
2 74
Another provision applicable to bases like Guantanamo, or
those in Japanese or Korean territory is, "[areas] leased by or
otherwise reserved or acquired for the use of the United States"
and "outside the United States.... ,275 Bases under NATO Status
of Forces Agreements may remain the territory of the host coun-
try but jointly shared with the United States. 2 7 6
The UCMJ governs those subject to its jurisdiction every-
where, or in the language of the statute, "in all places." But, inter-
preting Article I, Section 8, the Supreme Court interfered with
Congress and the military in the Vietnam War era by drawing
non-statutory limits around military offenses, requiring a military
nexus.27 7 A post-Vietnam court overruled O'Callahan v. Parker
downgrading "nexus" and emphasizing "status."
2 7 8
C. Customary International Law
Under customary international law, military jurisdiction was
Anderson, The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000: Closing the Gap, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 446 (2001).
274. UCMJ, art. 2(9). The expression "Prisoner of War" is found in treaty law,
especially the Geneva Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 47 Stat. § 202.
The law of war contrasts the provisions governing prisoners of war with the status
of "unlawful combatant" to which no P.O.W. rights are guaranteed. In Ex Parte Quiin,
Chief Justice Stone wrote:
Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by
opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture
and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by
military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.
317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942).
275. The Guantanamo Naval Base continues under a 1934 lease. See 1934 Lease
Agreement, supra note 47. During the pre-war period, the United States leased bases
from Great Britain in its Atlantic colonies from Newfoundland to Trinidad.
276. Examples are La Sigonella in Sicily and Rota in Spain.
277. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 272-73 (1969) (five to three majority).
The defendant, an off-duty member of the military, in civilian clothes, in a hotel room
in Honolulu, Hawaii, in peacetime was charged with attempted rape, assault with intent
to rape and house-breaking. The decision warned Congress and the Executive that
exercises of power not subject to the Constitution are limited to the least possible
power. Trial by court martial for an offense without a military connection was held to
be unconstitutional.
278. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 450-51 (1987) (five to three major-
ity). An active duty Coast Guard seaman stationed in Juneau, Alaska was charged with
sexual abuses of two daughters of a fellow Coast Guardsman. O'Callahan was specifically
overruled.
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exercised by a belligerent power that has occupied enemy terri-
tory in wartime under the name Military Government.2 79 In time
of war or peace where public safety is imperiled by the absence
of local police power, the military may exercise Martial Law, 28
0
but the Supreme Court limited its exercise during the American
Civil War where the courts remained open and its processes were
unobstructed.2 81
While the law of war (Ius in bello) has existed for years, de-
fined by Church Councils 28 2 and treatise writers,283 there was no
international enforcement against national executives until the
London Agreement of August 8, 1945.284 The law of war has
developed since that time through resolutions of the U.N. Secur-
ity Council under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter 285 and the
279. Military government. This branch of law owes much to the work of Professor
Francis Lieber (1800-1872) of Columbia Law School. Born in Berlin and imprisoned as
a young radical in Prussia in 1819; on release he fled to England, then to the United
States (1827). He became Professor of History at South Carolina College (1835-1856),
then to Columbia University in New York (1857-1865). He joined the Columbia Law
School Faculty from 1857 until his death. He wrote many texts, including The Code for
Government of the Armed Forces (1863), source for Army General Order 100, Instruc-
tions for the Government of Armies in the Field. See COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed.
2005); Charles Fairman, Some Observations on Military Occupation, 32 MINN. L. REV. 319
(1948); see also DoRis A. GRABER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCU-
PATION, 1863-1914: A HIsToIucAL SURVEY (1949). German actions in Belgium 1914-
1918 began a new species of barbarous treatment of civilian populations.
280. Martial Law. Actual presence and control of a military force authorizes the
enforcement of obedience on all persons therein temporarily. The 1907 Hague Con-
vention (No. V) put limits on the actions of an occupying power. See generally WILLIAM E.
BIRKHIMER, MILITARY GOVERNMENT & MARTIAL LAw (3d ed. 1914).
281. See Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 141-42 (1866).
282. The Second Lateran Council (1139 A.D.) forbade Christians to use the cross-
bow as a weapon. The Third Lateran Council (1179 A.D.) prohibited selling Christians
into slavery and authorized the Truce of God-cessation of hostilities of all types weekly
from Wednesday evening to Monday morning.
283. See treatises De Re Militari et Bello Tractatus (1563), by Pierino Belli (1502-
1575); DeJure Naturae et Gentium (1672), by Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1684); and De
Jure Belli ac Pads (1625), by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645).
284. See International Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Ma-
jor War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280. The United States, United Kingdom,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and France agreed on a four-power court to try
major war criminals. See generally TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG
TRIALS (1992).
285. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/
Res/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827,
U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (May 25, 1993).
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Treaty for the International Criminal Court.28 6
Several parts of the most important substantive law of war
were codified by Congress in the UCMJ: Art. 99 Misbehavior
before the Enemy;28 7 Article 104, Aiding the Enemy in War-
time;2 8 Article 105, Misconduct as prisoner of war;28 9 and Arti-
cle 106, Espionage in Wartime; 2 0 triable by court martial or mili-
tary commission. This codification resulted from uncertainty
about the law applicable to the enemy saboteurs tried by military
commission during the Second World War in Ex Parte Quinin.29'
286. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF 183/9 (1998). The treaty was adopted by vote of 120 to 7 at Rome on
July 17, 1998. The United States voted no. It entered into force on July 1, 2002.
287. Misbehavior before the enemy in wartime includes any person who:
(1) runs away; (2) shamefully abandons, surrenders or delivers up any com-
mand.., which it is his duty to defend; (3) through disobedience, neglect, or
intentional misconduct endangers the safety of any such command . .. ; (4)
casts away his arms or ammunition; (5) is guilty of cowardly conduct; (6) quits
his place of duty to plunder or pillage; (7) causes false alarms... ; (8) willfully
fails to do his utmost to encounter, engage, capture or destroy any enemy
troops . . . ; (9) does not afford all practicable relief and assistance to any
troops, combatants, vessels, or aircraft of the armed forces [of] ... the United
States or their allies when engaged in battle.
UCMJ art. 99.
288. UCMJ art. 104:
Any person who - (1) aids, or attempts to aid, the enemy with arms, ammuni-
tion, supplies, money, or other things; or (2) without proper authority, know-
ingly harbors or protects or gives intelligence to or communicates or corre-
sponds with or holds any intercourse with the enemy either directly or indi-
rectly; shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial or
military commission may direct.
289. UCMJ art. 105:
Any person subject to [the UCMJ] who, while in the hands of the enemy in
time of war - (1) for the purpose of securing favorable treatment by his cap-
tors acts without proper authority in a manner contrary to law, custom, or
regulation, to the detriment of others of whatever nationality held by the en-
emy as civilian or military prisoners; or (2) while in a position of authority over
such persons maltreats them without justifiable cause; shall be punished by
death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.
See Howard S. Levie, Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict (Naval War Col-
lege Int'l. L. Studies, No. 59, 1978).
290. UCMJ art. 106:
Spies. Any person who in time of war is found lurking as a spy or acting as a
spy in or about any place, vessel or aircraft within the control or the jurisdic-
tion of any of the armed forces, or in or about any shipyard, any manufactur-
ing or industrial plant, or any other place or institution engaged in work in aid
of the prosecution of the war by the United States, or elsewhere, shall be tried
by a general court-martial or by a military commission and on conviction shall
be punished by death.
291. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); see also supra note 274.
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D. U.S. Federal Law
1. The Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the
United States
The first Congress dealt with murders outside state jurisdic-
tion, applicable on the "high seas, or in any river, haven, basin or
bay out of the jurisdiction of any... state. ''292 Gradually Con-
gress added other felonies: piracy, mutiny, robbery, burglary
and rape.293 In 1909 Congress reorganized these provisions as
the Special Maritime Jurisdiction. Further revisions applied
these laws to aircraft and land areas beyond the jurisdiction of
any state.29 4
A 1966 incident demonstrated the usefulness of the proce-
dure. A Cuban national, living and working on the Base, killed a
Jamaican who also lived and worked on the Base. In the absence
of diplomatic relations, no transfer of the prisoner to Cuba was
possible and no United States Court existed on the Base, but
under the special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction Act, the
federal court to which an accused is first brought has jurisdiction
over the accused. The accused Cuban was flown to Miami where
he was indicted for the crime, but a determination of mental
incompetence to stand trial, as part of an insanity defense, ren-
dered a trial impossible.
Violations of the law of war are to be tried by courts martial
292. See Act of April 30, 1790, § 8, 1 Stat. 112 (1790). Congress has provided as
follows:
Art. 36: (a) Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof,
for cases arising under this chapter triable in courts-martial, military commis-
sions and other military tribunals, and procedures for courts of inquiry, may
be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he consid-
ers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts, but
which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter.
The Manual for Courts-Martial provides as follows:
[M]ilitary commissions.., shall be guided by the appropriate principles of law
and rules of procedure and evidence prescribed for courts-martial.
MCM pmbl. (2) (b) (2). Neither of these provisions has been repealed or rescinded by
subsequent legislation.
293. Act of April 30, 1791, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112 (currently 18 USC §§ 1651-1690,
2111-19, 2031-2032 (repealed)).
294. Congress has regularly added offenses to Section 18 of U.S. Code. See generally
Christopher C. Burris, Time for Congressional Action: The Necessity of Delineating the Jurisdic-
tional Responsibilities of Federal District Courts, Courts-Martial, and Military Commissions to Ty
Violations of the Laws of War, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REv. 4.
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of members of the U.S. military or by military commission for all
others, but the procedures and evidentiary rules are to be those
of the UCMJ. 29 5
It is apparent that although U.S. law could be clearer, it is
adequate to deal with criminal offenses by U.S. citizens or non-
U.S. personnel before an authorized court on the U.S. Naval
Base at Guantanamo, Cuba.
Having analyzed the law applicable in Guantanamo, the ob-
vious question is: "Why would the United States build a new U.S.
prison at an obsolete naval base in a foreign country?" The an-
swer may have been a legal miscalculation caused by the conflict-
ing answers given by the Supreme Court to the question whether
the Constitution follows the flag.
This issue does not seem to have been raised before the
United States acquired an overseas empire in 1898.296 As previ-
ously noted, the acquisitions were very controversial 297 and that
controversy was reflected in the Supreme Court's review of a se-
ries of problems in the Insular Cases298 concerned with trade pol-
icy on which the justices divided five to four in voluminous opin-
ions. In DeLima v. Bidwell,299 the court held that the United
States tariff on imports from Puerto Rico could no longer be
295. Before the Second World War, many federal installations, such as forts and
naval bases were built in federal enclaves-like the District of Columbia-where the
state had ceded its jurisdiction as well as title to the land; however, in the rapid build-up
of military installations before and during the Second World War, the federal govern-
ment merely bought the land, to which state law continued to be applied through the
Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13(a). The predicate is the commission of
an act, "punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State, Terri-
tory, Possession, or District" but which has not been made punishable by Act of Con-
gress. Id.
296. In reRoss, 140 U.S. 453, 464-65 (1891), involved a trial before the court of the
U.S. consul at Yokohama, Japan where a British subject seaman had killed a ship's of-
ficer of the U.S. ship on which both were serving while the ship was in Yokohama in
Japanese territorial waters. The seaman was arrested, tried and convicted of murder by
the U.S. consul in his court, as authorized by statute applicable "in non-Christian coun-
tries." Id. at 465. The conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court on the basis of
long-standing custom and history, because,"... the Constitution can have no operation
in another country." Id.
297. See Ramos, infra note 379, at 226.
298. 182 U.S. 1, 180-81, 200 (1901). See generally Charles Fairman, Some New
Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag, I STANFORD L. REV. 587 (1949); Gerald
Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 LOYOLA L. REv. 1 (2004).
299. 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
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collected since Puerto Rico had ceased to be a foreign country at
the treaty of peace in the war with Spain. In Dooley v. United
States,3°° there could not be a tariff in Puerto Rico on exports
from the United States for the same reason. In Downes v. Bid-
well, 30 1 Justice Brown explained that it was for Congress alone to
decide what provisions of the Constitution and laws of the
United States to apply to the newly acquired territories, because
the Constitution did not apply immediately to the benefit of
these existing populations. (Unlike the nineteenth century set-
tling of the West where immigrants and territorial governments
arrived in gradual succession.) Thus, the Constitution did not
follow the flag. Justice Fuller's dissent reached the opposite con-
clusion; the intermediate position was that of Justice White con-
curring in the result.
The Supreme Court confronted issues of criminal law two
years later30 2 and the result was similar to the Insular Cases. The
Republic of Hawaii had been annexed to the United States in
1898 during the Spanish American War. After the annexation
but before Congress authorized the territorial government,
Osaki Mankichi, a Japanese subject, was tried and convicted of
the crime of manslaughter in a Hawaiian court without indict-
ment by Grand Jury and a unanimous jury verdict, procedures
authorized in the previous Kingdom of Hawaii.3" 3 Petitioner
Mankichi sought habeas corpus on the ground that his convic-
tion violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Consti-
tution. In a five to four decision, Justice Henry Brown, author of
the Insular Cases, rejected habeas corpus and held that these pro-
visions were not fundamental and had long been accepted as
suitable for Hawaii.30 4 In view of the acquisition of Hawaii by
voluntary annexation rather than conquest and treaty, the
300. 182 U.S. 222, 235-36 (1901) (citing DeLima and holding similarly).
301. 182 U.S. 244, 289-90 (1901). Justice Fuller, in dissent, denounced un-
restricted power in distant provinces. Id. at 372-73. Justice White, later Chief Justice
from 1910 to 1921, believed that the Constitution and laws followed the flag into "incor-
porated" territories, but as to "unincorporated" territories, Congress can decide on
those provisions (other than fundamentals) to be applied. Id. at 288-94. There is, how-
ever, some embarrassing racist prejudice in his exclusion of uncivilized races unfit to
receive the benefits of U.S. citizenship. Id. at 306.
302. See Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903).
303. Id. at 234 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
304. Id. at 218. A similar result concerning jury trial in the Philippines was
reached in Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
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Brown opinion did not rely on the Insular Cases, but Justice
White's concurrence was based on the Insular Cases.3"' The dis-
senters considered that all the Constitutional provisions applied
from the moment of annexation, citing Ex Parte Milligan and dis-
tinguishing the Insular Cases.3 °6
The right to jury trial was again considered twenty years
later as it applied to Puerto Rico. In Balzac v. The People of Porto
Rico (sic),3 ° 7 the defendant was accused of the misdemeanor of
criminal libel in the newspaper of which he was editor. He de-
manded a jury trial but it was denied and he was tried and con-
victed by the court without a jury.30 8 Referring to the Insular
Cases, Chief Justice Taft held that the right to jury trial did not
apply.30 9 (He also found that the First Amendment did not pro-
tect this "excessive and outrageous" speech, thus Justice Holmes
merely concurred in the result.)31 °
Government attorneys then applied the rule of the Insular
Cases in combination with the canon of construction against the
extraterritorial application of statutes31' to a wide range of issues
dealing with U.S. government conduct beyond the international
boundaries of the United States.
That permissive attitude was certainly questioned if not put
to rest in Reid v. Covert.3 12 Justice Black's opinion is a landmark
for the supremacy of the Constitution:
At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United
States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill
of Rights. The United States is entirely a creature of the Con-
stitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It
can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by
the Constitution. When the government reaches out to pun-
ish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights
and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life
305. Id. at 219.
306. Id. at 245, 237. Justice Harlan's dissent stresses the conditional approval of
the 1787 Constitution by important states until the promise of a Bill of Rights was made,
as evidencing the fundamental nature of the grand jury and unanimousjury. Id. at 244-
45.
307. 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
308. Id. at 300.
309. Id. at 305, 309.
310. Id. at 314.
311. See generally Equal Employment Opp'y Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244 (1991).
312. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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and liberty should not be stripped away just because he hap-
pens to be in another land ....
Then Justice Black becomes prophetic.
The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional
protections against arbitrary government are inoperative
when they become inconvenient or when expediency dictates
otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flour-
ish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and
undermine the basis of our government. 314
But how to deal with the Insular Cases? Justice Black dismissed
them.
The "Insular Cases," which arose at the turn of the century,
involved territories which had only recently been conquered
or acquired by the United States. These territories, governed
and regulated by Congress under Article IV, § 3, had entirely
different cultures and customs from those of this country ....
Moreover, it is our judgment that neither the cases nor their
reasoning should be given any further expansion. 315
Of the eight participating justices, Black's opinion spoke for
Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Douglas only.
Justices Clark and Burton dissented;3 16 and Justices Harlan and
Frankfurter concurred in the result because it was a capital case,
but were unable to sweep away the wise and necessary gloss of
the Insular Cases."'7
The Insular Cases still haunt the jurisprudence of the Su-
preme Court, as seen in the amazing opinion of Chief Justice
Rehnquist in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez318 where a Mexican
citizen drug dealer, wanted by the United States Drug Enforce-
ment Agency [DEA], had been kicked out of Mexico (literally)
into the hands of the waiting D.E.A. at the border for prosecu-
tion in the U.S. on charges of drug smuggling.319 The real evi-
dence in the case, however, was the product of a subsequent
search of the accused's apartment in Mexicali, Mexico by D.E.A.
agents with the approval of the Mexican police. The accused's
313. Id. at 5-6.
314. Id. at 14.
315. Id. at 13-14.
316. Id. at 78-90.
317. Id. at 49 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 65 (Harlan, J., concurring).
318. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
319. Id. at 262-63.
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effort to exclude the documentary evidence from the search was
based on the Fourth Amendment's requirement of "Warrant(s)
... upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched .... ,,32
The ChiefJustice, however, was concerned with the opening
words of the Amendment and not the prohibited conduct, as he
finds the words, "The right of the people" to be more significant
than the introductory words of the Fifth Amendment ("No per-
son shall be held...,,) 21 and Sixth Amendment ("In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused...").122 The ChiefJustice's reasoning
was that the Fourth Amendment was, "to protect the people of
the United States against arbitrary action by their own Govern-
ment; it was never suggested that the provision was intended to
restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens
outside of the United States territory."3 2' Accordingly, when vio-
lations of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights are tolerated
outside the United States,3 24 a fortiori, "[i]f such is true of the
Fifth Amendment, which speaks in the relatively universal term
of 'person,' it would seem even more true with respect to the
Fourth Amendment, which applies only to 'the people."' 3 25
320. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
321. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a GrandJury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger, nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation.
322. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
323. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 206.
324. SeeJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
325. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269.
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The Insular Cases then receive a resurrection: "certainly, it is
not open to us in light of the Insular Cases to endorse the view
that every constitutional provision applies wherever the United
States Government exercises its power. "326
The Chief Justice's opinion for three colleagues also en-
joyed concurrences by Kennedy3 2 7 and Stevens3 28 but produced
expectable dissents by Brennan,329 Marshall, and Blackmun.33 °
Accordingly, the Insular Cases, like the common law writs, may
have been buried by Justice Black, but, they "rule us from their
graves. "
3 3 1
Non-U.S. personnel, potential defendants before U.S. Mili-
tary Commissions at Guantanamo have been before the Su-
preme Court in two cases: Rasul v. Bush,332 and Hamdan v. Rum-
sfeld.333 The latter case is more closely concerned with military
commissions and will be discussed infra, but Rasul v. Bush more
directly deals with the applicability of the Constitution and laws
to Guantanamo. Both majority opinions are by Justice Ste-
vens.
3 3 4
326. Id. at 268-69.
327. Id. at 275, 278 (search not a violation of"due" process, because impracticable
in foreign countries where privacy may have a different meaning than in the United
States).
328. Id. at 279 (search not unreasonable).
329. Id. at 279-97. The fact of criminal prosecution in the United States is the
sufficient nexus of the accused to the U.S. Constitution.
330. Id. at 297 (no testing of probable cause to determine reasonableness of
search).
331. "The forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their graves."
FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAw: A COURSE OF
LECTURES 1 (A. H. Chaytor & W. J. Whittaker eds., 1936).
332. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
333. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
334. John Paul Stevens, born in Chicago in 1920, attended the University of Chi-
cago where he was Phi Beta Kappa and earned the A.B. in 1941. He then served on
active duty as a naval officer in the Second World war from 1942 to 1945. After release
from the Navy, he attended Northwestern University Law School where he was editor-
in-chief of the law review. He achieved the highest grades in the school, and received
the J.D. in 1947. He then served as law clerk in 1947-1948 to Supreme Court Justice
Wiley B. Rutledge (1894-1949), a passionate New Deal supporter who had been a law
professor (Colorado) and law school dean (Washington University of St. Louis and
Iowa), before appointment to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (1939-1943).
After his clerkship, Stevens returned to Chicago to practice law, specializing in antitrust
law from 1948 to 1970, during which time he taught briefly at the University of Chicago
Law School and Northwestern University Law School. In 1970 he was appointed to the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals by President Nixon. He was elevated to the Supreme
Court by President Ford, replacing Justice William 0. Douglas. Initially, he was often
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In Rasul, the question is: Do the courts of the United States
lack jurisdiction to review the legality of indefinite detention of
foreigners by the United States military outside the United
States? The answer of the majority is negative, because these for-
eigners have the "privilege of litigation" in U.S. courts, unaf-
fected by their status as prisoners or detainees.335
The court's answer is theoretical only, the merits of the peti-
tion are not addressed. The precedential problem was the 1950
decision of Johnson v. Eisentrager,"6 which Justice Stevens first dis-
the bridge between the last of the old "liberal" court (Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun) and the new Burger-Rehnquist Court. He wrote the majority opinion re-
viewing the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of Article IV and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in the privilege to travel for welfare recipients in Saenz v. Doe, 520 U.S. 489 (1999).
It is not unfair to say thatJustice Stevens has not become more liberal, rather, the Court
has become more conservative, thus he has become the Great Dissenter. Some of his
dissents are not only notable but noble, others are quite blunt and confrontational. See
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000);
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 878
(1997); United States v. Nordic Village Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992); Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517 (1984); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Nat'l League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). His maritime law dissents have also been remarkable. See
Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Vimar Seguros y
Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995); Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499
U.S. 603 (1991). Now, as senior associate justice he assigns the writing of opinions in
which the ChiefJustice is in the minority. See Symposium: The Jurisprudence ofJustice
Stevens, 74 FoRD. L. REv. 1557-2369 (2006).
335. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485. Shafiq Rasul, a British subject, was arrested by an
Afghan warlord and handed over to U.S. forces and transported to Guantanamo in
January 2002.
336. In Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), twenty-one Germans (possibly
civilians) were sent to assist their Japanese ally with intelligence work in the war in
China. They continued that cooperation after the surrender of Germany (May 8,
1945). At the end of the Pacific war in August 1945, they were captured by the Chinese
Army of Chiang Kai-shek and turned over to the U.S. Army unit operating in China. A
U.S. military commission was convened at Shanghai, wherein the Germans were put on
trial for violation of the laws of war, convicted, and sentenced to prison. The U.S. Army
then transported the Germans to the Landsberg Prison, Bavaria, in the American Zone
of Occupation of Germany to serve their sentences with other Nazi war criminals.
Counsel for these German prisoners sought habeas corpus from the United States Dis-
trict Court for Washington, D.C.; the District Court denied the writ, but the Court of
Appeals reversed. Defendant was the Secretary of Defense as the legal custodian. The
opinion was by Justice Jackson, U.S. chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg War Crimes
Trial in 1945-1946. The Supreme Court's holding was:
We hold that the Constitution does not confer a right of personal security or
an immunity from military trial and punishment upon an alien enemy en-
gaged in the hostile service of a government at war with the United States.
339 U.S. at 785.
Justice Black's dissent was concurred in by Justices Douglas and Burton. Justice
Black took the high ground of Constitutional supremacy:
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tinguished on the facts and then extinguished on the law.
The Rasul petitioners were nationals of nations friendly to
the United States (Australia, Great Britain and Kuwait), whereas
the Eisentrager petitioners were from a nation at war with the
United States (Germany); the petitioners deny having commit-
ted any offenses against the United States, whereas the Eisen-
trager petitioners were convicted of war crimes;-the petitioners
had not been charged with any offenses in two years of deten-
tion, whereas the Eisentrager petitioners had been tried and con-
victed; and the petitioners are imprisoned in a base over which
the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control,
whereas the Eisentrager petitioners were imprisoned in an enemy
nation under military occupation.' 7 The opinion distinguished
the basis of Eisentrager as the constitutional right to habeas
corpus, whereas in Rasul the Court dealt with the habeas corpus
statute338 and its previous interpretation in Ahrens v. Clark, 9
Conquest by the United States, unlike conquest by many other nations, does
not mean tyranny. For our people "choose to maintain their greatness byjus-
tice rather than violence." [citing the Roman historian Tacitus]. Our Consti-
tutional principles are such that their mandate of equal justice under law
should be applied as well when we occupy lands across the sea as when our
flag flew only over thirteen colonies. Our nation proclaims a belief in the
dignity of human beings as such, no matter what their nationality or where
they happen to live. Habeas corpus, as an instrument to protect against illegal
imprisonment, is written into the Constitution. Its use by courts cannot in my
judgment be constitutionally abridged by Executive or by Congress.
339 U.S. at 798.
337. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476.
338. 28 U.S.C. § 2241-2255 (Supp. 2005) (formerly 28 U.S.C. 452 et seq).
339. 335 U.S. 188 (1948). The petitioners were 120 German nationals, living in
the United States at the outbreak of the War with Germany (December 11, 1941) and
accordingly, enemy aliens. They were being held at Ellis Island in New York Harbor
awaiting deportation to Germany. Pursuant to the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, 50 U.S.C.
§ 21, the President issued a removal order (Proclamation No. 2655 ofJuly 14, 1945, 10
Fed. Reg. 8947). Petitioners hope to avoid return to occupied and devastated Germany
by release from Ellis Island under habeas corpus, filed in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia against the Attorney General. The District Court dismissed, and
the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Justice Douglas narrowed the issue to the jurisdiction of a United States court to
consider a writ for habeas corpus from petitioners outside the district. Reviewing the
history of the 1867 statute that added the words, "within their respective jurisdictions"
to the earlier statutory provisions, thus the Ellis Island petitioners could not seek the
writ in the District of Columbia.
Justice Rutledge, for whom John Paul Stevens served as a law clerk, wrote a dissent
to which Justices Black and Murphy joined. The dissent says that the majority "cuts
much more sweepingly at the roots of individual freedom by its decision upon the juris-
dictional issue than could any disposition of those issues. The decision attenuates the
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which was the governing precedent at the time of Eisentrager.
Ahrens held that the habeas corpus statute required that the peti-
tion must be filed in the district court where the petitioners are
confined. Twenty-five years later, the Court overruled Ahrens in
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky,34° reinterpreting
the habeas corpus statute to require that the court issuing the
writ of habeas corpus must have jurisdiction over the custodian of
the petitioner. Thus, Eisentrager has lost most of its force.
Having determined the court's statutory jurisdiction, Justice
Stevens then considered the "longstanding" presumption against
the extraterritorial reach of a statute. He found that the pre-
sumption was inapplicable because this was not an extraterrito-
rial application of a statute since the Guantanamo lease agree-
ment conferred, "complete jurisdiction and control" over the
Naval Base to the United States. Cuba's ultimate sovereignty be-
came irrelevant.
Further, Justice Stevens held that the jurisdiction over alien
detentions is also correct because aliens have had the privilege
of litigation in our courts since the Alien Tort Claims Act of
1789. 34'
Justice Stevens' opinion sufficed for Justices Breyer, Souter,
O'Connor and Ginsburg, but Justice Kennedy could not accept
the reasoning based on Braden that opened the federal courts to
all types of persons located outside the United States, thus his
concurrence is narrowed to indefinite pre-trial detention at
Guantanamo, 4 2 a weaker case of military necessity because of
the distance from hostilities and the absence of proceedings.343
Justice Scalia's dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Thomas, fears that the floodgates have been opened
by the carefree majority who have sprung a trap on the warrior
government so that Guantanamo becomes a foolish place to
personal security of every citizen... [by] a narrow and rigid territorial limitation upon
issuance of the writ." 335 U.S. at 194.
For the connection between Justice Stevens's Rasul opinion and Justice Rutledge's
Ahrens dissent, see Joseph Thai, The Law Clerk Who Wrote Rasul v. Bush: John Paul Ste-
vens's Influence From World War II To the War on Terror, 92 VA. L. REv. 501 (2006).
340. 410 U.S. 484 (1973). There are no international aspects to this case. The
Court revised the statutory language in a case where a prisoner in Alabama sought
habeas corpus in Kentucky.
341. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480-85.
342. Id. at 485-86.
343. Id. at 487.
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have housed alien wartime detainees. 34' He further questions
the reliance on U.S. jurisdiction at Guantanamo, since it is not
the "sovereign territory" of the United States.3 4 5 He puzzled at
the wrenching departure from the Eisentrager precedent and
concluded that the majority has produced a potentially harmful
effect upon the nation's conduct of a war.3 4 6
There may have been a practical effect of Rasul as the De-
partment of Defense established the Combatant Status Review Tri-
bunal3 47 to advise commanders on continued detention of Guan-
tanamo prisoners. Furthermore, procedures to establish military
commissions to determine criminal charges against detainees
were begun, leading to the 2006 decision in Hamdan.348 Shafiq
Rasul was released for return to the United Kingdom in March
2004 before the oral argument.
Decided on the same day with Rasul were two other "enemy
combatant" cases: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld3 49 and Rumsfeld v. Pa-
dilla.35 ° Neither case dealt with a Guantanamo detainee and
both petitioners were U.S. citizens rather than aliens. Neverthe-
less, Hamdi has a due process issue that also affects proceedings
at Guantanamo whether in the CSRT or the military commis-
sion-the neutral decision maker.3 51
344. Id. at 488.
345. Id. at 497-98.
346. Id. at 498-501.
347. See infra note 405.
348. See infra note 398.
349. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
350. 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
351. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), the defendant, Yaser Esam Hamdi,
a U.S. citizen born in Louisiana in 1980, moved with his family to Saudi Arabia as a
child. By 2001, he was living in Afghanistan. At some point in that year, following the
attacks on September 11, 2001 he was seized by members of the Northern Alliance and
was eventually turned over to the U.S. military. He was initially detained and interro-
gated at Guantanamo Bay. Upon learning that he was an U.S. citizen, he was trans-
ferred to a naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia and then to a brig in Charleston, South
Carolina. Id. at 510. The Government contended that Hamdi was an "enemy combat-
ant," and that his status as such "justifie[d] holding him in the United States indefi-
nitely-without formal charges or proceedings-unless and until it makes the determi-
nation that access to counsel or further process [was] warranted." Id.
Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority (ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices Ken-
nedy and Breyer-with concurrences in the judgment by Justices Souter and Ginsburg).
The majority opinion did not decide whether the Executive has plenary authority
to detain pursuant to Article II, Executive Power, because it agreed with the Govern-
ment's alternative position that Congress had in fact authorized Hamdi's detention
through the Authorization for the Use of Military Force ("AUMF"). Citing Ex parte
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Quinn, the Court stated that "[t]he capture and detention of lawful combatants and the
capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by 'universal agreement and prac-
tice,' are 'important incident[s] of war.'" Id. at 518. In addition, the Court stated that
"[t]here is no bar to this Nation's holding one of its own citizens as an enemy combat-
ant," as stated in Ex pane Quinn. Id. at 519.
However, Justice O'Connor recognized that "[e]ven in cases in which the deten-
tion of enemy combatants is legally authorized, there remains the question of what
process is constitutionally due to a citizen who disputes his enemy-combatant status."
The Court noted that all parties to the suit agree that "absent suspension, the writ of
habeas corpus remains available to every individual detained within the United States"
and that suspension of the writ had not occurred. Id. at 525. Here, the "facts" pertain-
ing to Hamdi's detention are far from "undisputed," as the Government asserted. The
Government's assertion that Hamdi resided in Afghanistan at the time of his seizure is
insufficient by itself to justify his characterization as an enemy combatant.
The Court next uses the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), balancing test to
discuss the Government's interest versus "the fundamental nature of a citizen's right to
be free from involuntary confinement by his own government without due process of
law." The Court holds that a "citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as
an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a
fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral deci-
sionmaker." Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529-31. The Court next proposes a "burden-shifting
scheme" in which "once the Government puts forth credible evidence that the habeas
petition meets the enemy-combatant criteria, the onus could shift to the petitioner to
rebut that evidence with more persuasive evidence that he falls outside the criteria."
The Court believes that this system would protect both a defendant's liberty interest
and the Government's wartime functions. The Court stated that this process does not
apply to initial battlefield captures but rather is due only when "the determination is
made to continue to hold those who have been seized." Id. at 532-34.
The Court's holding necessarily rejects "the Government's assertion that separa-
tion of powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such
circumstances." Furthermore, "unless Congress acts to suspend it, the Great Writ of
habeas corpus allows the Judicial Branch to play a necessary role in maintaining this
delicate balance of governance, serving as an important judicial check in the Execu-
tive's discretion in the realm of detentions." Id. at 535-36.
While Congress authorized the detention of combatants in the narrow circum-
stances alleged in this case, due process demands that a United States citizen held in
the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest
the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.
Justice Souter, concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judg-
ment, agreed with the plurality's rejection of a limit on the exercise of habeas jurisdic-
tion in this case. However, he goes further to say that "[t]he Government has failed to
demonstrate that the [AUMF] authorizes the detention complained of here." In fact,
Souter believes that [i]f the Government raises nothing further than the record now
shows, the Non-Detention Act entitles Hamdi to be released." The Non-Detention Act,
18 USCS § 4001 (a), "bars imprisonment or detention of a citizen 'except pursuant to
an Act of Congress.'" In Souter's view, "it suffices that the Government has failed to
justify holding [Hamdi] in the absence of a further act of Congress, criminal charges, a
showing that the detention conforms to the laws of war, or a demonstration that § 4001
(a) is unconstitutional." Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539-54.
Justice Ginsburg joined injustice Souter's opinion. Id. at 539. Justice Scalia's dis-
sent was joined by justice Stevens, id. at 554-78, while Justice Thomas also filed a dis-
sent. Id. at 578-99.
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VI. THE USE OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS AT GUANTANAMO
Military Commissions to fix responsibility for criminal of-
fenses and assess penalties are an essential part of combat opera-
tions conducted in populated areas being occupied by military
forces. The reason for such commissions is military necessity.352
They originated at a time when customary international law al-
lowed the use of military force in declared wars. Now, Article
2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits nations from using force in
international relations and Article 42 vests in the Security Coun-
cil the authority to "take such action ... as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security . .. ."
Cases involving genocide, war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity are referred to the International Criminal Court ("ICC")
at The Hague.353 In the future, however, when the Security
Council authorizes enforcement of its decisions under Article 42
of the Charter,354 or when some other form of peacekeeping or
peacemaking involving military force has been sanctioned by the
Yaser Hamdi was released for return to Saudi Arabia in October 2004. See Stripped of
US Nationality, Yasser Hamdi is Home, ARAB NEWS, Oct. 12, 2004.
352. Military necessity is an inexact description of the professional skills needed to
analyze an enemy's strengths and abilities in order to overcome them and compel sur-
render; the wisdom to distinguish military from non-military targets and to decide that
a situation requires a military commission are among the skills.
353. The International Criminal Court became a reality on July 1, 2002, when the
treaty creating it entered into force. The post-Second World War Trials at Nuremberg
and Tokyo of the major war criminals for international crimes (planning or waging an
aggressive war, traditional war crimes, and crimes against humanity) were reviewed in
U.N. debates in the 1990s as the news media reported daily on human rights outrages
and war crimes of exceptional and fiendish brutality in Bosnia and Kosovo. Eventually,
the General Assembly called for a diplomatic conference to create the International
Criminal Court and define the substantive law of the court. At the Rome Conference in
1998, the United States insisted on recorded votes instead of consensus; the treaty was
approved by a vote of 120 yes and 7 no (United States, China, Israel, Iraq, Libya, Qatar,
and Germany). Despite his negative vote in 1998, President Clinton ordered the treaty
to be signed, subject to ratification, on December 31, 2000. The new Bush Administra-
tion reversed this policy and "unsigned" the treaty while pursuing bilateral agreements
to immunize U.S. military members from being subject to the new court. One hundred
and four nations are full members of the court, which will hear its first case later this
year.
354. U.N. Charter art. 42.
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41
[economic sanctions] would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate,
it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to main-
tain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of
Members of the United Nations.
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General Assembly or the Security Council,355 and crisis situations
develop in which large numbers of people have to be tried expe-
ditiously for crimes that they have committed, it is conceivable
that the United Nations might convene military commissions for
these trials, as an alternative to the ICC.
Absent from this discussion are the International Military
Tribunals convened by the victorious allies at Nuremberg 356 and
at Tokyo157 in 1945 to deal with the major war criminals of the
Second World War. Those unique proceedings were created by
the agreement of the victorious allied powers and were outside
the reach of U.S. laws.3 58
The court-martial 359 has usually been understood to involve
accused members of the convening authority's Armed Forces,
355. Uses of military force, less than enforcement under Chapter VII of the Char-
ter, are undertaken pursuant to an unofficial amendment often described as "Chapter
VII/2," beginning with truce supervision in Israel and Kashmir in 1948 and 1949, then,
because of the stalemate of the Cold War Security Council, moving to the General As-
sembly under the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution, G.A. Res. 337A (Nov. 3, 1950), for the
Suez Crisis, continuing through a series of thirty-eight peacekeeping operations during
the Cold War and after in places such as the Congo, Cyprus, Lebanon, Bosnia, Kosovo,
Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and Western Sahara. Since the end of the Cold War, peace-
making under Chapter VII has been authorized by the Security Council in Iraq,
Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, East Timor, Bosnia, and Kosovo.
356. Nuremberg Trials of the Major War Criminals were authorized by the deci-
sion of the four victorious allies in the London Agreement of August 8, 1945. The
results were reviewable only by the Four-power Allied Control Council. Nineteen
criminals were convicted and twelve were hanged. See TELFORD TAYLOR, ANATOMY OF
THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 587-99 (1990).
357. Tokyo War Crimes Trials were authorized by the Supreme Commander for
Allied Powers in the Pacific (General Douglas A. MacArthur U.S.A.) in accordance with
the Potsdam Agreement of the Allied Powers of July 26, 1945. Twenty-five were con-
victed and ten were hanged. See generally PHILIP R. PICCIGALLO, THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL:
ALLIED WAR CRIMES OPERATIONS IN THE EAST, 1945-1951 (1979); SONIA M. ZAIDE ET AL.,
THE ToKvo WAR CRIMES TRIALS: INDEX AND GUIDE (1981).
358. In Hirota v. MacArthur, 335 U.S. 876 (1948), an accused of the Tokyo major
war crimes trial sought review of the proceedings by petition for habeas corpus. Four
justices refused to hear the case (ChiefJustice Vinson and Justices Burton, Frankfurter,
and Reed). Fourjustices (Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge) would hear the case.
Justice Jackson, Chief U.S. Prosecutor at the Nuremberg major war crimes trial, nor-
mally recused himself from war crimes issues, but to break the tie voted to hear the
petition, which was denied.
359. Superior commanders in the field or at military bases are granted the right to
convene courts-martial to dispose of charges of crime against members of the military
subject to the orders of the convening authority. The only law to be applied is the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. An investigative body to determine facts and make rec-
ommendations is a Court of Inquiry; where prosecution of military personnel is likely,
provisions of UCMJ will apply. As compared to boards of investigation, the Court of
Inquiry usually has subpoena power like courts-martial. See generally Richard V. Meyer,
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whether voluntary or involuntary inductees, whereas the military
commission 360 is more indefinite-proceedings somehow con-
nected with military operations and with wartime crimes com-
mitted by accused persons, who are not members of the military
organization holding the trial. It is not unfair to observe that in
military proceedings, the goals are speed and efficiency. While
the civilian legal system subscribes to these objectives, meeting
the requirements of truth and justice, often a time-consuming
task, takes precedence.
The issue has been and still is whether trials by United
States military commissions 36 are exempt from the rules and
procedures that Americans identify with a fair trial. While this
section does not argue for the abolition of military commissions,
it does contend that any military commission of the United
States is governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the
Constitution of the United States, and the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 to which the United States is a ratifying party.
There has usually been a foreign element in the use of mili-
tary commissions. In the 1846-1848 Mexican War, thousands of
members of the United States Army and Navy were present in
Mexico for twenty-seven months. 6 2 The military commission
Wien A Rose Is Not A Rose: Military Commissions v. Courts Martial, 5J. INT'L CRIM.JUST. 48
(2007).
360. A Military Commission is a body whose procedures and rules of evidence are
modeled on the law applicable to courts-martial, but not limited to the UCMJ; it may
include the law of war and martial law. The commission usually consists of military
officers appointed by the convening authority. See Robinson 0. Everett & Scott L. Sil-
liman, Forums For Punishing Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
509 (1994); see also Louis FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERI-
CAN REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2005).
361. It is likely that General Winfield Scott (1786-1866), in command of the inva-
sion force that captured Mexico City in the US-Mexican War, was the first to use the
expression "military commission" in his General Orders No. 20 and 287 of 1847. See
David Glazier, Kangaroo Courts or Competent Tribunal? Judging the 21st Century Military
Commission, 89 VA. L. REv. 2005, 2028 (2003); see also JOHN S.D. EISENHOWER, So FAR
FROM GOD: THE U.S. WAR WITH MEXICO, 1846-1848, at 266, 303-07 (1989). Scott was
trained in law at William and Mary College and as an apprentice in Virginia before
joining the Army during the War of 1812. SeeJoHN S.D. EISENHOWER, AGENT OF DESTINr.
THE LIFE AND TIMES OF GENERAL WINFIELD SCOTr 2-19 (1997).
362. The Mexican War, in the U.S. view, began with an attack by the Mexican army
on U.S. forces south of the Nueces River, Texas, on April 25, 1846. The Republic of
Texas became independent of Mexico in the war of independence (Feb-Oct. 1836);
nine years later the Republic was annexed to the United States by Joint Resolution of
Congress; a treaty would not have achieved the required two-thirds approval. See EISEN-
HOWER, So FAR FROM GOD, supra note 361, at 13-14, 17-26. No treaty between Mexico
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convened there dealt with crimes that occurred during the
lengthy interaction between the American military and the Mexi-
can people deep inside of Mexico.363 The only previous foreign
experiences of the U.S. military were much briefer: the disas-
trous and unsuccessful invasion of Canada from July 12 to No-
and Texas or the United States had fixed the boundary. Texas claimed the Rio Grande
as the southern border; Mexico claimed the more northerly Nueces River. See Ronald
C. Lee, Jr., Justifying Empire: Pericles, Polk, and a Dilemma of Democratic Leadership, 34 PoL-
ITY 503 (2002). President Polk asked Congress to declare war, but the Congressional
Action declared that war already existed by action of Mexico (House: 174 yes, 14 no on
May 11, Senate: 4 0 yes, 2 no, 3 abstain on May 13). See Act of May 13, 1846, ch. 16, 29th
Cong., 9 Stat. 9 (1846); see also EISENHOWER, supra note 361, at 65-68. The war ended
with the peace treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Bevans 791, the
treaty having been compelled by the fact that the U.S. Army had occupied the capital,
Mexico City, on Sept. 14, 1847, and the principal port, Vera Cruz, on March 27, 1847.
See EISENHOWER, supra note 361, at 345-58. During an earlier armistice (Aug. 24-Sept. 6,
1847), a peace treaty had been negotiated, but was rejected by the Mexican Congress
and the war was resumed with the U.S. assault on Mexico City. See EISENHOWER, supra
note 361, at 328-34; see also BERNARD DEVOTO, THE YEAR OF DECISION, 1846, at 131-91
(1950).
363. The expeditionary force under General Winfield Scott had invaded a country
where different languages and customs could create unexpected problems with the ci-
vilian population. Thus, Scott's General Order No. 20 dealt with offenses by the U.S.
military against Mexicans-especially rape, assault, murder, robbery, and larceny-until
Congress could legislate specifically on the subject. Nevertheless, the procedural provi-
sions of the U.S. Articles of War governed. See Glazier, supra note 361, at 2027-34. Dur-
ing the existence of the war, the Military Commission was also used against Mexican
nationals accused of crimes against American military personnel. Id.
An unusual situation involved a unit of the Mexican army, The San Patricios, origi-
nally recruited from Irish immigrants living in Texas and northern Mexico, to protect
the Roman Catholic faith of most Mexicans from the aggressive Protestant proselytiza-
tion of southern U.S. residents who were moving into the Republic of Texas with their
slaves. See Richard C. Jones, Cultural Diversity in a "Bicultural" City: Factors in the Location
of Ancestry Groups in San Antonio, 23J. CULT. GEO. 33, 37 (2006).
After the war began, the U.S. Army and state militias heavily recruited recent Irish
immigrants who had fled the deadly privation and disease of the Potato Famine (1845-
1850) in Ireland. Fierce punishments for excessive drinking, or discourteous language
to superiors and discriminatory treatment of their Catholic faith disillusioned many of
those Irish troops, who deserted their units in Mexico and went over to the Mexican
army unit commanded by John Riley, the San Patricios, which fought in the Mexican
defeats at Monterey, Cerro Gordo, and Churubusco. See Rosemary King, Border Crossings
in the Mexican War, 25 BILINGUAL REV. 63, 107 (2000). Captured San Patricios were
severely treated by the U.S. Military Tribunals: those who deserted before the war began
were branded on the face with the letter "D" and imprisoned at hard labor; those who
deserted after the war began were condemned to death as traitors; thirty were hanged at
the same moment in front of the U.S. Army at Mexico City on September 12, 1847.
Mexico rewarded those who survived with land grants. See PETER F. STEVENS, THE
ROGUES' MARCH: JOHN RILEY AND THE ST. PATRICK'S BATTALION (2005). Novelistic treat-
ment of their story is found in the film The San Patricios (San Patricio Productions
1996).
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vember 23, 1.812364 and Andrew Jackson's invasion of Spanish
Florida in April and May 1818 during the Seminole War.365 In
Jackson's case, he found two British traders, Alexander Arbuth-
not and Robert Armbrister, among his Indian enemies. Jackson
held a trial of the two British subjects in Spanish Florida in a
court or "military commission" under the law of war. Found
guilty, Arbuthnot was hanged and Armbrister was shot. Despite
fierce criticism of him by members of Congress and the Adminis-
tration, Jackson was never punished for his actions.
Military commissions were used inside the United States
during the Civil War366 when eleven states formed a foreign na-
tion, the Confederate States of America, which was never recog-
364. The invasion of Canada on three fronts was a total disaster: the western army
surrendered without a fight; the Niagara-front's three incursions ended with the Battle
of Lundy's Lane and ignominious retreat; and the attack on Montreal never material-
ized when the N.Y. militia refused to cross the Canadian border. Later, the British
burned Washington, but that army was defeated by AndrewJackson at New Orleans. See
WALTER BORNEMAN, 1812: THE WAR THAT FORGED A NATION (2004). But see FRANCIS
BEIRNE, THE WAR OF 1812 (1949) (concluding that War of 1812 was an absurd and
insignificant war).
365. Congress had frequently authorized the use of military force against native
tribes inside and outside the borders of the United States. See Curtis Bradley & Jack
Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 110 HARV. L. REV. 2047,
2073-74 (2005). The Seminole War was authorized by Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 93,
15th Cong., 3 Stat 523 (1819). See Bradley & Goldmsith, supra, at 2074. The same Con-
gress authorized force against slave traders and pirates. See An Act in Addition to the
Acts Prohibiting the Slave Trade, ch. 101, 15th Cong., 3 Stat. 532 (1819); An Act to
Protect the Commerce of the United States, and Punish the Crime of Piracy, ch. 77,
15th Cong., 3 Stat. 510 (1819); see also ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE
COURSE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE 1767-1821, at 347-98 (1977).
366. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25-27 (1942). Authorization for military com-
mission trials came indirectly through the 1862 statute dealing with the suspension of
habeas corpus and which also created the Office of Judge Advocate General of the
Army, to review, "the records and proceedings of all courts martial and military commis-
sions .... " Act ofJuly 17, 1862, ch. 201, 37th Cong., 12 Stat. 597 (1862). The "border"
states where slavery existed along with competing slave holders and abolitionists be-
came a critical area where Lincoln and the military sought to prevent secession by mar-
tial law, military action and suspension of habeas corpus. The situation varied in the
states of Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, the portion of Virginia which would separate in
1863 from the seceded state and become West Virginia, Missouri and in the southern
portions of the Ohio River states-Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. See generally Paul Fin-
kleman, Civil Liberties and Civil War: The Great Emancipator as Civil Libertarian, 91 MICH.
L. REv. 1353 (1993).
During the early years of the war, until the Union victory at Gettysburg on July 4,
1863, and the almost simultaneous victory at Vicksburg on July 4, 1863, martial law and
military commissions flourished, leading to the Supreme Court cases of Ex Parte Val-
landigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863), and Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2
(1866). See infra notes 371-76.
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nized by the international community. 61
The reputation of military commissions was permanently
stained in the trial by military commission of the conspirators in
the assassination of President Lincoln after the end of the Civil
War.3 6 The abusive treatment, farcical procedures, and the
367. See generally Charles M. Hubbard, James Mason, the "Confederate Lobby" and the
Blockade Debate of March 1862, 45 CIVIL WAR HIST. 223 (1999). In the seceded states, the
Union army occupied Western Tennessee in early 1862 and the Navy took New Orleans
in April 1862, but the first Union effort to take Richmond, Virginia, the Confederate
capital, known as the Peninsular Campaign, failed after five months in 1862; it resumed
under Grant in 1864.
The full scale Union invasion of the South came from Eastern Tennessee into
Georgia at Atlanta, from May 1864, crossing the state in the march to the sea of General
Sherman and moving north to Charleston. Martial law accompanied these actions.
Opposition to the military draft leading to the Draft Riots of July 13-16, 1863 in
New York City, should have involved a Presidential Military Commission to be applied
to, ". . . all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors within the United States and
all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any
disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to rebels. . ." Presidential Proclamation of
Sept. 24, 1862. No such trials were held and Congress disapproved the provision. State
criminal law trials disposed of the New York City incendiaries' cases. See generally JAMES
MCCAGUE, SECOND REBELLION: NEW YORK CITY DRATr RIOTS OF 1863 (1968); BARNET
SCHECTER, THE DEVIL'S OWN WORK, THE CIVIL WAR DRAFT RIOTS AND THE FIGHT TO
RECONSTRUCT AMERICA (2005). Many novels have used the draft riots: Bread and Circus
(1987), by Morris Renek, and Paradise Alley (2002), by Kevin Baker are good examples.
The riots also figure in the 2004 film Gangs of New York.
368. Confederate General Robert E. Lee surrendered his army to Union General
Ulysses S. Grant on April 9, 1865. President Lincoln was shot at Ford's Theater in
Washington on April 14 at about 10:15 p.m.; he died April 15 at 7:22 a.m. The accused
murderer, John Wilkes Booth, died outside Bowling Green, Virginia on April 26. Eight
persons, alleged conspirators, were arrested by the military around Washington. Presi-
dent Johnson appointed the Military Commission on May 1, 1865 after receiving the
written opinion of Attorney General Speed, 11 Op. Atty. Gen. 297 (1868). The arraign-
ment took place on May 10, in the Old Penitentiary building (the building no longer
exists; the site is within the National War College) where the public trial was held dur-
ing the next seven weeks. See generally EDWARD STEERS, JR., THE TRIAL: THE ASSASSINA-
TION OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND THE TRIAL OF THE CONSPIRATORS (2003).
The prosecution theory was a massive Confederate conspiracy for which manufac-
tured evidence and evidence under torture were used to involve Jefferson Davis and
other Confederate leaders in a scheme to produce chaos in the Union by eliminating
the federal leadership. There were clearly two conspiracies involving John Wilkes
Booth: to kidnap Lincoln in March 1865 and to murder Lincoln in April 1865. Of the
eight defendants at the trial, three were obviously guilty: Lewis Powell (alias Payne)
who attempted to kill Secretary of State Seward; George Atzerodt, assigned to kill Vice
PresidentJohnson but unable find him and David Herold, who assisted Booth's escape
and was apprehended with him. Three were undoubtedly innocent of the murder con-
spiracy: Edward Spangler, stagehand at Ford's Theater; Dr. Samuel Mudd, who set
Booth's broken leg; and Mary Surratt, who kept the boarding house where Booth met
his fellow assassins including her son John Suratt, who escaped. Two childhood friends
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rush to execute the innocent with the guilty exacted vengeance
but not justice.
Residents of the former Confederacy were also subjected to
trials by military commission during the military occupation of
the South in the Reconstruction Period (1865-1877).) 6
of Booth were Confederate army deserters and involved in the kidnap conspiracy: Sa-
muel Arnold and Michael O'Loughlin. See STEERS, supra, xix, xxix-xxxvi.
The verdict was announced on June 30, 1865, and the four defendants sentenced
to death (Powell, Herold, Atzerodt and Mrs. Surratt) were hanged on July 7, 1865; the
four defendants sentenced to imprisonment were sent to the Dry Tortugas Prison in
Florida. The Military Commission of nine officers had three major-generals, four brig-
adier generals, and two colonels. Judge Advocate General of the Army, Joseph Holt,
prosecuted. The defense involved five attorneys and Senator ReverdyJohnson, a for-
mer Attorney General, who defended President Johnson in the impeachment trial
three years later. The three survivors of the Dry Tortugas Prison (Spangler, Mudd, and
Arnold) were pardoned by President Johnson in February 1869. See STEERS, supra, xvii,
xlvi. Hostile criticism of the Assassination Commission is found in: F. BERNAYS WIENER,
A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAw (1940); Kevin J. Barry, Military Commissions:
American Justice on Trial, 50 FED. LAW 24 (2003); Michal Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree: The
Bush Administration's Military Tribunals in Historical Perspective, 38 CAL. W.L. REV. 43
(2002); see also WILLIAM HANCHETT, THE LINCOLN MURDER CONSPIRACIES (1983); GuY W.
MOORE, THE CASE OF MRS. SURRA-rr (1954); cf WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LIBER-
TIES BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998); EDWARD STEERS, JR., BLOOD ON THE
MOON: THE ASSASSINATION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN (2001);John Curran, Lincoln Conspir-
acy Trial and Military Jurisdiction Over Civilians, 9 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 26 (1933).
A similar travesty of a mock trial occurred on November 10, 1865 in the military
commission that hanged Captain Henry Wirz, C.S.A., commandant of the notorious
Confederate Prisoner of War Camp at Andersonville, Georgia where 13,000 Union
soldiers of 45,000 prisoners had died as the result of starvation, disease, exposure, and
savage brutality. See Michelle Garcia, Prison Atrocities Close to Home, Far From This Century,
WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2006, at A2. The commission president was Major General Lew
Wallace, USA, (1827-1905), a member of the military commission that tried the Lincoln
assassination conspirators (and author of the novel Ben Hur). Command responsibility
for the savage brutality of the guards clearly rested on Wirz's shoulders, but he was also
convicted of thirteen specific murders for which there was no credible evidence. See
Lewis Laska & James Smith, Hell and the Devil: Andersonville and the Trial of Captain Henry
Wirz, CSA 1865, 68 MIL. L. REV. 79 (1975); see also OVID FUTCH, HISTORY OF ANDERSON-
VILLE PISON (1968). The Andersonville trial has been dramatized by Sol Levitt in The
Andersonville Trial (1959); its 1970 television production won an Emmy Award.
369. Lincoln's Presidential Reconstruction Plan of amnesty and quick reunion of
the seceded states was being carried out by President Johnson before the Congress
(elected in 1864) assembled in December, 1865. Congress, however, rejected the Lin-
coln plan and substituted the Radical plan to treat the seceded states as "Conquered
Provinces," occupied and governed by the U.S. Army and not ready for readmission to
the Union. The Radical Plan was passed over the veto of President Johnson. Acts of
1867, ch. 153, § 3, 14 Stat. 428. Instead of ten states, the South became five military
districts under martial law administered by military commissions. An even more radical
Congress was elected in 1866, which overrode vetoes and attempted to remove the Pres-
ident by an impeachment that failed by one vote in the Senate. The U.S. Army was not
removed from occupation duties until after the disputed election of 1876, when Presi-
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The Supreme Court steered clear of the emergency mea-
sures abrogating civil liberties during the Civil War and during
the period that followed the Lincoln assassination, 370 but the Su-
preme Court took vigorous action after the war when a military
commission at Indianapolis, four hundred miles from the near-
est war zone, ordered the death by hanging of a well-known
Democratic politician, Lambdin P. Milligan, one of the leaders
of the anti-war Democrats labeled "copperheads. '' 371 The Demo-
cratic Party had fractured in the 1860 presidential election,
when the northern Democrats nominated Senator Stephen A.
Douglas of Illinois and the southern Democrats nominated John
A. Breckinridge of Kentucky, ensuring Lincoln's election. By
1864, without the slaveholding Confederates, the Democratic
party reemerged behind General George McClellan at its Chi-
cago Convention on August 29, 1864, with an anti-war platform
demanding immediate cease-fire and restoration of the union.
Milligan was clearly opposed to President Lincoln. He was ac-
cused of joining a secret society, The Order of American
Knights, and conspiring with its members to overthrow the gov-
dent Hayes, selected by the Electoral Commission, withdrew the Army in April 1877 as
part of the deal that made him president. Participation of five justices in the Electoral
Commission may have made the Court wary of cases arising under the military occupa-
tion.
Military commission trials were first used during the War, essentially in war zones
or areas likely to become war zones (slave states not seceded, non-slave-holding border
states and occupied seceded states). The accused were usually transient residents of
slave states, Confederate sympathizers, anti-war Democrats, draft resisters, and actual
spies and traitors. The actual number is unclear, but there were several thousands.
370. The Supreme Court was suspected of treason during most of the war because
of its 1857 Dred Scott Decision and the political sympathies of its members: ChiefJustice
Taney of Maryland, aJackson Democrat;Justice Campbell of Alabama, who resigned his
seat to become Secretary of War in the Confederate States Cabinet; John Catron of
Tennessee, Benjamin Curtis of Massachusetts, and Nathan Clifford of Maine were Dem-
ocrats, appointed by Democratic Presidents. See A. Leon Higginbotham Jr., Bondage,
Freedom, and the Constitution: The New Slavery Scholarship, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1695
(1996). President Lincoln did not achieve a reliable Supreme Court until Congress
created a tenth justice in 1863 and the death of Chief Justice Taney in October 1864.
See DAVID MAYER SILVER, LINCOLN'S SUPREME COURT 185 (1998). The different political
backgrounds were reflected in Ex Parte Vallandigham. See 68 U.S. (1 Wall) 243 (1864)
(denying Supreme Courtjurisdiction). Clement L. Vallandigham, an Ohio Democratic
Congressman, was a candidate for Governor in 1863; his anti-war speeches and pro-
Southern sympathies led to his trial and conviction by military commission. See MARK E.
NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 162-74 (1991).
371. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). Lambdin P. Milligan (1812-
1899) was a lawyer and politician from Huntington, Indiana. He was an outspoken
opponent of the war and a Southern sympathizer. Id.
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ernment of the United States. The offenses were alleged to have
been committed between October 1863 and August 1864. He
was convicted by the military commission that had been con-
vened on October 21, 1864 and given a death sentence - for-
warded to President Johnson for confirmation, at which time
Millligan sought habeas corpus from the Indiana federal circuit
court, whose two judges divided on the issue that was then
brought to the U.S. Supreme Court.3 72
The writ of habeas corpus was granted April 10, 1866, al-
though the written opinion supporting the writ did not follow
until eight months later. Presumably Vallandigham was over-
ruled. Justice Davis's language is absolutely clear: "Martial rule
can never exist where the courts are open, and in the proper
and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction."373
Justice Davis, a Lincoln appointee, had been Lincoln's cam-
paign manager in 1860. The Court was unanimous concerning
the grant of the writ in the case of this military commission.1
74
The five-justice majority also held that neither the President nor
Congress could authorize such a military commission.175 The
four-justice minority opinion by Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase
believed Congress could authorize such a commission.376 This
case was the one whose precedential value had to be distin-
guished or ignored seventy-five years later in Ex Parte Quiin. 377
Military Commissions were also used during the Indian
Wars, 37' during foreign expeditions in the Spanish-American
372. 71 U.S. at 114; see also A. NEVINS, 2 THE WAR FOR THE UNION: THE ORGANIZED
WAR TO VICTORY 1864-1865 131-35 (1971).
373. 71 U.S. at 127.
374. Id. at 132.
375. Id. at 121-22. The majority was composed of Justices Clifford, Davis, Field,
Grier, and Nelson.
376. Id. at 137. ChiefJustice Chase, and Justices Miller, Swayne, and Wayne made
up the minority.
377. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
378. One Indian War Commission provided the spectacle of the simultaneous
hanging of 38 Dakota Indians at Mankato, Minnesota on December 26, 1862 after the
military trial that condemned 303 to death, the classic example of white man's injustice
that eventually led to the Battle of Wounded Knee, December 29, 1890, where the U.S.
Army massacred the Sioux Ghost Dancers. See Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota
War Trials: A Study in Military Justice, 43 STAN. L. REv. 13, 13 (1990); see also John
Rhodes, An American Tradition: The Religious Persecution of Native Americans, 52
Mont. L. Rev. 31, 31-33 (1991). See generally Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261
(1901).
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War,3 79 and during the First World War. 8 °
The most widespread use of military commissions occurred
during the Second World War, especially in Hawaii3 8' (not yet a
state) and in areas outside the United States.3 8 2
The use of the military commission in the United States in
379. In the Philippines, Spanish authority ended in early 1899, as in Cuba, and the
U.S. military governor used military commissions to deal with criminal offenses by and
to citizens of the Philippines. See Michael 0. Lacey, Military Commissions: A Historical
Survey, 2002 ARMY LAW. 41, 45 (2002); see also Efren Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construc-
tion of American Colonialism: The Insular Cases (1901-1922), 65 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 225, 226
(1996) (describing the Treaty of Paris and the end of Spanish rule in the Philippines).
380. In the First World War, lasting only 19 months for the U.S., where U.S. mili-
tary forces were engaged in battle on the territory of our ally France, the military com-
mission was not used until after the end of the war in the occupation of the Rhineland.
There was no division of Germany into occupation zones as occurred after the Second
World War. Allied threats to try the Kaiser and German officers for war crimes were
never realized. The Kaiser remained in exile in neutral Holland until his death in 1941.
The German Supreme Court conducted war crimes trials under German law at Leipzig
with unsatisfactory results, in allied eyes, because of the defense of superior orders. No
senior commanders were prosecuted. SeeJack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of
Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 249, 251-52 (2002); see also Karl Arthur Hochkam-
mer, The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal: The Compatibility of Peace, Policy, and International
Law, 29 VAND.J. OF TRANS'L L. 119, 132-40 (1995) (describing Kaiser Wilhelm II's exile
in The Netherlands and war tribunals in Leipzig).
381. After the Japanese aerial attack of December 7, 1941 on Pearl Harbor, the
Army imposed martial law, approved by the Governor and President Roosevelt. Trials
by military commission for violations of law and military orders by civilians were author-
ized by General Order No. 4 of December 9, 1941. Martial law and military government
continued until October, 1944. SeeJason Collins Weida, A Republic of Emergencies: Mar-
tial Law in American Jurisprudence, 36 CONN. L. REV 1397, 1417-20 (2004); see also Duncan
v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946) (condemning convictions by military commis-
sion). The Court declined to review Executive Order 9060 of Feb. 19, 1942 ordering
the relocation of Japanese-American citizens and aliens. See Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (convictions vacated, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987). Congress
established a Commission in 1980 on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians
and in 1988 approved the Civil Liberties Act authorizing payment of $20,000 for each
surviving detainee as a redress of grievances. See Michael A Newton, Harmony or Hegem-
ony? The American military Role in the Pursuit of Justice, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 231, n.68
(2004).
382. After the Second World War, military commissions accompanied the army in
enemy countries: Germany, Italy, Austria, andJapan and in enemy-occupied countries:
France, Korea, and the Philippines. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Homma v.
Peterson, 327 U.S. 759 (1946).
At the conclusion of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg for major
war criminals whose crimes were not confined to a single location, each of the occupy-
ing powers created a tribunal for the trial of war crimes by enemy military found in
their zones. Trial and conviction of a U.S. dependent wife for the murder of her mili-
tary husband before the U.S. Military Commission was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952); see also Everett v. Truman, 334 U.S. 824 (1978)
(denying motion for leave to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus). Worldwide, the
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1942 for the trial of Nazi saboteurs is the authority offered in
2002 and later by the Bush administration for dealing with un-
lawful enemy combatants."'
Nevertheless, the precedential status of Ex Parte Quirin,3 8 4
remains questionable if applied to a situation other than that of
the total war of 1941-1945.
President Roosevelt had consulted with Attorney General
Francis Biddle about the Nazi saboteurs in the week before the
issuance of Presidential Proclamation 2561.385 The military com-
mission began its work on July 8 and continued to hear evidence
number of executions of the defeated axis is uncertain. In the American Zone of Ger-
many, 1,814 war criminals were convicted and 450 were hanged.
383. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, (1942) (denying habeas corpus to petitioners
held in custody for trial before a military tribunal). See generallyJ. Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction
of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism, 96 Am. J. Int'l L. 345 (2002) .J.
Forrester and K. Barry, Military Commissions: Meeting American Standards of Justice, 49
FED. LAw 28 (2002); R.O. Everett, The Law of War: Military Tribunals and the War on
Terrorism, 48 FED. LAW 20 (2001).
384. 317 U.S. at 1. Germany declared war on the United States on December 11,
1941, and the United States declared war on Germany on the same day. See Matthew
Lippman, The History, Development, and Decline of Crimes Against Peace, 36 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 957, 998 (2004).
On June 13, 1942 four German military men in civilian clothes, disembarked from
an enemy submarine at Amagansett on Long Island, New York: Ernest Burger, George
Dasch, Heinrich Heinck, and Richard Quirin all were English speakers who had lived in
the United States. On June 17, 1942, four more German military men in civilian
clothes landed from another submarine at Ponte Vedra Beach near Jacksonville, Flor-
ida: Herbert Haupt, Edward Kerling, Hermann Neubauer, and Werner Thiel, (Their
official status in the German military was unclear.) They were also English speakers who
had lived in the United States. All were trained in the use of explosives to disrupt
shipyards, factories and military depots. Pursuant to a presidential order, and on the
advice of the Attorney General, a military commission was to be convened for trial of
the eight Germans under the law of war. See Proclamation No. 2561,July 2, 1942, 7 Fed.
Reg. 5101, see alsoJoseph ThysellJr., Ex Parte Quirin: The Case for Military Comisssions, 31
S.U. L. REv. 129, 131-143 (2004) (describing the facts that lead to Ex Parte Qririn).
385. Denying Certain Enemies Access to the Courts of the United States, Procla-
mation 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 7, 1942).
DENYING CERTAIN ENEMIES ACCESS TO THE
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION
WHEREAS the safety of the United States demands that all enemies who
have entered upon the territory of the United States as part of an invasion or
predatory incursion, or who have entered in order to commit sabotage, espio-
2007] GUANTANAMO AND U.S. LAW
nage or other hostile or warlike acts, should be promptly tried in accordance
with the law of war;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the
United States of America and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution
and the statutes of the United States, do hereby proclaim that all persons who
are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with the United States or
who give obedience to or act under the direction of any such nation, and who
during time of war-enter or attempt to enter the United States or any territory
or possession thereof, through coastal or boundary defenses, and are charged
with committing or attempting or preparing to commit sabotage, espionage,
hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law of war, shall be subject to the law
of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals; and that such persons shall
not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding directly or
indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on their behalf,
in the courts of the United States, or of its States, territories, and possessions,
except under such regulations as the Attorney General, with the approval of
the Secretary of War, may from time to time prescribe.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and caused the
seal of the United States of America to be affixed.
DONE at the City of Washington this 2d day of July, in the year of our Lord
nineteen hundred and forty-two, [SEAL] and of the Independence of the
United States of America the one hundred and sixty-sixth.
Franklin D. Roosevelt
By the President:
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State;
see also 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 7, 1942).
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
APPOINTMENT OF A MILITARY COMMISSION
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President and as Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy, under the Constitution and statutes of the United
States, and more particularly the Thirty-Eighth Article of War (U.S.C., title 10,
sec. 1509), I, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, do hereby appoint as a Military Com-
mission the following persons:
Major General Frank R. McCoy, President
Major General Walter S. Grant
Major General Blanton Winship
Major General Lorenzo D. Gasser
Brigadier General Guy V. Henry
Brigadier General John T. Lewis
Brigadier General John T. Kennedy
The prosecution shall be conducted by the Attorney General and the
Judge Advocate General. The defense counsel shall be Colonel Cassius M.
Dowell and Colonel Kenneth Royall.
The Military Commission shall meet in Washington, D.C. on July 8, 1942
or as soon thereafter as practicable, to try for offenses against the law of war
and the Articles of War, the following persons:
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and argument for the next three weeks. a6
Ernest Peter Burger
George John Dasch
Herbert Hans Haupt
Henry Harm Heinck
Edward John Kerling
Hermann Otto Neubauer
Richard Quirin
Werner Thiel
The Commission shall have power to and shall, as occasion requires,
make such rules for the conduct of the proceeding, consistent with the powers
of military commissions under the Articles of War, as it shall deem necessary
for a full and fair trial of the matters before it. Such evidence shall be admit-
ted as would in the opinion of the President of the Commission, have proba-
tive value to a reasonable man. The concurrence of at least two-thirds of the
members of the Commission present shall be necessary for a conviction or
sentence. The record of the trial, including any judgment or sentence, shall
be transmitted directly to me for my action thereon.
Franklin D. Roosevelt
THE WHITE HOUSE
July 2, 1942
From June 17 to June 25, Winston Churchill visited President Roosevelt at Hyde
Park and in the White House to resolve Stalin's demand for an invasion of France in
Fall 1942, an impossibility in view of the planned invasion of North Africa in Operation
Torch set for November. They also discussed the atomic weapons that the United
States was developing in the Manhattan Project. Churchill learned of the disaster to
British forces at Tobruk in Libya, and the United States rushed a flight of heavy bomb-
ers, destined for the Pacific to Cairo to rescue the British situation. After Churchill left,
the President stayed for the first time at Camp David (then called Shangri-la) in the
mountains of Maryland. See MARTIN GILBERT, CHURCHILL AND AMERICA 258-61 (2005);
JON MEACHAM, FRANKLIN AND WINSTON 181-95 (2003); Dois KEARNS GOODwiN, No OR-
DINARY TIME: FRANKLIN AND ELEANOR ROOsEvELT: THE HOME FRONT IN WORLD WAR II
345-49 (1995).
386. The Commission met in secrecy at the Department of Justice in Washington
on July 8, 1942 and thereafter until August 1. Despite a proper defense on legal
grounds by an experienced trial lawyer, Kenneth Royall, the inevitable outcome was
about to be reached when seven of the eight, excluding Dasch, petitioned the U.S.
District Court for a writ of habeas corpus and claiming that military commissions lack
jurisdiction over civilians while the courts are open and functioning. The writ was de-
nied, and an immediate appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, then on summer recess, was
allowed. The Court, except forJustice Murphy, who was on military duty, assembled for
two days of public argument, then rendered its decision orally the next day, affirming
the rejection of the petition.
The Commission convicted all eight, on August 3, and sentenced all eight to death.
Dasch and Burger, who assisted the prosecution, were spared by the President, who
commuted the sentence of Burger to life imprisonment and 30 years imprisonment for
Dasch. The President confirmed the sentences, except as commuted, on August 5,
1942, and the executions, by electrocution, were carried out at the District of Columbia
Jail on August 8, 1942. With the saboteurs dead, the U.S. Supreme Court had time to
prepare the written opinion, published on October 29, 1942.
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The unique review of a habeas corpus petition by the Su-
preme Court in the middle of the challenged trial did produce
an immediate decision denying the petition, but the written
opinion did not appear until three months later.3
87
The October opinion evidences some anguish on the part
of Chief Justice Stone3 88 and has some internal contradictions389
The vigorous defense of the saboteurs by Colonel Kenneth Royall did not impair
his career. He was born in North Carolina and graduated from the University of North
Carolina in 1914. He then attended Harvard Law School. He served in the Field Artil-
lery in France as a lieutenant (1917-19) and then returned to North Carolina where he
practiced law in Goldsboro and Raleigh. He then entered politics. In the Second
World War, he became an Army colonel and was promoted to Brigadier General after
the saboteur trial. He served as Special Assistant to Secretary of War Stimson in 1944.
President Truman appointed him Secretary of War in 1947. At the creation of the
Department of Defense, he was appointed Secretary of the Army, serving two years
before he returned to the practice of law in Washington, D.C. and New York.
387. The decision may be seen after the passage of 65 years as the Total War ex-
ception to the Milligan decision; however, it is significant to note that the Supreme
Court heard the habeas corpus petitions even though the only review of the record of
trial was to be by the President alone, and the President had specifically excluded the
civilian courts. The Court was not concerned with the facts or the procedures of the
commission, but only the lawful exercise of presidential power in a threat of foreign
sabotage in wartime. The actual guilt of the eight men was noted in a brief sentence, "it
is the absence of uniform that renders the offender liable to trial for violation of the
laws of war." 317 U.S. at 28. Having previously noted the British 1929 Manual of Mili-
tary Law, listing war crimes and concluding, "all war crimes are "punishable by death."
317 U.S. at 27. The literature on this case continues to be substantial. See H.H. Koh, The
Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 337 (2002); G.E. White, Felix Frank-
furter's Soliloquy in Ex Parte Quirin, 5 GREEN BAG 2d, 423 (2002); M. Belknap, The Supreme
Court Goes to War: The Meaning and Implications of the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MiL. L. REv.
59 (1980); Cyrus Bernstein, The Saboteur Trial: A Case History, 11 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
131; (1943); F. Granville Munson, The Arguments in the Saboteur Trial, 91 UNIV. PA. L.
REv. 239 (1942).
388. Harlan Fiske Stone (1872-1946), born in Chesterfield, New Hampshire, en-
tered Massachusetts Agricultural College where there was compulsory military training,
but from which he was expelled for disciplinary violations; then he attended Amherst
College, B.S. 1894, teaching high school for a year before making enough money to
start law school at Columbia University (LL.B. 1898) at which point Columbia hired
him to teach Bailments and Insurance part-time while he began the practice of law with
the firm of Sullivan & Cromwell in New York City. In 1902, he briefly joined the Colum-
bia Law Faculty, but resumed law practice in 1905. In 1910, he returned to Columbia as
Dean and Professor of Law, teaching Trusts, Wills, Criminal Law and Equity, his spe-
cialty, continuing to teach there until 1923. During the First World War's compulsory
draft, he was a member of a Board that dealt with the conscientious objector exception
to the draft. After the armistice, he joined the protests of the Red Scare raids and
prosecutions led by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer and Francis Gavan, Dean of
Fordham Law School. In a conflict over teaching methodology with University Presi-
dent Butler, Stone resigned in 1923 to return to practice. The scandals of the Harding
administration, especially involving Attorney General Daugherty, persuaded the new
president, Calvin Coolidge, to appoint Stone to the position of Attorney General in
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but is justified as an exception to the Milligan case by the total
war with fascism. Its precedential effect is also lessened by the
history of the President's order creating the 1942 Military Com-
mission, because that order was changed and was not used in the
second instance of Nazi saboteurs landed later in the war by sub-
marine on our shores. 90 In fact, the changes in the Presidential
order of January 16, 1945 require a comparison of the back-
April 1924. Stone served only nine months before accepting the President's appoint-
ment as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. He served during the legal battles of
the New Deal, usually differing with his colleagues, the Four Horsemen, (Butler, Mc-
Reynolds, Sutherland and Vandevanter), in support of legislative solutions to the De-
pression. Although Stone was a lifelong Republican, President Roosevelt appointed
Stone Chief Justice in 1941. He suffered a stroke while presiding over the Court on
April 22, 1946 and died after only four and a half years as Chief Jusitce. It should be
noted that the Chief Justice's son, Major Lauson Stone, U.S.A., a JAG officer, was de-
tailed to assist Colonel Royall in the defense of the saboteurs at the Commission; he did
not participate in the proceedings before the Supreme Court and Chief Justice Stone
did not recuse himself with the agreement of his colleagues. See generally ALPHEUS T.
MASON, HARLAN FisKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW (1956) (describing the life and career
of Harlan Fiske Stone).
389. Ex Parte Quinn holds that: "Constitutional safeguards for the protection of all
who are charged with offense are not to be disregarded." 317 U.S. at 25.
390. The Military Order provided as follows:
MILITARY ORDER
GOVERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS FOR THE
TRIAL OF CERTAIN OFFENDERS AGAINST THE LAW OF WAR AND GOVERNING
THE PROCEDURE FOR SUCH COMMISSIONS
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President and as Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy, under the Constitution and statutes of the United
States, and more particularly the Thirty-Eighth Article of War (10 U.S.C.
1509), it is ordered as follows:
1. All persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with
the United States or who give obedience to or act under the direction of any
such nation, and who during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United
States or any territory or possession thereof, through coastal or boundary de-
fenses, and are charged with committing or attempting or preparing to com-
mit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law of war,
shall be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals.
The commanding generals of the several service and defense commands in
the continental United States and Alaska, under the supervision of the Secre-
tary of War, are hereby empowered to appoint military commissions for the
trial of such persons.
2. Each military commission so established for the trial of such persons shall
have power to make and shall make as occasion requires, such rules for the
conduct of its proceedings, consistent with the powers of military commissions
under the Articles of War, as it shall deem necessary for a full and fair trial of
the matters before it: Provided, that:
Such evidence shall be admitted as would in the opinion of the president
of the commission, have probative value to a reasonable man;
The concurrence of at least two-thirds of the members of the commission
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grounds of the orders of July 1942 and January 1945 as to court-
martial proceedings and post-trial review. Habeas corpus review
of a prison sentence was belatedly sought from a 1945 military
commission in Colepaugh v. United States, 391 but the result was the
same as in Ex Parte Quirin.
The first six months of the Second World War were the
darkest hours of persistent defeats, 92 public fears 93 and dangers
present at the time the vote is taken shall be necessary for a conviction or
sentence;
The provisions of Article 70 of the Articles of War, relating to investiga-
tion and preliminary hearings, shall not be deemed to apply to the proceed-
ings;
The record of the trial, including any judgment or sentence, shall be
promptly reviewed under the procedures established in Article 50 1/2 of the
Articles of War.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
THE WHITE HOUSE
January 11, 1945.
391. 235 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1014 (1957).
In November 1944, William C. Colepaugh, a U.S. citizen who had been trained as a
saboteur in Nazi Germany, landed on the coast of Maine from a German submarine
with an associate; both were in civilian clothes but armed and possessed false identifica-
tion. Colepaugh was apprehended and charged with violation of the law of war on
January 11, 1945 for trial before a military commission. He was convicted and sen-
tenced to prison. Eleven years later he sought habeas corpus to challenge his convic-
tion and imprisonment alleging that he should have been tried by jury for treason in a
civil court. Id.
The denial of habeas corpus by the District Court was affirmed because the offense
of unlawful belligerency under the law of war had been clearly stated and referred to a
military commission, thus the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are inapplicable under Ex
Parte Quirin. Id.
392. Fears of air raids, actual Nazi submarine devastation of Atlantic shipping, and
an actual attack on the California coast by a Japanese submarine on February 23, 1942
created newspaper hysteria. Apprehension of food shortages, leading to rationing;
price and rent controls; rationing of gasoline and rubber put the nation into a war
mode that lasted until VE Day (May 8, 1945) and VJ Day (August 15, 1945). See generally
RICHARD LINGEMAN, DON'T You KNow THERE'S A WAR ON?: THE AMERICAN HOME
FRONT 1941-1945 (1970) (commenting on U.S. social conditions during World War II).
393. The nation was at war with Germany, Italy and Japan, but the loyalty of the
millions of U.S. citizens with German and Italian ancestry was not seriously questioned
while anti-Japanese racism on the West Coast led to the exclusion of U.S. citizens of
Japanese ancestry from coastal areas of California, Oregon, and Washington, resulting
in the internment of about 110,000 Japanese-Americans of which 70,000 were U.S. citi-
zens in "relocation" or concentration camps. All enemy aliens were supposedly
rounded up or accounted for, but this applied only to Japanese and some German
residents. The Japanese internment program was approved by the Supreme Court. See
generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Korematsu contained fierce
dissents by Justices Jackson, Murphy, and Roberts. Id. The conviction has since been
vacated. See generally Korematsu v. United States, 584 F.Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(outlining the recent history of the Korematsu decision).
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of invasion.394 The entire American nation knew of the war and
suffered its deprivations. By 1945, the end of the war was in
sight, and a review of the facts and laws of military commissions
became a necessity, along with the requirement that the Articles
of War (predecessor of the Uniform Code of Military Justice)
procedures be followed.
Comparing the total war exception of Ex Parte Quiin39 5 to
the November 16, 2001 Presidential Order for Military Commis-
sion trials396 is futile. Both had resulted indirectly from vicious
and deadly surprise attacks, but the resemblance ceases there.
Disruption of the civilian community has been minimal. Control
of industry for war-related production is non-existent. Wages
and prices are not controlled. Taxes have not increased but
have decreased. Shortages and rationing are non-existent, and
most important there is no military draft. Unhappily, mistrust of
government39 7 cannot be discounted as we consider the Su-
preme Court's 2006 review of proposed military commissions.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 8 is the leading case at the present
time on proposed military commissions at Guantanamo. The
holding in the majority opinion by Justice Stevens, speaking for
four other justices, (Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer) is
clear: ". . . we conclude that the military commission convened
to try Hamdan lacks power to proceed because its structure and
394. The surprise attack of December 7, 1941 on Pearl Harbor, without a declara-
tion of war, caused the destruction of 21 Navy ships, including 8 battleships, loss of 188
planes, the deaths of 2,335 military and 68 civilians. See GORDON W. PRANGE, AT DAWN
WE SLEPT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF PEARL HARBOR 512-27, 539-40, 573-81 (1982). Japa-
nese forces simultaneously attacked U.S. forces in the Philippines, Guam, and Wake
Island, and on British forces in Malaya and Hong Kong. By the beginning of 1942
Guam and Wake were lost and the Japanese invasion of the Philippines had encircled
U.S. forces on the Bataan peninsula, where they surrendered on May 6. British Singa-
pore surrendered on February 15 and the Dutch Army surrendered Java on March 9.
See Eric C. Miller, 12/7 & 9/11: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of History, 104 E. VA. L.
REv. 571, 578 (2002).
In Europe, Britain was reeling under Nazi air attacks, France, Belgium, Nether-
lands, Norway, and Denmark had surrendered and the German army was victorious in
Egypt and the Germans had advanced deep into Russia where the Soviet government
had abandoned Moscow and Leningrad was encircled.
395. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
396. Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
397. Government dissimulation or "spin" has been a feature of political life at least
since the Second World War, resulting in the widespread belief that governments are
systematically unable to tell the truth.
398. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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procedures violate both the UCMJ and the Geneva Conven-
tions." Dissents were written by three justices (Scalia, Thomas
and Alito); 99 and Chief Justice Roberts did not participate.
There is also a plurality opinion (Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer and
Stevens) dismissing the charges of conspiracy.4 °0
Because the first prong of the majority opinion is the ab-
sence of presidential power to override existing statutory provi-
sions of the UCMJ, the question for the future is whether Con-
gress has provided an acceptable new form of military commis-
sion in the Military Commissions Act of 2006401 that will
withstand constitutional scrutiny of its continued departures
from the existing UCMJ as an expression of due process. The
second prong of the majority opinion is the deviation from the
treaty-based standards for military trials of combatants; the ques-
tion for the future is whether the President or Congress violated
international law and whether they intended to do S402
The facts of the case are assumed: Salim Ahmed Hamdan,
of uncertain age, from Yemen, apparently worked as a driver and
bodyguard for Osama Bin Laden, leader of the Al-Qaeda terror-
ist organization, in Afghanistan. He may have performed other
tasks assisting Bin Laden. Hamdan was captured by the North-
ern Alliance militia, opponents of the Taliban and their Al-
Qaeda allies, in November 2001 in the early stages of the United
Nations Afghan War 40 in which United States forces had been
399. Id. at 2810-55.
400. Id. at 2775.
401. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
402. See generally Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859
F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
64 (1804); Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statu-
tory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1103 (1990).
403. Following Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (February 1989) an intense
civil war raged until one of the most radical of Islamic factions, the Taliban, captured
Kabul in 1996; their control lasted until November 2001. See Symposium, Women &
War: A Critical Discourse, 20 BERKELEYJ. OF GENDER L. &JusT. 352, 366 (describing the
phases of war in Afganistan).
After the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, the U.N. Se-
curity Council condemned the attacks as a threat to international peace and security
and "called on" all States to "suppress terrorist acts" and recognized self-defensive ac-
tion. See S.C. Res 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
On the refusal of the Taliban to shut down AI-Qaeda facilities and hand over
Osama Bin Laden, the U.N. Security Council called upon all States to prevent and sup-
press terrorist attacks. See S.C. Res 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). Air
attacks by U.S. and U.K. forces began October 7, 2001 as self-defensive uses of force.
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engaged for several weeks. Within a few months Hamdan was
"sold" by his captors to the United States as an AI-Qaeda terror-
ist. In June 2002 Hamdan was transported to Guantanamo for
detention awaiting some disposition, unknown to him. Two
years after his Guantanamo detention began, criminal charges
were filed against him.4" 4
At this point it is necessary to review the procedures at
Guantanamo: the first is the Combatant Status Review Tribu-
nal,4 °5 an administrative procedure to determine the continua-
tion of detention; the second is the Military Commission, a
quasi-judicial determination of criminal charges and assessment
of penalties therefor.406
While there are substantial questions concerning the con-
duct and review of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (here-
after C.S.R.T.), the focus of this case is disposition of the crimi-
nal charges by military commission.
After the first year of detention, Hamdan was declared to be
"triable" by military commission for crimes not specified °v and
military defense counsel was provided who demanded a speedy
U.S. and British ground forces followed, assisting the Northern Alliance, enemies of
Taliban, by the end of October 2001 (when the accused Hamdan was captured). The
Taliban fled Kabul on November 13, 2001. See BRUCE R. PIRNIE, RAND CORP., BEYOND
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT: FORGING A NEW AIR-GROUND PARTNERSHIP 48-49 (2005). President
George W. Bush declared an end to the hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan on May 1,
2003. See Tom Shales, Aboard the Lincoln: A White House Spectacular, WASH. POST, May 2,
2003, at C1.
404. 126 S. Ct. at 2759.
405. The Combatant Status Review Tribunal ("CSRT") was established on July 7,
2004 by order of the Secretary of Defense, an administrative body to determine the
continued detention of Taliban captives as unlawful combatants in an environment free
of law and lawyers. The tribunal of military officers operated at Guantanamo to con-
sider whether the detainee, assisted by a representative (not a lawyer), can overcome
the official determination of combatant status. It is a mockery of the battlefield screen-
ing of P.O.W.'s from civilians under the Geneva Convention. Validity of CSRT actions
is conferred on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The CSRT was cre-
ated in response to Rasul v. Bush. See 542 U.S. 466 (2004). See supra notes 337-346.
406. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001). The order reads, in part:
Any individual subject to this order shall, when tried, be tried by military com-
mission for any and all offenses triable by military commission that such indi-
vidual is alleged to have committed and may be punished in accordance with
the penalties provided under applicable law, including life imprisonment or
death.
407. See 126 S. Ct. at 2759.
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trial under the UCMJ. 4 °8 One year later charges were proffered,
alleging Hamdan's conspiracy with Al Qaeda to attack and mur-
der civilians."' Defense counsel sought habeas corpus, 4 °
granted by the District Court,4 1 1 but reversed by the Court of
Appeals41 2 in an opinion by Judge Randolph. Judge John Rob-
erts, about to become Chief Justice of the United States, was a
member of the panel.
The first problem was whether Congress had foreclosed
consideration of this habeas corpus appeal by the 2005 Detainee
Treatment Act that deprived the courts ofjurisdiction,413 but the
court found the statute to be, in effect, prospective so that
habeas corpus issues already in the courts were not affected.4" 4
Justice Scalia, however, found that jurisdiction to hear the case
was lacking.4
15
At the outset the Supreme Court did not confront the ques-
tion whether the President alone may convene military commis-
sions without congressional approval on the grounds of control-
ling military necessity.4 16 But that question did not have to be
reached because Congress had consistently legislated on the sub-
ject of military commissions, citing Ex Parte Quirin's 1942 reli-
ance on Article of War 15 and the provisions of the 1950
408. Id. at 2760.
409. See id. at 2761.
410. Id.
411. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp 2d. 152 (D.D.C. 2004)
412. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
413. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 is contained within the National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. See Pub. L. No. 109-163, §§ 1401-1406, 119
Stat. 3136, 3444-80 (2006). The Act specifies, in part:
Except as provided in § 1405 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, no
court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider:
(1) an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf
of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba or
(2) any other action against the United States or its agents relating
to any aspect of the detention by the Department of Defense of an alien
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who
(A) is currently in military custody; or
(B) has been determined by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in accordance with the procedures
set forth in section 1005 (e)of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2003 to
have been properly detained as an enemy combatant.
414. See 126 S. Ct. at 2762-69.
415. See id. at 2810-23.
416. See id. at 2774.
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UCMJ.
4 1 7
In a crucial footnote, Justice Stevens says, "whether or not
the President has independent power, absent congressional au-
thorization, to convene military commissions, he may not disre-
gard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own
"1418war powers, placed on his powers....
Turning to the fatal defects of the presidential military com-
mission, the Court based the invalidity on the UCMJ:
The UCMJ conditions the President's use of military commis-
sions on compliance not only with the American common law
of war, but also with the rest of the UCMJ itself, insofar as
applicable and with the rules and precepts of the law of na-
tions.... The procedures that the Government has decreed
will govern Hamdan's trial by commission violate these
laws. 4 19
The fatal defect is the admission of prosecution evidence in
the hearing without the knowledge or presence of the accused
and his counsel.4 2 ° Evidentiary defect is the admission into evi-
dence of coerced evidence, hearsay, and unsworn oral or written
testimony. 21
Two provisions of the UCMJ were crucial in Justice Stevens'
opinion: Articles 21 and 36. Both are used to strike at the idea
that there was something about the actions of Congress in the
417. See id. at 2774-75.
418. See 126 S. Ct. at 2774, n.23. Justice Stevens cites Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), which held that President Truman's seizure of the steel
industry during the Korean War was unconstitutional. See id. at 587. The nine justices
produced seven opinions. Justice Black's majority opinion rejected the arguments
based on the president's powers as commander in chief, his foreign relations powers,
the pastoral power to execute the laws faithfully and the NATO Treaty obligation. See id.
at 586-87. The Court was perhaps unduly impressed by Congress's failure to include
such power in the Taft-Hartley Act, vetoed by Truman who refused to apply the 80 days
Cooling-off Injunction. The dissent by ChiefJustice Vinson and two justices (Read and
Minton) argued the wartime seizures of railroads and other industries in the First and
Second World Wars, to no avail. See id. at 693-99 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). The present
difficulty with the case as precedent is the acceptance of a difference between foreign
and domestic uses of presidential power-the assumption that the steel strike was
purely domestic seemed obvious then; today a globalized world finds that distinction
more difficult to justify. Cf Curtiss-Wright Export Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 304
(1936) (upholding congressional delegation to the President in the area of foreign
relations).
419. 126 S. Ct. at 2786.
420. See id.
421. See id. at 2786-87.
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Authorization for Use of Military force ("AUMF")4 22 and the
President's Military Order of November 13, 20014 23that raise
them above all contrary provisions of the Constitution, statutes -
specifically the UCMJ and precedents created in the Civil War
and the Second World War.4 24 UCMJ Article 21 provides,
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon
courts - martial do not deprive military commissions, provost
courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction
with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the
law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost
courts, or other military tribunals.
Justice Stevens notes that this provision is the same as Article of
War 15, reviewed in Ex Parte Quiin, noting:
[T] he Quiin Court recognized that Congress had simply pre-
served what power, under the Constitution and the common
law of war, the President had ... to convene military commis-
sions - with the express condition that the President and
those under his command comply with the law of war.
[T] there is nothing in the text or legislative history of the
AUMF even hinting that Congress intended to expand or al-
ter the authorization set forth in Article 21 of the UCMJ. 425
At issue with respect to military commissions compliance
with the UCMJ, is UCMJ Article 36, at the head of the Trial Pro-
cedures sub-chapter indicating the President's authority to pre-
scribe rules-essentially the authority behind the Executive or-
der for the "Manual for Courts Martial." This statute uses the
word "practicable" in each of its sections. An obvious question is
whether it means the same thing in each provision.
Article 36(a) provides that substantive and evidentiary rules
of United States district courts should be applied in military
commissions, which are not contrary to or inconsistent with the
UCMJ, such rules being prescribed by the President "so far as he
422. Pub. L. No. 10740, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
423. 66 Fed. Reg. 57833, Nov. 13, 2001.
424. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2
(1866).
The broadest reach of the president's wartime commander-in-chief powers may be
reviewed in JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANs: AN INSIDER'S Accour OF THE WAR ON
TERROR (2007). Professor Yoo was Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Depart-
ment of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, 2001-2003.
425. See 126 S. Ct. at 2774-75.
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considers practicable. 426
Art. 36(b) provides that all such rules shall be uniform "inso-
far as practicable" and reported to Congress. 4 27 It is uncertain
whether the result intended was the same as with changes to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are laid before Congress
for 90 days before becoming effective.
While the textual contexts are different: 36(a) rule prepara-
tion; and 36(b) rule enactment, a systematic theory of interpre-
tation would accord the same meaning to both uses of "practica-
ble," but in Justice Steven's analysis, 36 (b) is a limitation on 36
(a) so that different meanings apply..
Justice Stevens assumes that the President had determined
the impracticability of district court rules to which complete def-
erence is owed, but there was no determination that it is imprac-
ticable to apply the rules for courts-martial.
Subsection (b) of Article 36 was added after World War II,
and requires a different showing of impracticability from the
one required by subsection (a). Subsection (a) requires that
the rules the President promulgates for Courts-martial,
provost courts, and military commissions alike conform to
.those that govern procedures in Article III courts, "so far as
he considers practicable"... Subsection (b), by contrast, de-
mands that the rules applied in courts-martial, provost courts
and military commissions ... be "uniform insofar as practica-
ble. 4 2 8
There is no suggestion, for example, of any logistical dif-
ficulty in securing properly sworn and authenticated evidence
or in applying the usual principles of relevance and admissi-
bility.4 2 9
426. UCMJ Art. 36(a). Article 36 provides:
Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, in cases
before courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military commissions and other mili-
tary tribunals may be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall so
far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of
evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United
States district courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with
this chapter.
427. UCMJ art. 36 (b) ("All rules and regulations made under this article shall be
uniform insofar as practicable.").
428. 126 S. Ct. at 2791.
429. Id. at 2792.
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Assuming arguendo that the reasons articulated in the
President's Article 36 (a) determination ought to be consid-
ered in evaluating the impracticability of applying court-mar-
tial rules, the only reason offered in support of that determi-
nation is the danger posed by international terrorism. With-
out for one moment underestimating that danger, it is not
evident to us why it should require... any variance from the
rules that govern courts-martial.43 °
Because the President's rules omit the fundamental right of the
accused to be present at his trial, "the jettisoning of so basic a
right cannot lightly be excused as practicable." '431 Accordingly,
the UCMJ must govern, and the Hamdan commission rules are
illegal.4 3 2
This fundamentalist reasoning must surely affect any future
trial to be held under the Military Commissions Act of 2006,
which deprives an accused of the right to be present by way of a
purported amendment to UCMJ.
Judge Randolph's Court of Appeals decision had refused to
consider international law issues, especially those arising under
the 1929 and 1949 Geneva Conventions, because the alleged
procedural rights are not judicially enforceable; even if enforcea-
ble, this petitioner is not entitled to them; and courts should
abstain from such questions. 3
The Supreme Court, however, bypassed the government's
argument based on the difference between the Taliban, as a
High Contracting Party, and Al-Qaeda (not a High Contracting
Party) in Article 2 whose language is common to the four con-
ventions that make up the 1929 and 1949 international commit-
ments. 434 But common Article 3 is not so narrowly confined to
war between signatory states, but rather applies in the territory
of a High Contracting Party in which a conflict not of interna-
tional character is occurring.435 Common Article 3 mandates
that sentences and executions result from 'judgment pro-
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. See id. at 2793.
433. 415 F.3d at 40-41.
434. See 126 S. Ct. at 2794-95.
435. See id. at 2776.
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nounced by a regularly constituted court. '4 36 The Court views
Common Article 3 as a form of protection for "individuals associ-
ated with neither a signatory nor even a non-signatory "Powers
who are involved in a conflict 'in the territory of' a signatory.
437
The regularly constituted court must, ". . . [afford] all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable" by
civilized peoples.438 In a systematic interpretation... of Com-
mon Article 3, the Supreme Court reached into the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention for language interpreting "regularly consti-
tuted court" to mean ordinary military courts and not special
tribunals.44 ° Thus, the UCMJ, with the right of the accused to be
present, emerges as a prerequisite of international law by way of
common Article 3.441
The Dissenters found authority for the President's military
commissions in the immediate response of Congress to the Al-
Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001 in the statute described as
Authority to Use Military Force ("AUMF") 44 2, already recognized
as authoritative in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld in 2004, and castigates the
court's "audacity" in failing to abstain from a review of the presi-
dent's decision-making.4 4 3
The plurality opinion concluded that the conspiracy charge
against Hamdan and any alleged overt acts do not state a viola-
436. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva,
art. 3, 1(d), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 ("The following acts are
and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever... (d) the passing
of sentences and the carrying out of executions without judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples").
437. 126 S. Ct. at 2796.
438. Id.
439. Four schools of treaty interpretation can be found within The Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra
note 196, art. 31. Article 31 states:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordi-
nary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose."
The systematic interpretation goes beyond the exact textual ambiguity to
seek out the meaning within the "four corners of the instrument.
440. 126 S. Ct. at 2796-97.
441. See id.; see also Theodor Meron, Geneva Conventions as Customary International
Law, 81 A-M. J. INT'L. L. 348 (1987) (discussing obligations under the Geneva Conven-
tions).
442. See 126 S. Ct. at 2820-22.
443. Id. at 2821; see supra note 351 and accompanying text.
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tion of the law of war, and accordingly, cannot be referred to
trial by military commission.444
Winthrop's treatise on military law analyzed historical mili-
tary commissions to conclude that the offense must have been
committed in a theatre of war and during the conflict.445 This
conclusion is incorporated into the common law of war that
Congress has committed to military commissions in the UCMJ4 4 6
The conspiracy charge here was not preferred by a commander
on the battlefield, but by an official far removed from any hostili-
ties, and that alleged an illegal agreement of 1996 long before
the September 11, 2001 attacks and the AUMF statute, accord-
ingly the military necessity for trial by military commission is en-
tirely absent.447
Descending from the heights of abstraction, we come to the
remand to the D.C. Circuit that will mean many more years of
pre-trial detention for Hamdan in the American "Bleak House"
at Guantanamo.
In another Cuban, non-Guantanamo, context, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the provisions of the Immigration statute
to deny the government's request for indefinite detention of
inadmissible aliens for reasons of national security.4 4 8 Although
it concerns a complex problem in statutory construction, there is
an underlying rejection of indefinite detention even for career-
criminal aliens. The occasions for the decision was a circuit split:
the writ of habeas corpus having been granted in the Ninth Circuit
449 and denied in the Eleventh 450 to Cubans eligible for deporta-
tion but refused entry into Cuba.
Both detainees, Martinez (9th Cir.) and Benitez (11th Cir.)
arrived in the United States as part of the Mariel boat lift in June
1980.451 As they were not then convicted criminals or certified
lunatics they were admitted on parole, awaiting INS asylum de-
444. See id. at 2776.
445. See WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 836-37 (2d ed. 1920).
446. See 126 S. Ct. at 2778-81.
447. See id. at 2785-86.
448. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386-87 (2005); cf Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. at 507, 554-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disapproving of indefinite detentions).
449. Suarez-Martinez v. Ashcroft, No. 03-35053, 2003 WL 23892563, at *1 (9th Cir.
Aug. 18, 2003).
450. See Martinez, 543 U.S. at 376-77 (2005); Benitez v. Wallis, 337 F.3d 1289 (11th
Cir. 2003).
451. See 543 U.S. at 371, 374.
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termination. Both soon had criminal convictions in the United
States: Martinez convicted of assault in Rhode Island and bur-
glary in California; Benitez convicted of grand theft in Florida.
Both served prison sentences in United States state prisons and
upon completion of sentences, their INS parole status was re-
voked and they were detained and ordered to be deported.45 2
The Cuban government refused to permit their return to Cuba,
and refused even to negotiate their return. The Immigration
Statute authorized detention during a 90 day period to affect
removal from the United States.455 Interpreting that statute the
Supreme Court authorized further detention,454 ... only for so
long as was reasonably necessary to secure... removal," presuma-
bly six months.455
Years beyond the six month detention period the detainees
petitioned for habeas corpus under the federal statute 456 and the
Supreme Court has now held that it must be granted, although
their parole into American society can be monitored.
Justice Scalia concluded:
The government fears that the security of our borders will be
compromised if it must release into the country inadmissible
aliens who cannot be removed. If that is so, Congress can
attend to it. But for this court to sanction indefinite deten-
tion in the face of Zadvydas would establish within our juris-
prudence, beyond the power of Congress to remedy, the dan-
gerous principle that judges can give the same statutory text
different meanings in different cases.45 7
Because of Hamdan's reliance, in part, on the Geneva Con-
ventions for the unconstitutionality of the proposed military
commission it is appropriate to consider the anti-foreign and
anti-treaty provisions of the 2006 Military Commissions Act.4 58
First, detainees are forbidden to invoke the Geneva convention as
a source of rights before the commission or in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings.45 This prohibition is directed only to the detainee
452. See id. at 374-75.
453. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a) (1) (2006).
454. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).
455. Id. at 689-99.
456. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).
457. 543 U.S. at 386.
458. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2005).
459. Id.; 120 Stat. 2631.
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and not to the courts' sua sponte review of precedents involving
the Geneva Convention. Second, no international or foreign law
is to be used in the interpretation of the War Crimes Act.4 60
Constitutional case law makes it clear that Congress can by
statute change the domestic effect of treaties or customary inter-
national law when it clearly intends to do so.46 1 This is so despite
the hortatory language of The Paquete Havana:46 2 "International
law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction." '4 63
Nevertheless, the Act's interpretation of the substantive law
to be applied in United States courts cannot simultaneously af-
fect the methods by which courts perform their judicial func-
tions in light of the specific constitutional language separating
the legislative and judicial powers:
Article 111(2)
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases in Law and Eq-
uity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States and Treaties made or which shall be made, under their
authority ....
The concept that Congress or the President can tell the
courts how to do their job challenges the principle of separation
of powers inherent in the scheme of constitutional government.
The anti-foreign and anti-international provisions of the 2006
Military Commission Act destroy the concepts of ordered liberty
upon which the United States was built.
460. This provision of the Military Commission Act amends the War Crimes Act.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006).
No foreign or international source of law shall supply a basis for a rule of
decision in the courts of the United States in interpreting the prohibitions
enumerated in subsection (d) of such section.
This echoes a 2003 House bill that reflected the current thinking ofJustice Scalia. The
bill requires that "the Supreme Court should base its decision on the Constitution and
the Laws of the United States, and not on the law of any foreign country or any interna-
tional law." See H.R. 446, 108th Cong. (2003); Antonin Scalia, Foreign Legal Authority in
the Federal Courts, 98 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 308 (1998); see also, A Conversation Between
U.S. Supreme Court Justices, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional
Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 I NT'L J.
CONST., L. 519 (2005); Richard S. Markovits, Learning From the Foreigners: A Response to
Justice Scalia's and Professor Levinson's Moral Parochialism, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J. 367 (2004).
461. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998); see also Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1888); Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan,
859 F.2d 929, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
462. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
463. Id. at 700.
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In Hamdan's future is a hearing before a flawed military
commission without the presumption of innocence, without
knowledge of the evidence used against him and without the
ability to combat coerced and hearsay evidence. Without doubts
about the outcome of such a hearing, appeal lies to the conven-
ing authority and the review board. The vagaries of that process
cannot be predicted, but, despite the efforts of government, it is
not impossible that the Supreme Court will again have to con-
front the fate of Salim Ahmed Hamdan. To prevent that possi-
bility, Hamdan and the other candidates for military commission
treatment should be sent from Guantanamo to Washington for a
military commission hearing under UCMJ standards to deter-
mine his participation, if any, in Al-Qaeda operations, based on
an open record of trial. At this remove from the facts of 2001, it
is hardly possible that there could be anything to damage the
United States government in such a proceeding.
Conclusion
Guantanamo Bay was acquired by the United States as an
imperial outpost in a time of great empires. It is a colonial rem-
nant of a policy abandoned seventy-five years ago when the
United States became the Good Neighbor. Nevertheless, Ameri-
can complicity in the failure of Cuban democracy and the grind-
ing poverty of the people is part of the historical record. Fur-
thermore, toleration of two Cuban dictators (Machado and
Batista) demonstrated American blindness to the problems of a
close neighbor. The United States did not create the Castro dic-
tatorship but American trade and immigration policies have un-
consciously perpetuated his rule.
Guantanamo no longer represents a single American virtue;
there is nothing about its existence as a prison about which an
American can be proud. The only thing Guantanamo now rep-
resents is a perverse effort to hide government actions from the
searchlights of the Constitution and laws. Blame for these secre-
tive policies can be shared on a bi-partisan basis: the Democratic
administration for the callous treatment of Haitian and Cuban
boat people and the Republican administration for the lawless
treatment of prisoners of war from Afghanistan. There is no rea-
son to perpetuate these mistakes.
Closing the Guantanamo prison would not be a victory for
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Fidel Castro, but for the United States Constitution. American
withdrawal from the Naval Base itself is more complicated. Cuba
must not be allowed to replace an American military base with
those of China, Iran or Venezuela. The security of the hemi-
sphere is at stake, thus, American departure must be carefully
negotiated with Cuba, something envisioned in the lease itself.
Fidel Castro has proposed that the abandoned naval base
could become a medical treatment center for the Caribbean; a
good idea, but the aging facility no longer provides the latest
techniques in tropical medicine and disease control. Instead,
the existing structures might furnish the beginnings of a new
United Nations University for research and teaching, devoted to
the peoples of the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico, bringing to-
gether the virtues and talents of Cuba, the United States and the
hemisphere.
